The Performance of Offices of Technology Transfer

Federico Castillo

Doug Parker

David Zilberman

Introduction

Over the last 25 years, we have seen a significant increase in formal technology transfer from universities and research institutes to private sector organizations in exchange for monetary compensation. While the number of university offices of technology transfer have increased significantly, there is little real information about their performance. It is not clear to what extent technology transfer activities can pay for university research nor which fields of research and what types of universities are the main gainers from this arrangement. How are offices of technology transfer structured? What types of arrangements do they have for financial payments? This paper addresses these questions, using the results from four recent studies. The first study involved in-depth interviews with technology transfer officials at ten universities and government research institutes (see Postlewait et al., 1993 for detailed results). A second study surveyed the operation of 46 offices of technology transfer (see Castillo et al., 1999), and we incorporate results from two surveys conducted in 1995 and 1996 by AUTM (Association of University Technology Managers). Here we let the data speak for itself, with a minimum of statistical manipulation.

History of Offices of Technology Transfer

Most major innovations once originated with practitioners. While academics worked out the principles of chemistry, physics, biology, and medicine that provided the foundation from which applied knowledge and new technologies emerged, the actual application was generally left to others. Around the turn of the century, scientific entrepreneurs such as Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell created many of their major inventions in private laboratories, and the patents they obtained became the cornerstones of new industries. Such companies established research laboratories (including Dupont, AT&T, IBM, Ford, and Kodak), and their work laid the foundation for many commercial innovations introduced during the 20th century. The U.S. government also established major research labs to pursue research and development efforts for the military and agriculture. As new technologies evolved, academic researchers increasingly produced major innovations and patents, especially in engineering and medicine. The latest wave of innovations has been in biotechnology and related fields.

Offices of technology transfer (OTTs) were established to facilitate development and utilization of commercially viable innovations discovered by university and government scientists. The first OTT was established at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1932. A few OTTs are thirty or more years old, but most were created in the 1980s after passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, which created a uniform patent policy among all the federal agencies that funded research. Under Bayh-Dole, universities could retain title to materials and products their employees invented under federal funding.

Our analysis shows that the average OTT is fifteen years old. If the four oldest OTTs are eliminated, the average age of AUTM institutions drops to less than ten years old. One measure of the growth in OTT activities is the number of patents issued by universities. Prior to 1981 fewer than 250 patents were issued annually, while an average of 1300 patents were issued each year from 1993 to 1995. Royalty income increased from $123 million in 1991 to $592 million in 1996.

Objectives and Operations of Offices of Technology Transfer

The initial impetus for establishing offices of technology transfer, even before the Bayh-Dole Act, was the perception of many universities that their patents and ideas were not being utilized by the private sector (Postlewait et al., 1993). These universities recognized that private enterprise would not develop university patents unless it could obtain (often exclusive) rights to these patents. Thus, every OTT official we interviewed felt the first objective of the OTT is to transfer technology and to increase commercial application of university-generated knowledge for public use and benefit.

Two more OTT objectives that have become prominent over time are provision of services to university faculty and fundraising for the university. When university faculty wish to commercialize their ideas, OTTs provide a formal, above board, and relatively effective mechanism to accomplish this. The early success of some universities in obtaining royalties led to the sometimes unsubstantiated perception that OTTs could generate major funds for the university. Despite the importance of earnings from technology transfers, most OTT officials we interviewed agreed that financial concerns did not dominate academic considerations. For example, while a short delay in publication may be imposed to assure patent registration, faculty members are allowed and even encouraged to publish results and to compete in the academic research race, despite patent considerations (Postlewait et al., 1993).

Corporate reception of many university innovations is not always enthusiastic; many corporate officials have been quite cool toward ideas not developed in their own shops. This helped prompt OTTs to form alliances between university researchers and venture capitalists to establish start-up companies. Many such start-ups become successful and are then taken over by established corporations. Some examples of companies spawned by OTTs include Sun Microsystems, Cisco, Genentec, Chiron, and Amgen. The number of start-up companies associated with university innovations has increased over time. For example, 464 of the 1633 start-ups founded between 1980 and 1995 were founded in 1994 and 1995 (AUTM, 1996). OTT officials scout and assess potential innovations at their universities, look for possible buyers of university patent rights, establish contacts between university personnel and possible investors, and monitor and enforce contracts.

