


Edited and
Introduced by
Sheldon Rothblatt



*The
OECD,
the
Master
Plan
and the
California
Dream*

A
Berkeley Conversation

Steve Mizer

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the California Dream:
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Center for Studies in Higher Education
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1992

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Introduction

Sheldon Rothblatt

For many years it has been the policy of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the industrial-nation consortium whose headquarters, near to and incorporating the former Monagesque Embassy in Paris, to assist member nations by commissioning reports on major social or economic problems affecting national performance.¹ These are very often reviews of governmental "policy," and they include science and technology, the environment, the economy, manpower and social affairs. Education is another favored category. To date at least twenty-two countries have been reviewed, several twice.

The two broad aims of such reviews are first, to provide member nations with outside, disinterested assessments of policy from the perspective of sympathetic yet independent-minded Examiners. The second is to allow other member nations the opportunity to benefit from such reviews, even if the situations are not precisely analogous or the recommendations exactly applicable. The Examiners are chosen for their international distinction in the relevant area of analysis and serve entirely as individuals, not as representatives of their countries or institutions of affiliation.

Towards the end of the 1980s the Organisation departed from its practice of assessing "nations" by commissioning a review of higher education in the State of California. The Examiners' report was presented to the OECD in Paris in May 1989. It has now been published in English under the title *Higher Education in California*, hereafter to be called *Review*. The published version contains the Examiners' report, the replies to the

¹The original (1960-61) member countries of the OECD are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. Countries becoming members at later dates are Japan (1964), Finland (1969), Australia (1971) and New Zealand (1973).

Examiners' questions by the California delegation to Paris and a descriptive background report from the California Postsecondary Education Commission containing an extremely valuable summary of information on California by Clive Condren of the Office of the President of the University of California.² Excerpts from the *Review* appear in Chapter 2. The contributions to this volume have been designed to "gloss" and complement the *Review*.

California has long attracted foreign attention. In his magnificent work on comparative law and institutions, the distinguished lawyer and historian, Lord Bryce, observed more than a century ago that California "grew up . . . like a gourd in the night," and "has more than any other [American state] the character of a great country, capable of standing alone in the world." He also noted, with chilling detachment, that the "wildness" of the gold rush era had "passed into the soul of the people, and . . . left them more tolerant of violent deeds, more prone to interferences with, or supersessions of, regular law, than are the people of most parts of the Union."³

The Examiners were more or less instructed to concentrate their inquiry on postsecondary education, although downward glances were inevitable. In the reasoning of the staff at number 2, rue André-Pascal in Paris, the State of California, while only one of fifty states plus territories in the United States, was similar in scale to most of the OECD affiliates, making comparison possible. With a population of some thirty million, a geographical area approximately the size of the British Isles, and an economy whose strength as measured in gross product placed it sixth among world economies, California as the most populous of American states was virtually a nation unto itself and deemed worthy of a separate review. In any case, it would have been quite out of the question for a federal union where educational policy is decentralized to be assessed as if it were a smaller nation.⁴

But California's scale, size and wealth were obviously not the only reason why this Pacific state was singled out for attention. California's higher education "system" was another. Among American states, California had long enjoyed—perhaps since World War II—a reputation as America's most innovative state in a variety of ways, higher education amongst them. With its silicon valleys, service sectors and diversified economy mixing agriculture

²*Higher Education in California* (Paris, 1990), and in French as *L'Enseignement supérieur en Californie*, in the series *Reviews of National Policies for Education* (*Examens de politiques nationales d'éducation*).

³James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth*, II (New York, 1923), 426. First published in 1888.

⁴However, the attention of readers is directed to an earlier OECD report of a 1961-62 study entitled *Higher Education and the Demand for Scientific Manpower in the United States* (1963).

and industry, California had emerged as the first and perhaps most advanced example of a "postindustrial society." California lay on the caravan route of many delegations from abroad eager to study or to learn about a provision for higher education considered exemplary for public sector education. Indeed many visitors, probably to the irritation of other Americans, viewed California as the quintessential American system, and in their zeal to learn the Golden State's secrets, doubtless overlooked the special features and qualities of other states. In fact historically, the University of California, one of the three "segments" (or "sectors") of public higher education in the state, had itself once looked to the University of Michigan for leadership and inspiration. But delegations are generally more interested in the present and the future than in the past.

Delegations came with Baedeker in hand, in this case, a document from the 1960s called the "Master Plan."⁵ It was both Baedeker and Bible. To tax the reader's patience with yet a third metaphor, the Master Plan was also a written constitution, and the beauty of a written constitution lies in its accessibility and apparent clarity. Consequently, for our visitors, as indeed for the politicians and public policy analysts of the state, the Master Plan has generally possessed a beguiling simplicity.

As a Plan, or a planning document, the Master Plan appeals to the proponents of two opposed theories of public sector decision-making. The first are those who favor control of the structure and policies of higher education by bureaucratic intervention from the center, or at least central guidance of a significant kind. The second are those who prefer a situation where the role of government is limited to very general policies, perhaps only exhortations, and essential policy decisions are decentralized, or in current policy language, privatized. In both theories, government funding in whole or part is assumed.

The Master Plan could appeal to different kinds of policy planners because it contains both statist and market features. It is statist because the Plan demarcates three separate spheres of higher education and partitions educational responsibilities between them. State financing formulas are then related to missions and functions. The Plan's trinary system superficially resembles the British and Australian binary systems now in the process of complete dissolution.

The Plan is a market-related policy because it does not prevent the three segments from competing in a national market for students, faculty or additional financial support, and on many significant aspects of higher education policy it is silent or extremely permissive.

Possibly less apparent to visitors were the remarkably "American" assumptions and values deeply embedded in the Plan and in the minds of its

⁵A *Master Plan for Higher Education in California, 1960-1975* (Sacramento, 1960).

creators. President Clark Kerr has provided us with an extraordinary account of these in Chapter 3, and they are all the more impressive because of his obvious unflagging commitment to them.

Somewhere in the 1980s the proponents of the second or privatization policy began to outnumber and replace the first. As we move into the 1990s, most of the bookings are still for international delegations that favor or believe they ought to favor policies denominated "the market." Current catchwords have many meanings, but in broad terms "market" means a higher education policy that is cost efficient, flexible and contains a high degree of local or independent initiative. It also means a policy that includes the search for alternative or plural institutional support and financing hitherto in many countries the responsibility of government. In this respect, privatization introduces at least one element of uncertainty into a nation's funding provision for higher education.

The Master Plan is a compromise among competing interests. It also contains what anthropologists and legal scholars call evasions, myths and fictions. Indeed, by necessity, all cultures, like legal systems, contain them. They exist because they define a standard, or a solution to insupportable contradictions and dilemmas. The seventeenth-century noble myth of primitive individual freedom, which underlies America's legal and constitutional provision for natural rights, is possibly the most famous. Another, more relevant to our topic, is the historic belief in the consonance of individualism and universal opportunity. In this volume, and in the *Review* itself, Professor A. H. Halsey repeatedly challenges Americans to prove that this belief is not an historical myth.

A typical "evasion" by Americans is to avoid advocating principles that make open, invidious distinctions. "Excellence" is such a principle. Wherever it implies academic superiority in faculty appointments, teaching, research and students, the tendency is for Americans to argue that "excellence" also occurs in nonacademic arenas. In Chapter 3 of this volume, President Emeritus Clark Kerr refers to John Gardner's use of the word in this sense, and it is interesting to note that the Master Plan prefers to dwell on missions and functions rather than on meritocratic or status criteria.

Private colleges and universities in the United States have a freer hand in defining academic excellence, although they too must be certain to respect the "social contract" with their publics. Excellence in an American context consequently lacks the elite emphasis existing elsewhere, for example, in the French network of *grandes écoles*. The California Master Plan thereby also differs from British-style binary systems which, in their heyday, made no effort to conceal the differences between a high prestige, high quality "university" sphere and a less privileged, lower-standard polytechnic sphere.

One caveat needs mentioning. Excellence, if it is not a manifest has always been a latent principle, as President Kerr mentions while discussing

the circumlocutions implicit in the "bargaining" that led up to the formulation of the Master Plan.

Under the Master Plan, the University of California was given responsibility for post-M.A. graduate and professional study as well as research. A second segment, the state colleges and universities, were allotted a certain amount of carefully delineated research, but were primarily teaching institutions. They were also the principal sources of teacher training in California and indeed, within the United States generally, training some 11 percent of credentialed teachers nationally. The third segment of community colleges, which has undergone extraordinary growth since the 1950s, retained its two-year format but was also given access to an extraordinarily large market of potential students. As Patrick Callan explains later in this volume, the California State University (as the former state colleges became known) and the community colleges acquired new organizational and governance forms as a consequence of the Plan, in the process losing the single-campus governance that they had previously enjoyed. The California State University in particular became more centralized than either of the other two segments.

Each segment was assigned primary responsibility for a certain percentage of the graduating high school population. The University of California admitted the smallest numbers but selected them from the schools' high achievers. The California State University drew from a larger pool and was less selective. The community colleges were allowed to establish what was virtually an open admissions policy. However, none of the segments were excluded from admitting the best undergraduate students should they wish to come, and exceptional graduate students could still elect to take a master's degree within the state university segment. The American principle of consumer choice was maintained throughout, which is yet another and important reason why the University of California could not adopt a thoroughgoing emphasis on uniformly high undergraduate admissions standards. This was only possible where the University enjoyed monopoly privileges, as in doctoral degree-granting programs and the higher professional schools.

There was, of course, much more to the Master Plan, as the essays in this volume indicate. Many details, as President Kerr explains, could not be worked out until a new coordinating body at the state level created by the Master Plan assisted the segments in realizing the logic of the Plan. This body later came to be known as the California Postsecondary Education Commission. However, one extremely important principle had been secured in advance and was, in so many respects, the key to intersegmental cooperation, the means by which a potentially undesirable competition between at least two of the segments was obviated. This was to foster the

"transfer" or "articulation"⁶ principle. Students admitted to one segment could move to another upon satisfaction of certain criteria. Community college students could transfer to the University of California, as could State University students, but University students were also admissible to the State University. Students failing the University courses could recoup their chances by readmission to the other segments, although again only by satisfying certain criteria.

As I write, the transfer principle is better understood in Europe today than in the early 1970s or 1980s through greater familiarity with the organization of instruction in the United States. The *Review* notes that the French have a credit system (*unités de valeur*),⁷ and Scotland, which historically has perhaps been the archetype for the transfer principle, allows for student interchange between its universities. The privilege, however, does not extend to universities south of the Tweed since their degree programs are differently structured. German students wandered about in the nineteenth century, although obtaining, banking and using credits were scarcely imaginable in the German university system. Transfer is also better understood because of the creation and elaboration of the European Community, the creation of certain kinds of intercountry educational programs like ERASMUS, COMETT or LINGUA, and the thinking that accompanies the vision of a United States of Europe. If labor is allowed to cross national boundaries, why not students? Certainly the "university idea" is international and ancient in origin.