OTT Activities and Personnel

In order to explore patterns of time allocation among technology transfer-related activities, the survey by Castillo et al. (1999) asked OTT personnel to estimate the time they spent on these activities. This information is presented in Table 1, broken out by public and private universities. Licensing activities take the most time at both types of institutions. Such activities include identifying and contacting potential clients, negotiating licensing contracts, and working out protocols for the transfer of knowledge. Note that evaluating inventions and assessing markets overlap. While about the same amount of time is spent in total on these two activities, private universities seem to put more emphasis on market-related activities. Private universities spend relatively more time on market assessment, referring inventors to sources of financing, and enforcing and monitoring contracts. Private universities may give more weight to the earnings obtained by technology transfers. Spending more time on monitoring contracts increases contact time with clients, and builds and enhances the social networking that may lead to future transfers.

Table 1: Percent time public and private university

OTT officers spend on various activities

Activity

Public

(%)

Private

(%)

Soliciting ideas

8.7

7.0

Evaluating Inventions

15.2

10.0

Assessing Markets

8.1

11.8

Referring inventors

3.6

4.4

Preparing patents

5.5

5.0

Drafting licenses

26.8

29.4

Enforcing patents

2.9

4.3

Monitoring Contracts

9.1

17.8

Other

18.7

9.1

OTT personnel have heterogeneous backgrounds, but contract officers tend to have training in the sciences and engineering, and some have business and/or law degrees. Some OTTs have lawyers on staff, but others may rely on outside legal assistance to draft and enforce contracts. Some OTT officials suggest that relying on outside legal assistance for such tasks, and thus limiting the involvement of lawyers in negotiations, allows more flexibility in contracting (Postelwait et al., 1993).

OTT Measures of Success

The outcomes of OTT activities have several dimensions. They include patents and licenses, establishment of start-up companies, and earnings in the form of signing fees, royalties, penalties, and equity in start-up companies. OTT activities may also result in contracts, grants, and donations to the university. We mentioned earlier that the number of start-up companies spawned by OTTs has increased significantly in recent years. This in itself is an indicator of the aggregate success of OTTs. Another measure of success is income from royalties. Figure 1.A shows the distribution of earnings for a sample of 30 universities and research institutions in 1992, and Figure 1.B shows this distribution for 1995. In 1992 six of the institutions are "big hitters", with earnings of about $10 million, while in 1995 seven universities exceeded earnings of $10 million. But the 1995 earnings for many of the institutions, including leaders such as the Columbia University more than doubled. This may reflect earnings from new patents as university portfolios increase, more intensive utilization of products resulting from existing patents, and more aggressive commercialization. In 1992 12 institutions showed earnings between $1 and $6 million, while earnings of the rest were below $1 million. In 1995 all 30 leading universities have earnings exceeding $1 million.

There were two turnovers in the top 10 universities from 1992 to 1995, and 8 turnovers in the top 30. The skewed distribution of OTT earnings in Figures 1.A and 1.B (attached as separate documents) reflects the skewed distribution of earnings for some patents and licenses. A few patents, including the Cohen-Boyer (for genetic recombination), the Hepatitis B vaccine, and the Gatorade sports drink, generate tens of millions of dollars during their lifetime. Most patents, however, generate incomes from zero to tens of thousands of dollars.

Several variables determine the success of OTTs. The first is age. It takes time to establish a portfolio of patents and to sell licenses. Typically, there is a three to seven year lag from the time a licensing agreement is signed until it begins to generate income. Technology diffusion causes license earnings to grow gradually, so younger OTTs tend to lag significantly in their earnings relative to older OTTs. Figure 2 depicts the hypothetical relationship of earnings as a function of age for a typical OTT. Models of innovation suggest that the curve will be S-shaped, with an early build-up period, subsequent take-off, and then a period of saturation (Sunding and Zilberman, forthcoming). Table 2 compares the 1992 and 1995 performance of the ten top-ranked universities in the categories of licenses, royalties, and research expenditures.

Figure 2. OTT earnings as a function of age

Table 2: Comparison of the performance of top ten

universities for selected categories for 1992 and 1995

 

Top 10

(1992)

Top 10

(1995)

Licenses

53.2

47.6

Royalties

71.4

69.7

Research Expenditures

37.6

37.6

Note that the top ten universities had identical research expenditures in 1992 and 1995, but their share of licenses and royalties declined in 1995. The older OTTs are highly ranked, and the reduction in their share of total earnings in licenses and royalties reflects a growth in the relative earnings of the younger OTTs as they mature. Since royalties lag behind license build-up, the 5.6% reduction in the share of licenses (Table 2) is greater than the 1.7% reduction in royalties.

Another factor which determines the success of an OTT is the academic standing of the university, especially in biology, medicine, and engineering. Highly-ranked research institutions such as the University of California, Stanford, Columbia, and MIT are leading income-earners among U.S. universities. The distribution of earnings in Figure 1 does not show equity payments. In the case of MIT, equity payments play a major role; its cash earnings underestimate its true ranking. Table 3 presents the results of the Castillo et al. (1999) survey regarding equity preferences among OTTs.

Table 3: Equity preferences reported by OTT officials.

Question

Number of respondents

% of sample responding yes

"My institution prefers cash payments but will consider equity"

18

58

"My institution prefers equity"

0

0

"My institution believes equity and cash are of equal value"

9

29

"My institution will not or is not allowed to consider equity"

4

12

NA

1

 

Total

32

99

While the numbers in Table 3 indicate that many OTTs can use equity, data from other sources indicates that fewer than 0.5% of the licenses issued in 1995 actually did so (AUTM, 1996).

Table 4 compares distribution of average income and average number of patents for the universities we sampled. Medical fields led income generation (37%) and patents (34%), while agriculture generated about 19% of the income and about 15% of the patents. Engineering and physics accounted for about 16% of the income, but 29% of the patents. Computer licenses generated a large share of the "Other" category.

Table 4: Average income and number of patents for study sample.

 

Category

Average Income* (%)

Average Number of Patents (%)

Agricultural (non-biotech)

7.5

6

(N=24)

Agricultural (biotech)

10.4

6.8

(N=23)

Engineering/Physics

16.5

29.1

(N=25)

Medical (diagnostics)

11.0

7.6

(N=25)

Medical (pharmaceuticals)

15.6

13.7

(N=25)

Medical (devices)

8.1

10.1

(N=24)

Chemicals (Agriculture)

1.2

2.0

(N=25)

Chemicals (Industrial)

8.2

12.8

(N=25)

Medical (Res. Agents)

3.1

3.5

(N=25)

Other**

17.5

8.9

(N=25)

Total***

99.2

100.3

* Number of respondents (N) =19 for all categories.

** Includes computer software and hardware and communication devices.

*** Totals do not add up to 100 due to rounding errors.

 

There are several differences in earnings between public and private universities. For example, private universities use equity much more intensively. As Table 5 demonstrates, there is a significant difference between the distribution of average income and number of patents by category between private and public universities. Note that public university income spreads out over a larger range of fields. The earnings and patents of private universities are more concentrated in medical and industrial chemical research, and they gain very little income from agriculture. Many public universities are land grant institutions with strong agricultural schools, and this is reflected in their patents and earnings. Public universities also have a stronger emphasis on engineering.

Table 5: Average income and number of patents by category for public and private universities.

 

Average Number of Patents (%)

Average Income ($)

Category

Public

Private

Public

Private

Ag. (non-biotech)

7.9

0.3

11.8

0.1

Ag. (biotech)

8.5

2.0

16.0

0.9

Engineering

30.9

24.6

18.2

13.6

Med. (Diag.)

6.1

11.4

10.8

11.4

Med. (Pharm.)

12.1

17.9

6.4

31.4

Med. (Devices)

9.2

12.5

10.7

3.6

Chemical (Ag)

2.8

0

1.9

0

Chemical (Ind.)

10.4

18.9

3.8

15.9

Med. (Res. Agents)

3.9

2.4

3.9

1.7

Other

Computer software

7.9

11.4

15.2

21.4

The OTT officials interviewed by Castillo et al. (1999) suggest three additional factors that affect earnings. These are amount of research dollars spent ("gotta play to win"), involvement of the innovators, and sheer luck. A successful transfer requires knowledge on both the sending and receiving ends. Innovator involvement is essential to communicate the ins and outs of invention technology to the new licensees who will produce and market the product. Some universities, such as the University of Florida, are highly ranked because of big hits (Gatorade). We found two important factors that affect the performance of OTTs are the university’s fields of specialization and whether the university is public or private.