But even in 1992 the transfer principle within countries, let alone between countries, is far from being realized.⁸ For transferring as known in the United States depends upon another system, that of self-contained, semester-long or quarter-long "courses" or modular units where instruction and examining are combined in a single instructor. The system is virtually universal in the United States among the more than 3,000 institutions conventionally placed in tertiary education. It is common to public and private universities, community colleges or liberal arts colleges. And it is fundamentally American because it appears to put the consumer-student fully in charge of his or her educational career. Of course students and parents realize very well that not all higher educational institutions are

⁶A word that makes its appearance in the new sense somewhere in the Progressive Era of the early decades of this century.

⁷*Review*, 34.

⁸See Sheldon Rothblatt, "The American Modular System," and Oliver Fulton, "Modular Systems in Britain," in *Quality and Access in Higher Education, Comparing Britain and the United States*, ed. Robert O. Berdahl, Graeme C. Moodie and Irving J. Spitzberg, Jr. (Society for Research into Higher Education and the Open University Press, 1991), 129-141, 142-151.

equally accessible. They know that some have higher entry or transfer standards. They even realize that in the case of well-known private institutions the criteria for admission are not absolutely objective, entry being determined by such nonacademic factors as family income, whether a parent had attended the institution, the geographical distribution of the student body and minority or disadvantaged status. But because even such institutions, with the rarest of exceptions, divide instruction into distinct modules and subscribe to the transfer principle, their privileged position is excused.

Neither the modular system nor the transfer principle have, until very recently, been spoken about as a viable option in other countries, especially where English or European standards have been followed. And the issue has indeed been "standards." It is impossible to standardize an educational system broken into independent modules. It is impossible to make achievement standards uniform across an extremely large number of institutions differing in almost every respect from one another, the differences having arisen in response to the peculiarities of the American educational market and in deference to an ideology of consumerism and individualism. It is impossible to adopt something resembling uniform standards where secondary education is itself a mixture of modules of differing content, quality and purpose, as it has long been in the United States, and where, as Burton Clark has cogently explained in a series of writings, tertiary and secondary education are not united by common values or aspirations.⁹ But mass or universal access plus policies favoring consumer choice in education as with every other "good" require the fiction that variations in institutional standards may be real but they are in a special sense insignificant. It is yet another fiction that Americans accept—not without, it should be said, some confusion and misgivings—and which most Europeans until now oppose.

Changes in global values and institutions throughout the 1980s virtually dictated an OECD review of educational policy in California. The market principle, except in countries like Brazil and Japan which have significant private sectors, had not been fashionable in most countries of the world until about a decade ago. The impossible expense of maintaining elite standards under conditions of mass access made the American solution particularly interesting, as did disintegration of the Soviet system and weakening of sentiment favoring command economies. California was once again on the world's educational agenda, a ripe prospect for an Examiners'

⁹Burton R. Clark, "The High School and the University: What Went Wrong in America," Part 1, in *Phi Delta Kappan* (February 1985), 391-397, and Part 2, *Phi Delta Kappan* (March 1985), 472-475. See also *The School and the University, An International Perspective*, ed. Burton R. Clark (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1985).

visit. From the perspective of Californians, the visit was also appealing. Seldom, if ever, had the systems created by the Master Plan been reviewed by outside bodies with no apparent political agenda. Reviews being conducted at home—these are referred to by Patrick Callan in Chapter 5—were likely to concentrate on issues of current interest to the detriment of careful analysis of the place of higher education at the end of the twentieth century. In the opinion of those most closely involved, an OECD examination might provoke fresh thinking, or at least, further thinking on a great many pertinent issues.

Just prior to publication of the *Review*, Professor Halsey, one of three Examiners and principal author, approached the Center for Studies in Higher Education with the suggestion that the Examiners' findings as presented to the representatives of OECD member nations in Paris receive a public airing in California as well. The reasoning was appealing. While Californian delegations from the three public sectors and the private sector had been present in Paris, the format of the meetings (for which see the remarks provided by Halsey in Chapter 2) did not allow for extended discussion or debate. Consequently, with assistance from the Office of the President of the University of California, the Ford Foundation in New York City¹⁰ and the California Postsecondary Education Commission, the Center for Studies in Higher Education of the University of California convened a two-day *Conversazione*.¹¹ Held at Berkeley's Clark Kerr Campus on May 21 and 22, 1990, the main speakers included the three heads of the public systems of higher education as defined by the Master Plan and representatives of the private institutions,¹² the Examiners;¹³ President Emeritus

¹⁰We want to especially thank Dr. Peter Stanley, who gave us invaluable assistance while at Ford, and who has since left to become the president of Pomona College in southern California.

¹¹For the word *conversazione* and the spirit of earnest, gracious dialogue that it implies, I am indebted to Professor Claudio Véliz, formerly of La Trobe University, Melbourne, and now of Boston University. His own *Conversazioni* on culture and society, and the publications resulting therefrom, have in my view established a standard by which international meetings can be judged.

The success of the Berkeley meetings owe much to Janet Ruyle, Assistant Director of the Center for Studies in Higher Education, ably assisted by Pat Paulson. I am also personally grateful to Mrs. Ruyle for her help in editing and publishing this volume and to Ms. Paulson for her cheery participation.

¹²Dr. David Gardner, President of the University of California, Dr. John Smart, Vice Chancellor for University Affairs, California State University (substituting for the Chancellor), Dr. David Mertes, Chancellor, California Community Colleges, and Brother Mel Anderson, President of St. Mary's College, Moraga, and Chairman of the Association of Independent California Colleges and Universities.

Clark Kerr of the University of California; Professor Burton Clark of the University of California, Los Angeles; Patrick Callan, former Executive Director of the California Postsecondary Education Commission, sometime Vice President of the Education Commission of the States and now Director of the California Higher Education Policy Center Project; Dr. Ladislav Cerych, former Director of the European Institute of Education and Social Policy; and Dorotea Furth and George Papadopoulos of the Directorate for Social Affairs, Manpower and Education of the OECD, the office originating the policy review.¹⁴ We were pleased also to welcome participants and observers from other parts of the United States and abroad. (A complete list of the *Conversazione* conference participants appears in the Appendix.)

For those unable to attend, and for those who are particularly concerned about the changing characteristics of higher education, the Center for Studies in Higher Education (with the publishing assistance of our sister research unit, the Institute of Governmental Studies) decided to provide a series of relevant essays and conversations in published form. Most of the sentiments expressed in the contributions to this book were made during the two days of our meetings, so this volume is also in another sense an account of the proceedings. Parts of the volume represent ongoing conversations. In general we have preserved the highly distinct styles of the contributors. In Chapter 7, we have also included Halsey's written response to some of the points and criticisms made by Californians. As a veteran debater, distinguished broadcaster and leading sociologist, he understands, I am sure, that while he has the last word in this volume, he cannot always expect the same courtesy on those happy occasions when old friends come together.

The stylish opening of the *Review*, with its allusions to Hollywood and El Dorado, invokes the California dream. (How pleasant in this context to recall that one of Picasso's homes in Provence was called *La Californie*.) Images of sunlight, brilliant flowers, magnificent hillsides of volcanic rock,

¹³Besides Professor Halsey from Nuffield College, Oxford University, we were honored to host Professor Michio Nagai of the United Nations University, Tokyo. The third Examiner, Professor Pierre Tabatoni, formerly Recteur d l'Académie and Chancelier des Universités de Paris, was unfortunately unable to attend.

¹⁴Other participants were Janet Ruyle, Assistant Director of the Center for Studies in Higher Education; Professor Carol Christ, Provost of the College of Letters and Science on the Berkeley campus; Dr. Kenneth O'Brien, Executive Director of the California Postsecondary Education Commission; Dr. William Pickens, Associate Vice President for Finance, the California State University, Sacramento; Dr. William Moore, President, the Association of Independent California Colleges and Universities; Professor Joyce Justus, Assistant Vice President, Educational Relations; Clive Condren, Coordinator for Special Projects, the Office of the President, University of California; and Harvey Hunt, Assistant Superintendent and Director, Intersegmental Relations, California State Department of Education.

redwoods and Pacific surf follow. No satire is intended, although the references to the American novelist John Steinbeck and the 1930s generation of the Dust Bowl certainly suggest irony. The sensuous imagery, assuredly rare in dry-as-dust reports and reviews, underscores a leading impression conveyed by the report, namely, that the California dream may not be fully realized but nevertheless continues to live, not only in the state itself but abroad in Japan and Europe. In presenting the report to the *Conversazione*, Halsey restated several of the halcyon themes although in measured tones. California's secular religion, especially as it emanated from the south of the state, was a cornucopia of promises about individual self-fulfillment, a seductive message that through the medium of film appealed to the rest of the world as well. "No one but Californians," he said, "would offer a promise of one-generational success to, let us say, illegally-entered Mexicans."

The praise and even flattery for California—praise for an ingenious solution to the modern conflict between excellence and populism, praise for having made provision for the underprivileged and underrepresented, praise for a unique partnership between government and private initiative, praise for having made the dream of citizenship for all available through higher education—was, strange to say, unexpected by many of the conveners of the *Conversazione*. I myself felt somewhat in the position of Lord Annan, the former Vice Chancellor of London University, who once remarked that whenever the British were despondent over their economy and politics, the Harvard economist and former ambassador to India, John Kenneth Galbraith, would descend at Heathrow like a *deus ex machina* (literally) to remind them of their good sense and civilized manners. Here was I, and many others, troubled by a persistent California populism threatening to overwhelm academic excellence, by ideological divisions within the universities and colleges tearing away at scholarly values, by the persistent intrusion of particularistic issues into teaching, by financial problems threatening the health of the Master Plan and every other provision for higher education. The voters of the State of California, distrustful of their elected representatives and divided now into special interests, had, through a series of electoral "initiatives," impaired the capacity of the Governor and the Legislature to provide the citizenry with responsible and sensible leadership. Yet our friends from abroad, in their return visit to our state and in the *Review*, were reminding us of our famous and not our fatuous optimism. We might even rest on our laurels.