What Determines Earnings in Different Fields?

Table 6 summarizes survey response assessment of key variables that determine earnings in different fields.

Table 6: Typical values associated with elements included in licensing contracts for selected types of products.*

Type of product

Average % of sales

Average Value of Up-front Fixed Fee ($)

Average Value of Stock Options ($)

Average Value of Minimum Annual Royalty Payment ($)

Agricultural

3.9

(11)

20,105

(10)

NA

(0)

6,928

(7)

Engineering

6.3

(18)

32,236

(19)

NA

(0)

16,397

(12)

Medical (Therapeutics)

6.3

(17)

98,437

(16)

250,000

(3)

83,010

(12)

Medical (Diagnostics)

6.6

(17)

36,906

(16)

225,000

(3)

46,227

(11)

Medical (Devices)

6.6

(15)

37,115

(13)

550,000

(1)

38,775

(10)

Medical (Research Agents)

9.4

(16)

12,942

(13)

NA

(0)

4,444

(9)

Other

7.63

(6)

78583

(6)

NA

(0)

42,687

(4)

*Numbers in parenthesis indicate the number of institutions responding to the survey. Total sample = 32

 

Our detailed interviews suggested that OTT negotiators believe that profit from sales of product should be divided among four activities (research, development, marketing, and production). If profits are, say, 20% of the sale, the contribution of the four activities is assumed equal, and the university is entitled to the research contribution, then the OTT royalty should be 5% of sales. This logic suggests that university royalties will be higher in sectors with higher profit rates, in situations where the university has provided a more advanced product (thus contributing to development), or where the relative contribution of research to profit is higher. Table 6 shows that the royalty percentages in agriculture are lower than in other fields, probably due to the lower profit margin. The high royalty rates for medical research agents reflect the relatively high contribution of the university to the value of the marketed product. The average value of the minimum annual royalty payment for licensing diagnostic and therapeutic innovations is much higher than the other categories, especially agriculture and medical research agents. In the case of medical products, the value of the patents is very high and many were transferred to start-ups. Therefore, these are the areas where stock options are used. Notice (from Table 6) that their average value is already quite high. If the companies are successful, these values are likely to rise in the future. No wonder OTTs have lobbied intensively for increased use of stock options as payment for licenses. In retrospect, UCSF would have gained significantly had it had shares in Genenetec, while Stanford’s portfolio would have benefited greatly has it taken stock options in Sun Microsystems.

Technology Transfer Earnings in Perspective

There are different formulas to share OTT income from licenses. One popular formula is equal sharing (33%) among the university, the department, and the inventor. An alternative is 50-50 sharing between the inventor and the university. A department may share royalties to take into account the team research effort that led to the patent. This way the unit that contributed to the success, and not the principal researchers, benefits from the proceeds. While $500 million in annual revenue seems a large sum in absolute terms, it comprises a very small share of the $10 billion dollars annually spent on research in the United States. Of the top 30 universities in terms of technology transfer earnings, the top 10 generated 2.4% of their research budgets. Midrange institutions generated 1.4% of their research budgets, while the bottom 10% generated .71%. Much of this money does not returns to research program, but covers administrative costs. It is clear that technology transfer revenues cannot pay for university research.

Royalties, however, are only a small part of the benefits to society from university innovations and OTTs. These innovations generate much more income. If a university receives only 3% to 5% of the sales, 95% to 97% must move elsewhere. University innovations lead to spin-off products, and these innovations are imitated by copycats. The numbers presented here tell only a small part of the story. Research that leads to innovations may also educate graduate students and enhance researchers’ knowledge beyond the scope of a particular discovery. Many transfers from academia to industry go beyond the transfer of intellectual property. University professors and ex-graduate students may start new companies without formal technology transfer. Furthermore, the process of technology transfer is not limited to universities, the Silicone Valley, or the United States (The Economist, Feb. 20-26, 1999). Sony, for example, was founded by a University professor, Asada, and his student, Akio Morita. They obtained rights to the transistor, an invention patented by Bell Laboratories.