Hardly, for the *Review* is highly qualified, as were the presentations by Examiners at our *Conversazione*. For the dream to be pursued, Halsey cautioned, it had to hold out promises to groups as well as to individuals. While California had gone some distance towards achieving the goal, he cautioned us about the reality of low high school graduation rates. Other

European representatives at the meeting wondered whether American school participation rates were at all impressive when measured against countries like Switzerland and Germany, and in the *Review* itself the Examiners sternly observed that "we saw 18 year-olds in a community college struggling with those elementary quadratic equations which would have been mastered by boys and girls in an English grammar school or a French *lycée* at age 13."¹⁵ Halsey also noted, as the *Review* itself does on many occasions, that as education continues to be the principal means of entry into the better-paying sectors of the labor market, probably more so than ever before, the failure of the schools to control performance threatened to turn the dream into a nightmare.

But this last remark pointed to a genuinely troubling dilemma, not only for Californians but for Americans generally. The specter that haunts American higher education, and may well come to haunt all systems that concentrate on access at the expense of an historic or centrally imposed definition of excellence, is "remedial" education. The word is considered invidious in some educational quarters, partly because of its specific association with disadvantaged pupils and students or recent immigrants for whom English is a second language, but also because of its general suggestion of academic inferiority. In their search for cost effectiveness, flexibility and diversity, will our European colleagues run up against "remediation"? If not, Americans will have to appoint Examiners to travel abroad and learn how the pitfalls may be avoided.

The American modular system has several origins, but one of them is relevant to the problem of underpreparation for university work. Modules designed for underprepared students can be separated from other modules; and since poor preparation is often a question of deficiencies in a particular area of general education, the real discrimination of a two-track system is avoided. Students simply move between the modules, being prepared for some courses, less well-prepared for others.

There is, however, a kicker. Since all or nearly all course modules in their American version are self-contained, it is the case—we will never know the frequency—that the standards of a particular module are subtly lowered by the collective academic preparation of the class. "Hidden" remedial education results wherever the course standard is redefined because students in a class lack the necessary skills and proficiencies. Such downgrading is not possible in a system where modules, if they exist at all, are merely preparation for a comprehensive final examination with blind marking and external examiners. Some years ago, Berkeley faculty responding to a campus survey said that uneven classroom preparation was the greatest challenge to teaching. Berkeley faculty and admissions officers continue to

¹⁵*Review*, 34.

be dismayed by the large percentage of entering freshmen—25 percent at present, down from about 33 percent—who fail to pass the English proficiency examination (for whatever reason) and are required to take remedial courses in reading comprehension and writing. This is not a new situation. It has been a persistent problem since at least the 1950s, if not before.¹⁶

Some of our participants, as well as the Examiners, wondered how long actual or *de facto* remedial courses in writing or mathematics or languages would be tolerated by taxpayers in the current fiscal crisis. Special courses are obviously costly.¹⁷ But the subject is both delicate and political, for higher entrance standards intended to eliminate the problem of remediation would, in view of the inadequate high school preparation of students, unquestionably affect access.

Professor Halsey elaborated this last point in a special way. However much remedial courses offend purist academic sensibilities, they are also the means by which continual access to labor markets is assured. The American, as opposed to the European practice, has been to provide students with second, third and even more chances. Professor Martin Trow observes in Chapter 6 of this volume that a characteristic American attitude has always been that some higher education is better than none, irrespective of degree or standard. The cost is a system guaranteeing uniform excellence. This is the historic tradeoff.

Halsey then referred to several other general dilemmas that had special relevance to the California dream. Californians regard education as they regard consumption generally, as a good, a means for experiencing the better life. But, he warned, because Californians and Americans believe that market discipline should govern the distribution of goods, inequalities inevitably enter the social and economic systems. Conflicts and disagreement accordingly ensue.

Therefore Californians—Halsey referred to the Master Plan—like the citizens of other nations, realize that education cannot be governed exclusively by the principles of the market philosophy of autonomous production and acquisition. Indeed, the State of California was greatly

¹⁶In a number of forms, remedial education has characterized much of American higher education since the start. It was also to be found in eighteenth and early nineteenth-century Scottish and English universities. However, competition for entry, a limited number of student "places," national standards of achievement and an elite secondary system of education eliminated the need for remedial education about a century ago. Also eliminated was the second chance ethic so important to Americans.

¹⁷Remedial English classes at Berkeley dating back before World War II are being phased out, ostensibly for reasons of economy. They will be conflated with the regular reading and composition proficiency requirement courses beginning in 1992-93. Will this decision distort the spread of classroom proficiencies even more than at present?

responsible for the higher education system that attracted international attention. It has much left to do. The state (State) must continue to be a participant in the distribution of goods. Equally important, because the market may debase educational standards (or so the argument implies), the state is needed to uphold and guarantee the establishment and attainment of excellence. The challenge posed by Professor Halsey to the *Conversazione* was to clarify the role of the government of California in the provision for higher education and re-examine the nature of the partnership with Sacramento. He expressed his personal disappointment at the relative failure of California's academic community, especially the "experts" in the policy sciences, to alert the state's civic and political leaders to the importance of education considered as a public "good."

Halsey's challenge was taken up here and there in the course of the two-day meetings, although for reasons that will soon be mentioned, a number of other issues intervened and drew attention away from the question of government policy towards higher education. In the essays that follow, readers will be able to follow the debate as it has spilled over from the *Conversazione*. What emerged in part was yet another round in the encounter between European *étatisme*—which has any number of forms—and American voluntarism, "bottom-up" decision-making and a distrust of hierarchy and management or direction external to campuses and systems. President Kerr several times observes that a Master Plan originating from outside government but acceptable to it as a foundation document for the state's public provision for colleges and universities was needed precisely to ward off government legislation. Demography and expansion were creating conditions that threatened to overwhelm the existing higher education system.¹⁸ The state in its collective capacities—Governor, Legislature and bureaucracy—it may be surmised from his account, had neither the experience nor the structure to organize higher education in a manner equal to the challenges of a new age.

Several of the essays that follow take explicit or implicit issue with Halsey's contention that government is or is likely to be a force for good in the face of the manifold problems confronting California's higher education systems. There is strong disagreement over his confidently expressed belief that more planning, more government effort, strong and better central

¹⁸On another occasion, a "site selection gala" of April 6, 1990, called "Creating New Campuses: 1950 to 1970," sponsored by the Center for Studies in Higher Education with the assistance of the Office of the President, Kerr explained that unlimited or undirected enrollment growth, which he saw as a problem in other states, would have a deleterious effect on the standards of the University of California. He believed, and still believes, that gigantic universities are not desirable. Capping campus growth is therefore an important principle.

coordination will not result in greater state control over higher education. While—to put words in their mouths—our contributors might agree with him that California's academic community has had little influence over politicians, they might also argue that under present social and fiscal conditions the system of state government in California is unable to produce leaders of breadth and understanding. No one, of course, disputes the proposition that central government *can*, theoretically, be "enlightened." But "state" for Americans is rather abstract. The statement needs to be recast to move it from the possible to the actual. What exactly has been the role of Sacramento in supporting the triune higher education system now so eagerly studied by our friends and colleagues from abroad?

Sacramento accepted the Master Plan, but the Sacramento of 1960 was not the same state capital as the Sacramento of the 1990s. The Master Plan may have been an effort to provide some order in a runaway higher education environment, but, as any number of participants observed, California in the 1960s was a prosperous state with rosy economic prospects. The California of 1992 finds itself laboring under critical financial constraints. The 1980s were not hospitable to business planning and investment. An economic environment of high speculation, takeovers and sudden profit took precedence over investing in the economic and educational infrastructure. The public debt is large, business has taken a downturn, unemployment is running higher than the national average (as I write, 8.7 percent rather than the 5 percent mentioned in the *Review*, unusual for post-1945 California), and the infrastructure of roads, housing and public transportation is seriously undercapitalized. Furthermore, welfare problems barely known thirty years ago are today a major source of concern, as are the large numbers of homeless, the costs of health assistance for the elderly, the presence of new diseases and the immense difficulties arising from broken families, single mothers, drugs and child abuse. The prisons are full, and the legal system is bogged down in a system of litigation and appellate procedures worthy of comparison to scenes drawn by Charles Dickens more than a century ago. The American propensity for costly litigation, as represented by medical malpractice suits, eats up private and public revenue, as do suits against local government, occasionally by members of local government itself, or suits against the universities, which are frequent and expensive. Is there any other government, or university, in the free world today that must consider the possible litigious consequences of its policies and practices? Also, as the OECD report observes, one third of the world's legal emigrants eventually find a home in California, and there are public costs associated with their settlement.

In this climate, higher education must compete with many "entitlement" programs where funding is mandatory not discretionary. In education, attention is perforce directed to the kindergarten through high school sector,

which is itself, as in many of the other states of the Union, a disaster area. The government of the State of California must, under these circumstances, choose where to focus its energies and remaining funds, and immediate crises naturally attract more attention than problems that can be put off for the future. The California consensus at the *Conversazione* was that right now higher education cannot really compete very effectively. So desperate has the financial situation become that President Gardner, in responding to a letter from the Director of Finance for the State of California, has flatly declared that there is no more room for "further cutting, squeezing and trimming."¹⁹

It must be said that many of the other industrial nations face similar social, if not legal, problems. Unemployment, immigration, health and aging are not unique to the United States, although the magnitude and character of these problems will differ from nation to nation. It is always an error to think that problems exist only at home. Yet in one political respect California is unique, if not among all other American states then at least in comparison with other leading industrial nations. The state constitution allows for legislation through plebiscites. Furthermore, it allows citizens to initiate plebiscites. It allows tax and spending measures to be determined by popular vote.²⁰ Many who will be reading this book are aware of the effect of the famous tax-limiting "propositions," the ceilings imposed by initiative on state spending and the more recent measure favoring expenditure on K-12 and the community colleges at the expense of the two university segments. Furthermore, federally mandated programs have also severely reduced the discretionary budgeting powers of state government. The two constraints mean that 85 percent of California's annual budget is "protected." By any measure, this kind of revenue system must be considered egregious.

Is it even sensible any more to speak about the University of California as an American "state university"? In 1960, the State of California's share of the University's budget was approximately 60 percent. Twenty years later it had dropped to 40 percent, and projections for 1992-93 place the percentage at just under 30. A similar trend is discernible in funding for the California State University segment. The University of California has become at best only a "state-assisted" or "state-aided" university, with the bulk of its income derived from federal contracts and grants, endowment

¹⁹News release from the Office of the President (March 31, 1992).

²⁰The initiative process varies by state. The California one is particularly inflexible. "At present, California is the only state that prohibits the Legislature from amending the text of an initiative statute after its enactment. Furthermore, California voter initiatives are typically prolific and deliberately confusing or misleading." See the *San Francisco Chronicle* (April 15, 1992) for an account of the reform proposal of the California Commission on Campaign Financing, a mostly foundation-supported group.

income and gifts, patents and hospital and student fees. Commentators note that the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor is in a similar situation. "I wish to make it as clear as the English language permits," wrote President Gardner to the State Director of Finance,

that if left unchecked this reality will destroy California's world-renowned Master Plan for Higher Education, by which I mean closing the door on very large numbers of fully qualified students and/or dramatic increases in student fees and tuitions, and/or steady erosion in the quality and capability of our academic programs.²¹

Californians, as Americans generally, are not accustomed to scenarios without some relief; and even the tragic theater, through agreeable interludes, provides some refreshment for playgoers. Therefore it should be said that while the initiative process is currently working against higher education, California law does allow positive assistance in a different way. Capital can be raised by both government and educational institutions through the sale of public bonds initiated or authorized in the same fashion. The higher education segments have depended heavily upon bonds to fund new buildings and other capital improvements.

This description of California's politics and constitution does not provide us with a picture of that "State" which figures prominently in the writings of European theorists and intellectuals. It is not the State described by Halsey as "a relatively benign and reasonably uncorrupt instrument of democratic will" or as a peevish married partner of the university, the two perpetually quarreling but still loving as they recall the youthful romance that once turned their heads. It is true that Halsey's characterization of central political authority is intended to remind us of the role the State of California has played in adopting and supporting the Master Plan for some thirty years. He warns us not to assume that the tripartite division of public higher education was entirely or completely a "bottom-up" construction, or that voluntarism alone is sufficient for shaping a society devoted to the public good. He asks us to consider a conception of the "public good" that does not depend so heavily upon self-satisfaction and individual expediency. This is indeed an old and fundamental problem in social ethics.

In the creating and forming of the Master Plan, the State of California certainly played a part. President Kerr describes the cooperation of the Governor, some of the leading bureaucrats and a number of office holders. But how far is his "humble" account of informal, casual, clubbish arrangements for high policy from the more abstract conceptions of the State in

²¹News release, Office of the President (March 30, 1992).

political science theory!²² And it is foolhardy to predict a return to the informal decision-making environment of the euphoric 1950s in the very changed, far more bureaucratic, far more interventionist-minded California governments of the 1990s.

The vigorously independent, self-interested politics of California, itself a reflection of the remarkable strength of lobbyists and single-interest groups, results in a Legislature often at odds with the Governor. Major political parties, as nearly everywhere in the United States, are relatively weak, and party voting discipline is difficult to maintain as the two California chambers are filled with representatives with separate agendas, constituencies, financing and networks of influence. Hence Patrick Callan's observations about the changing role of the California Legislature, which, while publicly declaring the virtues of the Master Plan, continually chips away at its provisions and tries to find new ways to influence and direct the governance of the segments, for example, through line-item budgeting and veto (which Kerr was anxious to avoid).

The situation, Callan believes, calls for a restoration of public vision and leadership. Yet the politics of California, as the politics of the United States today, is a politics of minority conflicts and narrow interest lobbying that stand in the way of consensual measures for improving the public good. In Europe the historic preoccupation has been with the politics of class. In California it is the politics of ethnicity or the politics of other group interests that emerged with peculiar strength after the civil rights and New Left movements of the 1960s. The existence of so many diverse agendas produces contradictory demands from government, much rhetoric (as a number of participants at the meetings noted) and little in the way of significant result.

Thus Halsey's call for community through partnership with the State is not easily heeded. Californians may share his assumptions about the value of community but not about the State's capacity to promote community. The British parliamentary system produces (or strives to produce) strong government where cabinets make policy through party control of legislation. Executive and legislative functions are combined. Special interests can and do sometimes dominate policy, or the ideology behind policy—one thinks of trade union influence over the Labor Party, or the influence of lawyers, business and land over the Conservative Party—but usually such interests are instead mediated through the parties. In general it is easy to see why Halsey would regard the State as capable of furthering a broad conception of the public good.

²²Kerr's account reminds one of the casual decision-making of European governing aristocracies in ages past.

Academic Californians are not sanguine about the capacity of government today to speak for either the general good or to maintain a standard of excellence in education at any level. Nor do Americans generally regard government with affection, especially if we are to judge by the public opinion polls taken during this presidential election year. Many times during the *Conversazione*, speakers referred to the disaster areas of primary and secondary education. It is not as if the difficulties had not been noticed, publicly discussed or studied decades ago. The representatives of all segments expressed serious doubts about whether, in a pinch, the state government would protect quality as against quantity, and several segment leaders were not even optimistic about the choices their segments would make. In the spring of 1992, as state revenue forecasts and actual returns continue to be disappointing, signs of an uncomfortable erosion of quality appear everywhere in the segments, most notably: a cutback in hiring and replacement of faculty, which affects staffing ratios; a shortage of classes in the community colleges and the state universities; and mounting fees with the real possibility of tuition charges not far away—the latter raising concerns about minority access.²³ Primary research, whose importance is usually not understood by publics and politicians, is asked to yield ground to classroom teaching, but this is a topic that rarely receives intelligent exposition in the public arena.

It is only fair, as well as accurate, to note that the word "State" is not the only abstraction in need of qualification by the everyday facts of political life. "Market" is also problematical. Our colleagues from abroad, noting the very large number of governmental regulations, the State Department of Finance "control language" appearing in budgetary legislation and the line-item gubernatorial veto over the budgets of the community colleges and California State University, raised more than one eyebrow at the characterization of American higher education as a "bottom-up" system. They even find more rules and regulations, restrictions, guidelines, busybody poking about in all corners of higher education than they find at home.²⁴ Indeed,

²³The distinction between fees and tuition is important. The former are used for student services and support, but tuition, as the name indicates, is a charge for actual classroom instruction. It has been a principle of higher education in California not to impose tuition except for students from out-of-state. The question is therefore highly controversial. Unless defrayed by scholarships, fellowships or research grants and other subsidies, tuition is currently a hefty charge, if less than the charges in the leading private colleges and universities.

²⁴Two Dutch analysts provide important confirmation. Government intervention in Europe is nearly always by cabinet ministers, but American higher education must also endure the inquiries of legislators and their staffs. Scholars have tended to exaggerate the comparative institutional freedom of American colleges and universities.

so much is this the case that Professor Burton Clark also spoke about "state creep" in his formal presentation, and President Gardner often mentioned Sacramento's seeming desire to transform a normative system of higher education into a legislative one. The California State University has been particularly vulnerable to state intervention. Callan has noted how much of Sacramento's legislation affecting higher education is unenforceable or beside the point. It is not a thoughtful sign of the awareness of difficulties and bottlenecks but a hasty or opportunistic response to constituency pressures and political rhetoric.

Quite clearly, as Halsey argues—and the *Review* is suitably nuanced in this respect—California's higher education segments cannot be described as wholly the result of the invisible hand of Adam Smith's marketplace. Other American state systems, for example, the State University of New York, incorporate an even higher degree of outright state direction and administration, if in practice neither efficient nor inspiring. Several European colleagues mentioned the greater degree of institutional self-government existing in many other countries, where central campus governance tends to be weaker than in the United States. Concentrating decision-making in central campus governance is different from placing authority for university policy in external ministries of state, but the point is useful in another way. Lay boards are, or usually are, nonexistent in most countries.²⁵ It would not be easy to say in a European context, as was once said of a formidable member of the University of California Board of Regents in the last century, that when Regent Stebbins frowned "every Professor in the University trembled in his boots."²⁶ Academic senates, courts, convocations and other such instruments of professorial chairholder government are customarily more important in Europe than are the rectors and vice chancellors and other such representatives of campus government.

Given these realities, "market" is as helpful a description of decentralized control as "State" is a description of centralized management. Clark, in

Olaf McDaniel and Wiebe Buising, *The Level of Government Influence in Higher Education in the U.S. and Western Europe* (The Netherlands Ministry of Education and Science, 1992).

However, no state government in the U.S. has been as systematically interventionist or reformist as Sweden's 1960s Social Democratic Cabinet, for which see Aant Elzinga, "Universities, Research, and the Transformation of the State in Sweden," in *The European and American University since 1800: Historical and Sociological Essays*, ed. Sheldon Rothblatt and Björn Wittrock (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

²⁵Although active boards are returning to some parts of the British higher education system.

²⁶Verne Stadtman, *The University of California 1868-1968* (New York, 1970), 59. I am indebted to Professor Geraldine Clifford of Berkeley for drawing my attention to this example.

discussion, admitted that unqualified use of the word "market" would not advance our understanding of how the California system actually works, and at one point he referred to the "so-called market system." Clearly States have choices. Governments can control supply and thereby control demand. They can stimulate demand, or they can promote interinstitutional competition, as Clark explains happens in the United States. Numerous combinations of governmental, ministerial and voluntaristic activities are possible. These depend upon the nature of a country's political and electoral system, its traditions and powers of bureaucratic activity, its conception of constitutional sovereignty or the character of its revenue system. Markets themselves can be local, or no more than a "niche for highly specialized services," or national and international.

As Clark and Trow have often maintained (and do so here), when these possibilities are considered in relation to nations, *de facto* initiative and authority in the United States lie within the middle ranks of a higher education system, that is to say, the campus, whereas in most OECD countries there is a bimodal distribution of authority between the civil servants and the chairholders. But yet another distinction enters. Each American system, as well as each campus-level institution, contains within itself a myriad of departments, laboratories, research units, administrative structures, programs, support units, public relations offices, development offices, athletic programs, continuing education divisions and alumni associations that appear to spin in different orbits. Is the same as true in kind or degree in other nations? A single campus within a system may have a greater elite role than other satellites—the so-called "flagship" campus—but also within a single campus some units may be more elite, or more consumer-responsive than others, some more "academic," less service-oriented than others. And some units certainly have greater access to external funds, summer salaries or consulting and research funds, leading to extraordinary disparities in income and other important career distinctions. It would be a mistake to think that these disparities do not represent a "moral" problem for America's universities and colleges, and Halsey would certainly remind us that it is the kind of moral problem that market discipline specifically creates.

The word "market," then, is confusing unless used as a widely understood shorthand for the complex system of interdependencies and decentralized activity typical of America's colleges and universities. The market is not an alternative to, but a relationship with government, or governments. Conceptually, use of the word emphasizes the multiple sources of initiative within American higher education, of which the State is only one and in most respects the least creative of the forces driving campuses and systems. This is the heart of Clark's criticism of the *OECD Review*. The wellsprings of American higher education, he says in Chapter 4, are not policies and

plans like the California Master Plan. Indeed, the Plan imposes a static conception of higher education onto a dynamic enterprise. It is competition that drives California higher education; and that competition, especially but not only at the level of the University of California, is national. The market leaders, setting the standards for quality in undergraduate admissions, in staffing ratios, in high-prestige graduate and professional education, are a handful of the nation's private or "independent" universities and colleges.