Assessment and Implications

Over the last fifty years, research at universities and public research institutes has help spark major waves of technological change in the United States. University researchers introduced the first computers, developed e-mail and the World Wide Web, and generated the fundamental processes that spawned biotechnology. Government policies and institutional innovations enabled universities and research institutes to develop breakthrough technologies that changed the economy. A string of legislation provided massive public support for research on defense problems, health, space, and agriculture and the environment. Federal funds for more targeted research problems, and particularly for financing higher education, supplied the foundation of support that enabled universities to flourish. U.S. patent laws, especially the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, provided a framework that enabled universities to retain the title to their new technologies and innovations. Offices of technology transfer capitalized on the new legal possibilities for transferring knowledge and played a crucial role in developing a network of links between university researchers and potential users in the private sector. Venture capitalists helped university researchers finance the development of new, sometimes radical ideas and developed start-up companies that embodied many of the most radical and creative innovations.

Major corporations have very effective research organizations, but the patterns of development in biotechnology and information suggest complementarity between corporate and university research. University research may introduce breakthrough ideas tand new technology paradigms. Often these innovations are developed by start-ups and then absorbed within large corporations. For example, Genentec was purchased by Hoffmann-LaRoche, while Monsanto took over Calgene and Agrocetus, etc. The major corporations have a much stronger apparatus for product testing, as well as marketing and production. They rely on start-ups to complement their own research labs.

The complementarity between university and private sector researchers reflects the incentives they face. University professors and Ph.D. students are driven by the desire for knowledge, and they are compensated primarily by having their original contributions recognized (publication and promotion). While these may be important objectives for researchers in the private sector, they function as part of a team that commercializes ideas. Corporate research is targeted to overcome regulatory hurdles, reduce costs, and increase product appeal and efficiency.

The increase in the volume of private sector support for research does not imply that the government should reduce its involvement and support of research. Increased private investment reflects a more science-intensive production technology, which frequently relies on foundations laid by publicly-supported university research.

University innovations, OTTs, and start-ups also play an important role in increasing competitiveness. The first computers were developed in universities, but were commercialized by giant companies such as IBM. Some of the breakthroughs that made computers cheaper and more user-friendly again resulted from university innovations and start-ups. For example, Netscape evolved from a research effort that started at the University of Illinois. Most of the biotechnology-based medical treatments are also the result of university research. These innovations, once transferred to the private sector, accelerate the rate of product change and force established companies to act and adjust. In industries such as pharmaceuticals, agricultural chemicals, etc., there are some larger players who, if left to their own devices, might choose to slow the rate of innovation and product development to take some advantage of their market power. Start-up companies introduce new products and innovations that force large corporations to respond by reducing prices, improving their own product mix, or by taking over and marketing the start-up’s innovative products.

Conclusions and Further Research

The Bayh-Dole Act intensified technology transfers from universities to the private sector and led to proliferation of OTTs. These organizations developed procedures to identify potentially commercial ideas, handle patenting, sell licenses, initiate start-up companies, and monitor and enforce contract compliance. Universities with older OTTs, better academic standing, and larger research budgets are the most successful in technology transfer. Across universities, a small number of products generate much of the earnings. The main areas of earnings are in medical, engineering, agricultural, chemistry, and information. Private university OTTs are more likely to accept stock options and emphasize marketing and contacts with customers. While the earnings of OTTs represent a minute fraction of a university’s research budget, their success is an indicator of the value of publicly-funded university research. This research complements private sector research and is a source of breakthrough innovations, enhanced competitiveness, and technological change.

OTTs are relatively new organizations, and this study provides a general overview and indicators of their performance. The process of technology transfer and the relation between university and private sector research should be further investigated using much richer data (including data on individual innovations) to test more specific hypotheses regarding the relationship between institutional design, government policies, and the processes of innovation and technology transfer.

References

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(AUTM), The Association of University Technology Managers, "AUTM Licensing Survey, Fiscal Year 1995". Norwalk, CT. 1996.

Castillo, Federico, Zilberman, David, and Parker, Douglas. "The Role of Offices of Technology Transfer Offices in the Technology Transfer Process: Initial Findings." Unpublished Mannuscript. Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics. University of California, Berkeley. 1999.

The Economist. "A Survey of Innovation in Industry." The Economist, Feb. 20-26, 1999, special suppl., pp. 1-28.

Morita, Akio. Made in Japan. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books Ltd. (1988).

Parker, Douglas and Zilberman, David. "University Technology Tranfers: Impacts on Local and U.S. Economies." Contemporary Policy Issues Vol. 11. April (1993): pp. 87-99.

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