This segment receives the least attention in the *OECD Review*, a point made several times by the representatives of private-sector higher education. While only a few of the Californian or American independents are actually pacesetters, the segment itself subsidizes a significant portion of higher education. More than half of the colleges and universities in California are privately controlled (172 of 310). At least one-quarter of the students enrolled in California's four-year colleges and universities are in private institutions, providing a range of admissions that belies any assumption that private automatically means exclusive.²⁷

A higher education system broken into particles at campus, system and segment levels, offering a largely uncoordinated mass of modules, themselves essential to a national transfer function, will be as bewildering to the consumer as to any offshore observer. Consumers need marketing information, and the American higher education system obliges through mailing and media promotions.²⁸ The commercial tone of American higher education has always irritated and shocked our colleagues from abroad. (To the best of my knowledge, the first author to use metaphors of the marketplace to describe higher education was John Henry Newman, who bitterly denounced the founding of the University of London in the 1820s.) The American higher education ambience could not be further from the world of "high culture" suggested by hallowed words such as *Bildung* or *Wissenschaft*. At first glance, American universities and colleges appear to be havens of philistinism and denizens who are *halbgebildet*. Unquestionably they are, from a certain historical point of view, but at the same time our campuses are also homes for the great ideas, the lofty sentiments and the noble traditions that stir memories of the origins of universities now so

²⁷In California, undergraduates attending private institutions are eligible for state "Cal Grants," and in states like New York the independent colleges and universities can actually receive direct public subsidies.

²⁸Listening to the radio in Philadelphia, I once heard an ad for a local college that made claims rivalling those of a Florida retirement community. Saturday television broadcasts of college football games usually have an advertisement praising the overall achievements of the two campuses. The hype makes it seem as if each campus has a faculty entirely made up of Nobel Prize laureates.

many hundreds of years ago. Undeniably it is difficult to extricate these ideas from the Yankee culture of hoopla and bravado.

For the consumer facing a dazzling choice of programs, promises and boasts, especially the undergraduate consumer, the higher education system has needed to create a vast network of support services, the heart of which are housing, financial aid and academic advising. This last has problems of its own. At best the advising system is a form of crisis intervention. When measured against the size of the mass education system and the modular system of course organization, it can never be fundamentally successful. A system providing consumer choice on a mass scale cannot afford the support dollars required to deliver advice tailored to the individual. In this area America's ambitions have certainly outstripped her resources.

None of these nagging problematical features of American higher education received attention in the *Review* proper, yet they are inherent to the structure and premises of the system.

The question of social "class" was introduced into the meetings through the *Review*, which contains long sections on the relationship between class and citizenship (that is, full participation in a democratic polity). It is not customary for Californians to feature class-based issues in discussions of the provision for higher education. Indeed, says Trow in Chapter 6, the Examiners could not find official statistics relating to the educational participation rates of social classes because Americans do not customarily collect data in that fashion, nor do they feel guilty about apparent class differences. He provides an explanation. Class represents horizontal bonding. Such bonding is attenuated in American society and culture and has become even more so since the end of World War II. Labor unions tend to be weaker than their counterparts in other countries, academics have looser emotional connections with their universities, religious affiliations are normally also weaker, as are professional associations, neighborhoods, political parties and virtually all such categorical attachments. Family ties are also fragile at present, but in this matter Europeans are experiencing the same kinds of dissolution.

Americans, Trow continues, are obsessed by ambition. Lateral ties are a nuisance and a handicap, introducing competing strains and values and preventing the pursuit of a successful career or status. In this context, and in these endeavors, higher education is an ally. Indeed, it is the great and universal solvent, the subversive agency of horizontal bonding. The American university does not "validate" or "reproduce" class but ignores and abolishes it, especially and particularly since about 1945 or 1950. Trow suggests that affirmative action policies may reinforce this established tendency of encouraging the substitution of vertical for horizontal attachments. However, his remarks about the perceived differences of race and ethnicity greatly qualify his main argument.

An American literary critic of my acquaintance would agree with Halsey that universal access is unachievable if class-based disparities are not addressed, or at least he would agree on the existence of "class." He argued last year in a leading article in the Sunday edition of *The New York Times* that Hollywood filmmakers refuse to confront issues of class by brushing them aside in favor of some tried version of the Horatio Alger success story. To acknowledge the existence of class relations further means, in the context of our discussion, that education needs to confront the challenge of the maldistribution of life chances on a basis of class. This in turn once again raises the primary issue of where in society (if at all) the task of equalizing life chances is to be concentrated, and we have already heard Halsey suggest a more active role for government.

But Trow does not deny that life chances are inequitably distributed. He says that in using the "language" of class, we invariably suggest that inequities normally prevent Americans from having dreams of future glory. The truth is otherwise. Americans continually dream about rising upward in the social structure, and they are not content, as was the case in Europe before 1945, to replace social ambition with the bonding that class relationships provide. Perhaps one may add that this view of Americans as invariably upward-oriented has lately been doubted by scholars who find a growing egalitarianism in the country, as either the direct outcome of the politics of the disadvantaged or as a by-product of environmental movements. Several scholars suggest that these movements are anti-hierarchical, or even authoritarian.²⁹ Affirmative action policies promoting ethnic or minority representation in proportion to population affect business, government, the military and education. Liberal (that is to say, competitive) individualism is discouraged; and equality of opportunity is replaced, or partially replaced, by ideas about equality of outcome. These were not polemical issues at the time the Master Plan was first devised.

But just what is meant by "class"? By now this is a tired semantical and methodological debate in historical and sociological discourse. Suffice it to say that neither Halsey nor Trow accept a definition of class that posits an eventual conflict between rival groups, one propertied, one propertyless, for control of society. Neither then accepts the Marxist philosophical lexicon of false consciousness or acquired class consciousness or the other tergiversations of dialectical materialism. We might term Halsey's view of class as Victorian. It is the nineteenth-century novelist's depiction of society as

²⁹I am thinking specifically of the recent work of Aaron Wildavsky, *The Rise of Radical Egalitarianism* (Washington, D.C., 1991); and Wildavsky and Carl Dake, "Theories of Risk Perception: Who Fears What and Why?" in *Daedalus* (Fall 1980), 41-60.

divided into "two nations,"³⁰ rich and poor. Money makes the difference. The absence of money lessens the chances for upward mobility and creates, or reinforces, the kind of separatism and social differences implied by "class" identity. "Class" then takes on a reality of its own. Higher education fades as an option, since it becomes identified with class privilege.

This usage is more "European" than the simpler emphasis on money that most Americans may consider the equivalent of "class" feeling as captured in current Congressional discussions of a "middle-class tax cut." The American assumption has always been that income in and of itself allows for movement out of a particular occupational or social level, even income without education, or income will buy the necessary education. Speech accents, body movement, dress and other visible manifestations of origin mean less—it would be erroneous to suggest that they mean nothing at all—in an American context. Class feelings, that is, a sense of the differences that money brings, are therefore easily shed by Americans.

Lateral ties, to repeat Trow, are feeble and superficial. This also suggests that there is no one higher up the social ladder likely to circulate disparaging remarks about uppity members of the lower orders, or refer to the *arriviste* as having a family in "trade"—that is, such remarks are not likely to cause much mischief if circulated. Religious and ethnic prejudice are, however, wholly separate issues, and the emergence of an underclass largely composed of ethnic minorities, which both Halsey and Trow acknowledge, takes us well beyond the usual formulations of class theory.

Yet the differences between our discussants remain pronounced. They are methodological as well as national differences. Trow stresses the importance of subjective criteria in self-definition. If Americans regard themselves as individuals, act like individuals and believe in individual mobility, irrespective of whether they can actually achieve it in their lifetimes, their behavior belies the existence of class attitudes. But for Halsey the objective criteria are significant. Neither the refusal of statisticians to collect data on class distribution (as opposed to occupations, income, education, ethnicity and religion) nor American optimism about life chances undermine arguments for the existence of class feelings and class differences. To claim that Europe is less socially open than the United States is to take us into yet another area of American historical myth-making. Differences in labor markets produce differences in occupational but not social mobility.

Is an apparent phenomenon "real" if the existence of the phenomenon is denied or dismissed? Our readers are invited to consult Sigmund Freud and Henrik Ibsen, or other writers who have shed light on the reality

³⁰A famous reference appearing in one of Benjamin Disraeli's novels.

principle, to read Trow and Halsey and the *OECD Review* and to make up their own minds.

We return to a central point. The *Review* is designed as an examination of policy in line with other OECD national evaluations. Our *Conversazione* was implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, a discussion of the merits of a review thus organized and arranged. Clark's conclusion is that the review of a "plan" does not furnish an adequate evaluation of a system in motion, a system that is driven by imperatives not only outside the Plan but in contradiction to it. The Master Plan divided the Californian public higher education province into the classical three parts. It summoned into being a state-level coordinating agency. In so doing, it leaves observers with the impression or illusion that the segments are integrated and self-contained. But in reality, to use Clark's phrase, the segments are "self-amplifying." They continually kick against the Plan, battling its enrollment and resource constraints, invading one another's boundaries and violating the spirit of the original compromises, going in one direction when the Master Plan suggests they should continue in another. Indeed, one of our participants suggested that the Plan may actually be a nuisance. Since competition is what the campus responds to, all constraints on trade should be removed. Restless, born to have no peace and to give none to others, is how the Greek general and historian Thucydides described ancient Attica. Such is the American campus.

Consequently, says Clark, master plan policies are not the true source of American success in higher education nor the mainsprings of their drive towards prestige. In the American context, centrally derived or agreed-upon policies are no guarantee of excellence and rarely promote quality. And Callan takes the logic of this argument one more step. He asks whether the Master Plan, with all its rational seductions and air of bureaucratic order, has outlived its utility. It was a document for its time and place. Has ossification set in? Does our reverence for the Plan prevent Californians from considering fresh alternatives for the 1990s and beyond? Do the segments in their system forms provide the flexibility and novelty claimed for them? He points to serious deficiencies within the California State University segment. It is (and others at our meetings made similar observations), the least favored of the three segments, the middle child. Its mission, sandwiched between the entry system into higher education, the community college, and the ultimate exit system, the University of California, is less clear. It overlaps in both directions. But, says Callan, the California State University is so concerned with its birth order within the family of higher education segments that it has neglected its primordial function of preparing schoolteachers well and innovatively, and it has failed to develop collegial governance as it exists at the University of California. Its model is instead the industrial or labor-management one, and the ethos

or spirit of its academic life is thereby seriously undermined. Here is another area that the *Review* overlooks in its praise for the symmetry and beauty of the cherished document.

The Examiners and other participants were asked in advance to consider a special question of both academic and policy relevance. The question was "academic" because it required us to consider the methods and assumptions governing OECD nation reviews. The policy relevance lay both in the Examiners' conclusions respecting California and in their view of how California's provision for higher education foreshadowed developments within member countries. If the methods and assumptions of the *Review* were correct, presumably "lessons" of a practical nature could be derived from it.

The Examiners maintain that the Master Plan, which they accept as the basis of Californian higher education, represents a sensible balance between public and private interests, indeed, a necessary partnership. Halsey teases Americans for imagining that their governments rarely engage in exercises of rational planning, that policies are really no more than everyday common sense intuitively derived and spontaneously followed. This is yet another American fiction. He suggests that the current European love affair (and not just European) with privatization is short-lived, that disenchantment with market forces will set in unless government is also seen to be the guardian of the public interest.

The great virtue of the Master Plan is that it recognized the logic of mass education and "normalized" the forces that were transforming California society. If there is a Californian model of higher education suitable for export, symbolized and represented by the Master Plan, its value lies less in whether it can be precisely emulated than as a broad indication of the mixture of private and public, state and society, elitism and populism likely to exist in the industrial world as we move closer to the next century. As the European states loosen their hold on their own extensive array of higher education institutions, convergence towards the California model will inevitably occur. That process, Halsey says, is already well under way.

Californians do not dispute the effects of mass higher education. Their concern is whether a review of "planning" is the best means of evaluating a nation's provision for higher education. They also wonder whether the Plan really was a "planning document" and not something else altogether. The responses of the Californians do not cast a shadow over the Plan's fascinating history but over its precise former role and its future utility.

Implicitly the *Conversazione* was also asked to consider the relevance of a *Review* based largely on brief site visits or information supplied by the systems to be reviewed. Normally anthropologists spend years among exotic tribes learning languages and dialects in order to break their mysterious codes. Even under such optimal conditions, serious errors of interpretation

and understanding occur. Is it therefore possible for outside visits on the OECD format to be uniquely successful in tracing the inner circuitry of a complex wiring system? The Examiners were well aware of the disadvantages of a brief visit. Moreover, the same question may well be asked of all similar efforts to evaluate programs and institutions, those sponsored by educational accrediting bodies in the United States or reviews of disciplinary departments by visiting scholars. Are such activities genuinely utilitarian, or do they only "legitimize" programs and institutions, rendering them "accountable" to external scrutiny and therefore satisfying the public interest? While hardly a trivial function, it is different from an assessment that provides disturbing questions about the actual functioning of an educational system.

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that even the most informed specialists—and California was fortunate in having a distinguished group of Examiners—will inevitably encounter serious obstacles. And how much greater must those obstacles be in instances where respondents conceal information or provide only half truths? Such, I hasten to say, was certainly not an issue in the California case.

But qualifications about the utility of external reviews cannot be avoided. At least one participant in our meetings suggested that institutional self-studies are more valuable; but others were certainly dubious, knowing how often self-appraisals, especially when made under pressure, gloss over basic flaws. Quite clearly there is no one successful formula for producing a comprehensive review that combines a discussion of planning, that is the public policy dimension, with an understanding of how institutions really work. The American instance is difficult to review, especially because there is a fundamental dynamic tension between policy and actuality caused by deep contradictions in the nation's basic cultural beliefs about government, happiness, success and life chances. But such or different tensions also exist in other national systems of higher education, which must surely embody their own myths and fictions.

Hanging over the May *Conversazione* was the fate of yet another electoral initiative, this one awaiting the June elections. It had been devised to undo in small measure some of the taxing and spending constraints imposed by a decade of crippling propositions. It was an initiative greatly favored by California's higher education segments, whose budgets were otherwise stymied. It was supported by business leaders. The initiative passed, providing temporary relief, but at the time its fate could not be exactly known, and the uncertainty contributed to the air of anxiety permeating the meetings. The Examiners and other visitors from abroad, as well as our colleagues and associates in other American states, may well have been surprised by the absence of the customary sunny California disposition. After years of protracted drought, the winds of winter seemed

to blow; and as if to further symbolize a world turned upside down, rain fell during the time of the conference in a month commonly dry. The precipitation was not considered a fortunate omen at the time.

Gloom is contagious. On April 1, 1992 the Humanities Center at Berkeley's friendly rival, the private university of Stanford, sponsored a public lecture entitled "What Happened to the California Dream, the World We Lost: California in 1915 and Today." We read in the handout that "The California dream came close to reality at the same time that it assured its own destruction," and we are asked to recall an era when "population and industry had reached a happy equilibrium with the State's carrying capacity."

But some effort, however obvious and awkward, should be made to avoid total alarm. Therefore it is useful, in concluding these opening remarks, to borrow a practice from the sabbath morning services of synagogues. A portion of the prophets is often read; but if the selection ends on a somber note, lines of more hopeful purport are added to provide a more rounded view of the human experience.

The *Review* was the basis of our *Conversazione*. It prevented helter-skelter discussion by concentrating opinion. In a famous *bon mot*, that splendid English intellectual of the Age of Reason, Dr. Samuel Johnson, said that nothing concentrates the mind like hanging. Many felt that in the beginnings of a budgetary crisis of unfamiliar and mammoth ramifications, we were indeed in that situation. But the kind of focus encouraged by the presence of the Examiners stimulated wide-ranging, thoughtful and productive discussion. We are accordingly greatly in Professor Halsey's debt for his leadership in conducting the review, equally indebted to him for his large views sensitively expressed. We are certainly grateful to him for his wisdom (and courage!) in recommending to us that Californians be offered an opportunity to respond to the OECD Examiners in a public forum less restrained, less governed by protocol and in the best sense more disputatious than Paris.

The problem of reports, as everyone knows, is their brief life span. They are soon interred without decent burial or eulogy. Occasionally, to everyone's consternation, grave robbers strip them of their legendary gems, which are then peddled on the open market. Their settings, their contexts, are missing. Cardinal Newman's magnificent *Idea of a University* has often suffered from precisely that kind of theft, his lapidary sentences shamefully used to adorn very different arguments.³¹ It was to avoid that unseemly and undeserving fate, and to give wider prominence to issues central to the future welfare of great democracies, that our conversations were joined in Berkeley.

³¹John Henry Newman, *The Idea of a University, Defined and Illustrated*, ed. I. T. Kerr (Oxford, 1976). First published 1852.

Excerpts From Higher Education in California

A. H. Halsey

THE OECD EXAMINERS AND CALIFORNIA: A VIEW IN 1988¹

And then the dispossessed were drawn west—from Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas, New Mexico; from Nevada and Arkansas, families, tribes, dusted out, tractored out. Carloads, caravans, homeless and hungry; twenty thousand and fifty thousand and a hundred thousand and two hundred thousand. They streamed over the mountains, hungry and restless—restless as ants, scurrying to find work to do—to lift, to push, to pull, to pick, to cut—anything, any burden to bear, for food. . . . and the dispossessed, the migrants, flowed into California, two hundred and fifty thousand, and three hundred thousand. Behind them new tractors were going on the land and the tenants were being forced off. And new waves were on the way, new waves of the dispossessed and the homeless.²

"California Here I Come!" In the period between the two world wars this phrase became a cliché of hopeful journeying into the future, used not only

The OECD has graciously allowed us to reproduce a number of pages from the *Review* as part of this book, which we hope will serve as a "teaser" for readers, in film language a "trailer," attracting them to the *Review* itself. The excerpts from the Examiners Report and the "Rapporteur's Retrospect" from the *Review* were written by A. H. Halsey and selected by him for this chapter.

¹"Part One: The Examiners' Report, Chapter 1, California, America and the First World," in *Review* (Paris, 1990), 11-15.

²John Steinbeck, *The Grapes of Wrath* (Harmondsworth, 1939, 1951), 213-214.

by those who trekked out of the Oklahoma dust bowl in the 1930s but by people all over the western world who believed in the possibility of escape from depression and poverty. California was and remains a symbol of promise, of modernity, of new life, of realizable human prosperity. Hollywood reinforced the myth. European children of the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s imbibed a view of the world in which their everyday experience of an ancient Christian culture was rationalized, on the one hand in schoolrooms by one nationalistic version or another of their collective inheritance from ancient Athens and Jerusalem, and on the other hand projected into the future in dim cinemas from the screens of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer. The educational curriculum was always both ancient and modern. Arabic numbers, Latin declensions and post-Renaissance science had to be amalgamated with a new image of the American West—an essential, if unremarked because hidden, component of the child's total learning experience.

Californian celluloid portrayed another futuristic world. Just as the Spanish Royal Family erased the negative from its coat of arms, "*Nec Plus Ultra*," at the Straits of Gibraltar in the early sixteenth century,³ signalling that Columbus had discovered "more beyond," so California beckoned millions in the twentieth century to a life in which still more things would be hedonistically possible. Western films were modern morality plays. The past was naively depicted as cowboy heroics, the present as normal in clean, freshly painted suburbs, unbroken and prosperous families and all-American adolescents at high school commencements.

The future was held out against a gleaming technological background as the hope of progress towards unlimited personal fulfilment. All races were jostled together, homogenised by educational programmes of "Americanization" and integrated by a comprehensive, always open offer of educational opportunity, from kindergarten through the twelve grades and on to college and graduate school. Virtue triumphed cinematographically after much travail. Heroes were victorious by dint of individual resolve, women were quietly loyal to family values and decorously deferential to male pride. Villains were disposed of in the penultimate two minutes of high drama, and the blessed young couple rode off into a Californian sunset. In Great Britain alone in the 1930s, twenty million visits were made every week to "people's palaces"—twenty times the attendance at Matins or Evensong. A

³Thus, the Pillars of Hercules at the Straits of Gibraltar which had marked Spain as the outer limit of the civilised world now announced *Plus Ultra*: there is more beyond. Francis Bacon then made the Fatal Columns his frontispiece to the *Great Instauration*. See Peter Brian Medawar, *The Hope of Progress* (London: Wildwood House, 1972), 112.

new catechism of secular paradise was on daily offer around the globe, centered on a suburb in Southern California.

Such was the childhood of the three examiners in Japan, France and England. It was not, to be sure, our whole world, which remained rooted in other native traditions—Buddhist, Christian and humanistic. Nor was the Hollywood culture quite so simplistically optimistic. There was also the comic sadness of Chaplin's burlesque of the powerless urban proletariat, as well as Rose of Sharon's bitter struggle with starvation in the Californian orange groves of John Steinbeck's *The Grapes of Wrath*. We picture "the pictures" of the new world not to romanticise them but to emphasize their influence on a European or Asiatic upbringing as distinct from the narrower experience of formal education, and also to make it clear that the visitor to California typically arrives to a consciousness of *déjà vu* from early memories of dramatised representation. The task then, as probably from no other corner of the world, is to reconcile observed life to remembered art.

In fact, all three of us had crossed the Atlantic or the Pacific to California before from other regions of the First World. We all had had first-hand experience of the expansion of Californian society, economy and education in the second half of the twentieth century. Most pertinent to remark, perhaps, is that one of us had been one of the three examiners (and rapporteur) of the first, now largely forgotten, OECD exercise in America in 1961-62—a study of *Higher Education and the Demand for Scientific Manpower in the United States* [published in 1963]. We shall return to this convenient starting point when we discuss directly the relation of Californian higher education to the economy. Meanwhile, with respect to America and the First World, we can recall the remark of the 1962 examiners that:

There is much worry in high places that shortages will be present in 1970 unless immediate and drastic measures are taken to increase supply [of science and scientists]—shortages which will impair the economic and scientific efficiency of the United States and endanger her political and military role in the world.⁴

Nowadays America still leads the First World, albeit challenged in economic strength by a transformed Japan and a slowly resurgent Western Europe. At that time we visited La Jolla to admire magnificent hillsides of volcanic rock, redwoods and the Pacific surf, and the pioneering enthusiasm of sailor oceanographers at the Scripps Institute. Today there is the splendid and spacious campus of the University of California at San Diego. America and the First World have moved on, and California's silicon valley is at its spearhead of technological advance.

⁴OECD (Paris, 1963), 11.

California then cannot be taken as representative of America's fifty states. It is the most populous and prosperous of them but contains only one in ten of all Americans, it is highly urbanised (95 percent live in metropolitan regions), ethnically diverse to the extent that by the year 2000 ethnic minorities will be close to becoming the majority of the population, and wealthy (fourth among the fifty states in per capita income and seventh in median family income). Its people and places are new: 15 percent of Californians were born in another country and over half in another state. One in eighteen Californians is Asian or Pacific Islander, one in twelve is Black and one in five is Hispanic.

The immigration phenomenon has vast implications for education. California is an extreme example of the tradition of America as a nation of immigrants. One illustration is that Cardinal Richard Curling observed in 1947 that "in all of the American hierarchy, resident in the United States, there is not known to me one bishop, archbishop or cardinal whose father or mother was a college graduate."⁵ Today nearly two million Californians are enrolled in institutions of higher education. College-going in some form is the experience of the vast majority.

Alongside an advanced system of education there is also an advanced economy. California boasts the sixth largest of the world's economies. Only the rest of the United States, the USSR [as formerly known], Japan, Germany and France are bigger, while the United Kingdom, Italy, Canada and all other countries are smaller in terms of gross product. To put it sharply, California produces more than the United Kingdom, with half the people.

Thus, California today may be described as the exemplar of "postindustrial society," where new technological industry, especially in the information and communication sectors and in bio-technology, combined with an extensive service sector employing about 70 percent of the labour force, is able to maintain a society with a remarkably high quality of material life. Economic vitality and social diversity have produced a very low rate of unemployment: less than 5 percent of the active population. A "national product" ranking sixth in the world involves imports and exports on a global scale, especially with the Asiatic countries which absorb two and a half times more of Californian exports than does Western Europe and seven times more than does Latin America. In the past decade California has gathered no less than 22 percent of the natural scientists and engineers of the United States. It carries out a quarter of the federally sponsored research and development, and a quarter of the members of the National Academy of Sciences live within its boundaries.

⁵James J. Hennesy, *American Catholics: A History of the Roman Catholic Community in the United States* (New York, 1981).

According to the forecasts of the California Economic Development Corporation, this state, by the beginning of the next century, will advance still further on its relative position as an economic leader. In what the Corporation calls an "achievable scenario," income per capita will increase by 50 percent on the 1986 figure to reach \$26,900 a year, while its population will increase by nine million. Even on the least optimistic forecast an income per capita of \$18,000 will be achieved, compared with \$16,800 in 1986. Research and development expenditure per worker will be multiplied by 2.5 at best and by 1.3 at worst. Poverty, as measured by the proportion of families with an income of less than \$10,000, will decrease to 8 percent from its present level of 10 percent. This "achievable vision" expresses traditional Californian optimistic vitality with its characteristic expectation of future growth in production and productivity higher than that experienced in the past.

Euphoria is admittedly not universal. There is awareness of possible decline in California's advantages, for example if there were a decrease of military expenditure and a reduction of federal research resources. It is noted that California has recently failed to compete successfully for such federally funded national scientific centers as the National Center for Earthquake Engineering Research, the Sematec project and the Supercollider. Nevertheless, cheerfulness dominates. It is widely assumed that California can develop its scientific, technological and managerial elites, and reinforce their international outlook and effectiveness. Nor do we have serious reason to doubt the Californian capacity to prosper in the competition for economic growth.

On the other hand, however, we would note that the assumption is also made that California can go on integrating a state composed of numerically increasing ethnic minorities into an occupational structure which is assumed to demand higher and higher levels of education and qualification. Contingent issues of policy accordingly arise. It cannot simply be a question of more education, but rather of how much and what kind of education and training is appropriate for an economy living by advanced technology. It cannot either be simply a problem of educating a technocratic elite, since the whole labour force—and indeed the whole culture of modern society—is involved. And it cannot only be a problem of enlarging access, but also one of ensuring success, a challenge of equality and excellence. Recent Japanese experience has demonstrated how much technological and economic performance depends both on the elite and on a broader base of educated and adaptable labour. Such a labour force seems to be a prerequisite in a world where every developed country will be in ferocious competition for export markets. The winners will be those who can incorporate rapid advances in new technology and sell effectively in terms of price and quality of product. Appropriate education and training must therefore be a continuous preoccupation of policymakers.

For Californian competitiveness such rapid acculturation into post-industrial society of a massive influx of people with cultures and languages different from the "White mainstream" surely constitutes a major challenge. Our strong impression is that the Asian minorities in California adjust more easily than others to contemporary conditions. We notice, for example, that at Berkeley the (six-year) graduation rate of those enrolled from Asian families is over 70 percent and similar to that for the Whites, compared with little more than 40 percent for the Hispanics and the Black students. Perhaps these differences are a warning that the "melting-pot" dynamic, which has worked so well in the formation of Californian society, may reach its limits. It seems possible that some ethnic minorities bring with them traditions and values which enable them to take advantage of Californian opportunity, while others become concentrated by geographical and occupational location in such a way as to be diverted from the mainstream of employment in buoyant sectors of the labour market and to gravitate towards a slough of relative failure in the education system, especially at the primary and secondary levels. Although our task was to evaluate postsecondary education, we were constantly reminded by our Californian informants of grave dysfunctions in the K-12 system (Kindergarten through 12th grade) which result in ethnically unequal recruitment to the higher levels of education, in lower achievement and in discouraging signs of the perpetuation of an underclass.⁶

Furthermore, though growth in technological manufacturing and modern service sectors is so impressive and unemployment so low, there still exists in this modern economy a large number of jobs with insecurity of tenure, as is the case in most advanced industrialised countries with their rapid shifts in locations of production and demand for labour. These temporary, part-time, poorly-paid and poorly-regarded positions are occupied by the unqualified and in a disproportionate number by ethnic minorities. Such forms of employment are also of low educative value and draw in people from the social backgrounds which are most resistant to organised educational opportunity, even one as amply provided as that of California. The level of educational development is great, but the challenge also remains difficult and achievement incomplete. Moreover, with an ageing population

⁶We of course appreciate that not all Californians accept this negative view of the primary and secondary schools. Some would insist that significant progress has been made in school reform in recent years. For example, between 1984 and 1987 the number of students taking advanced mathematics increased by more than 50 percent. A full-scale study of the K-12 system was beyond our remit. Within our terms of reference the major point to be made is that cooperation between schools and postsecondary institutions will be essential to the solution of the problems of access and success that we discuss below.

and the exodus of the well-to-do and the professionally qualified from the cities into the suburban communities, there is a marked tendency towards inner-city concentration of people with low income, low qualifications and alienated cultures. These melancholy trends could produce a "dual society" with social polarisation, high rates of crime and deviance, and high burdens on the public purse, as well as a negative impact on overall productivity. Educational and social planning to avert such conditions, and to incorporate everyone into the general affluence through the learning opportunities provided by the system, is a distinctive challenge of tomorrow's California.

The anxieties to which we have referred are certainly in the minds of all responsible leaders in California, and form the background of educational debate and social policy. The problem is to know how quickly this awareness and energy can be mobilised to combat the threat of social disintegration. History, of course, offers considerable encouragement. California has been a triumph of incorporation into prosperity for the vast majority. In three generations a motley array of immigrants became Americans, albeit ironically with the help of two world wars as well as an exceptional rate of economic growth. For the future we would agree with the admittedly contentious belief of many Californian policymakers that the burden of incorporation into a pluralistic society has to rest centrally on the integrative capacity of the education system. It may be today that the high dropout rate from the secondary schools, especially among some of the ethnic minorities, is a strategic barrier to fashioning a successful future for California. It may be too that credential inflation (i.e., the raising of the formal educational qualification for entry to a given trade or profession), while perhaps contributing to economic growth, may at the same time threaten social integration. California may be the crucial, and is certainly a fascinating, test case of the capacity of an educational plan to unite a prosperous country.

Conclusion

Why then was California chosen as the focus for another of the OECD's reviews of national policy? It is not because California can be proxy for the United States—none of the fifty states lies at the median point of American economic or educational statistics. California is certainly superabundantly American but not an anonymous representative average. Even less is California a typical OECD territory. It is richer, technologically more advanced, educationally more lavishly endowed, and ethnically more diverse than any other part of the First World. Moreover, it shares only with Japan, Australia and New Zealand a close and complex communication with the developing economy of the Pacific Rim.

The choice of California for the review could have been justified by its special economic and geographical position on the western frontier of the

First World: but it was chosen for two quite different additional reasons. First, California offers the convenience, which the United States as a whole does not, of being comparable in scale to most OECD countries. Its 25 million people give it a government and administration of a size and scope somewhere between the smaller OECD countries such as Norway or Greece and the large ones like France or Germany. It is an appropriate choice, therefore, because comparisons are paradoxically only practicable between similar social entities. Second, the purpose of OECD national reviews is to draw lessons as far as possible for other Member countries. California, we hope to show, is an especially apt choice from this point of view, despite the fact that it is not a sovereign state. Like other OECD countries, it has a large public sector of higher education in which the state dominates policy. Yet unlike many Members of the Organisation, it somehow manages to allow and even foster lively competition between individual institutions, partly perhaps through the stimulus of an independent sector, partly through a general disposition towards innovation, partially through preferences for decentralised government and for lay boards alongside the professional bureaucrats. In other words, it seems to us to offer a dramatic illustration of a central question in current policy debate—the adaptation to each other of planning and market mechanisms in the joint pursuit of equality and excellence. It is to this question that we now turn.

CALIFORNIA AS OECD FUTURE?⁷

[In the body of the Examiners' report we described the Californian system of postsecondary education, its place as a variant of arrangements in the fifty American States, its structure of power, its mechanisms for planning and its problems of finance, labor supply and promotion of mobility through educational opportunity.—A. H. H.]

We began with a flattery: California was, for millions in our childhood, the hope of progress. We continued with a description: California has an advanced system of postsecondary education related to an advanced economy. We added a salutation: California is the exemplar of postindustrial society. We end now with a question: Is California the model for OECD futures? It is an ambiguous and could be a deeply political question. Models can be ideals or ideal types, i.e., they can be aims to be sought or avoided with passion, or they can be conceivable social states which social scientists can attempt to analyse in terms of the conditions and probabilities

⁷Part One: The Examiners' Report, Chapter 9, Challenges for the Future," in *Review*, 81-85.

of their emergence. The distinction is crucial, for the one implies advocacy while the other, in principle, presupposes value neutrality.

We cannot pretend to be fully qualified for either mode of discourse. We carried with us to California a lifetime of more or less sophisticated prejudices from England, France and Japan concerning ideals of society, economy and education. And those who gather to discuss our report, whether Californians, Europeans or representatives from OECD countries bordering the Pacific, will be burdened or enlightened by attitudes from their own experience. H. L. Mencken once remarked that if you hear a man praising his own country you may depend on it that he expects to be paid for it. We, by and large, have found much to praise in another country. Others may or may not concur. All that we can hope to do is to offer an honest report of our impressions, drawing attention to the priorities over which reasonable people may honourably disagree.

As to the other mode of discourse—futurology—we need no reminder of the intellectual difficulties. The history of social science is littered with inaccurate predictions and, indeed, is all too prone to convey false prophesy. Moreover, our visit to California was short, our study of its institutions brief and our mastery of its documents incomplete. Furthermore, even though—as we have remarked—information on Californian economy and education is as voluminous as anywhere in the world, it too falls short of offering a complete test of such theories of social change, of the impact of education on economic and social development, and of the structure of post-industrial society, as are available to us. Again, all we can do is to arrange limited evidence for rational discussion. In short, we cannot ourselves presume to present advice to other OECD countries as to whether they could or should make California their mentor.

We can nonetheless affirm that we have found some preconceptions in California which are fundamentally similar to those of other educational policymakers in OECD countries: they all subscribe to a value consensus; they want their people to be free, to be prosperous and to live in civilised accord. To be sure, this consensus may not extend to total agreement about the characteristics of a civilised person or an ideal society. The values of freedom, equality and order, in their shifting balance, are more or less compelling to different observers at different times in different countries. And cultural standards are intrinsically contestable. Some, like . . . [me], tend towards the absolutism which assumes that a Mozart symphony is more valuable than a rock concert, that astronomy is more truthful than astrology, and that Henry James writes better prose than Harold Robbins. Others are more cautious, believing with Professor Tabatoni that Mozart in his exuberance would have approved of jazz and even rock. Certainly, cultural relativism sets continuing problems for those who would shape educational curricula. Nevertheless, the operative consensus among policymakers in California, as in other OECD countries, is that they urge tolerance on each

other and desire earnestly that all citizens are incorporated as owners of all that is best in their humanistic and scientific inheritance. This is the faith of teachers everywhere. Disagreements turn more on means than on ends. And policy disputation is confused by uncertainty as to how potent formal education can be in reshaping or improving a civilisation.

Nowhere more than in California has the vision of the progressive educationist been more clearly, perhaps even naively, expressed. Both the official ideology, and the daily utterances of presidents and provosts, announce the ideal of a democracy of skilled producers and educated consumers. Nowhere is there more optimistic determination that schools and colleges can deliver such an elevated society.

If, then, we examine the possibilities of completing the journey to the "Californian dream" while mindful of the difficulties and of our own deficiencies, we shall thereby most effectively answer the general question of how much can be learned by OECD from the western coast of America.

The first point to accept about the map of the future is that there are immovable demographic contours. Most obviously, a population which has clearly moved into the new demographic regime of low fertility and increased longevity, combined with the recent and continuing influx of young immigrants, must give particular direction to educational policy. We would point to two such demographically based constraints on future progress. First, the cultural and economic background of the immigrants must imply priority of attention less to the postsecondary than to the K-12 stage of education. This will inevitably give rise to difficulties with the raising of resources and their allocation. The quality of postsecondary education is challenged not only by its own future needs for staff and facilities but even more by the quality and quantity of the 18 year olds whom it aspires universally to admit. Nor is this problem a leisurely preoccupation for the twenty-first century. Already in the 1990s the first demographic wave of relatively ill-prepared minority group children will come of postsecondary age.

Moreover, there is a second demographic difficulty. *The Twenty-First Century*⁸ details the approaching high rate of retirement of existing teachers. This phenomenon is a consequence of the educational expansion of the 1950s and 1960s. It poses the challenge of replacement, not only in simple numerical terms but also in the recruiting of a teaching force which reflects the social and ethnic composition of the new generation of students. Hence, the need for accelerated identification, training and promotion of ethnic minority teachers is already urgent.

⁸A background report by Clive Condren, *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century* (California Postsecondary Education Commission, 1988) and summarized in Part Three of the *Review*. This compilation of fact was an invaluable guide to us as Examiners.

A different set of constraints can be thought of as economic. The Californian aim is not only for a multicultural society but for a prosperous one in which production is based on a scientific culture. It therefore follows that a high output of both scientists and science must be part of the programme, that talent has to be mobilised whatever its social origin, and that future generations as a whole must be nurtured in a scientific culture which at the same time carries a universal consciousness of collective interdependence. The curriculum, from infancy through all the stages of upbringing and advanced education, is challenged to offer a wide cultivation in science, the social studies and the humanities so that all may know and appreciate the culture by which they live, and at the same time ensure the scientific advance and the technological skill that postindustrial society requires. Policies adequate to match this ambition will be a stern challenge to both teaching and research and will extend far beyond the boundaries of conventional or formal education to include the educative dimension of family life, the mass media and experience in the workplace.

Third, there are recognisable political constraints. Against the background of the dream of equity there are already clamorous demands from the relatively disadvantaged groups. Political support for an education system which may well be seen by some of the ethnic minorities as having denied them real opportunity in the past could easily be withheld in the future.

Given these demographic, economic and political difficulties, we can describe the Californian future as a dramatic challenge to both resolve and resource. The scale of the problems is such that the issue of balance between planning and market forces is surely a crucial one. There is no question, of course, of subsuming educational planning into the kind of command economy . . . [that existed in] . . . Eastern Europe. . . ⁹ California belongs with all other OECD countries to those political economies in which an optimal balance is sought between governmental and private enterprise and funding. The practical questions come in one form or another of the issue of how to articulate state and private interests. Discussion of these balances with respect to student support, the operation of schools and colleges, the funding and direction of research, the application of science to technological advance and the cooperation of educational with industrial enterprise can be usefully pursued in all OECD countries on the basis of what we have learned in California.

Debate on this broad issue of planning and the market is in any case especially opportune, given two facts: first, many if not most Californians are committed to the minimisation of state expenditure and the maximisation of private funding. Second, some OECD countries, especially in

⁹Referred to in Chapter 2 of the *Review*.

Western Europe, have been moving their policies in the same ideological direction against a tradition of strong state management in educational affairs. It is true that decreasing taxes provide, in particular, resources to people, who can therefore decide to allocate them partly for their personal education strategies in the schools of their choice. These tax rebates can complement public funding or substitute for it; but they are lightly effective for the less privileged groups and even the lower middle class, as they do not pay much tax, and they therefore rely on the political promises of free education for all, and thus for their own children's schooling: an historical cornerstone of Californian citizenship. This is where the priorities are, and they imply strong public support for education.

Our own tentative view is that the challenge of developing citizen opportunity in a multicultural society, of offering high quality education in science and the humanities to all, and of ensuring the renewal of scientific and technological culture in competition with the rest of the world, is one which cannot hope to be met without extension of resources for education and therefore more systematic overall policies and planning at all levels of the education system, and particularly at the state level which has to allocate public funds. Such policies might also be addressed more actively to the problems of reconciling the search for better performances in teaching the mass of Californians and the necessity to save scarce financial resources and human expertise.

Much of what we have written may be held to support this general view. Thus, though we have admired Californian science and technology, we have also observed dissatisfaction with basic education, especially in the high schools. Similarly, though we have been hugely impressed by the expansion of opportunity, we have also noted the differentially high dropout rates among Hispanic and Black students in high schools and from undergraduate courses. The mission of the community colleges has also commanded our respect for its audacious universalism. But the community colleges are in difficulties with respect to financial support, are plagued with the threat, as Joshua Smith¹⁰ has expressed it, of being a parking lot for students and educational tasks left by other segments, and have a patchy and unsatisfactory record in their attempt to develop effective transfer programmes to the four-year colleges.

If we lean towards shifting the balance in favour of political rather than private effort, our theoretical reasoning turns on the distinction between public and private goods. . . . [S]cience is a public good, technology more of a private good; technology can be appropriated, science belongs to us all.¹¹

¹⁰The predecessor of David Mertes as Chancellor of the California Community Colleges system.

¹¹For an elaboration of these points, see Chapter 8 of the *Review*.

It follows that the nurturing of science is a collective responsibility and therefore appropriate to the political process and to public funding. Similarly, education is at least in part a public good; and training, like technology, is a private accomplishment or property which can be bought or sold according to the preferences of buyers and sellers. Education on the other hand, through its "neighbourhood effects," is a public good: in a post-industrial and multicultural society education is an essential feature for both the integration and further progress of any country which lives by it.

Of course, the line between public and private, which perhaps the distinction between education and training only partly captures, is hard to draw. We might reasonably argue that education as a consumption or as a positional good should be thought of as private, and that only education as a production good be entitled to a place in the public realm. But at all events, all countries consciously or unconsciously make political decisions about this distinction when they construct their policies for taxation and educational expenditure. Present patterns in California can be looked at in this light, and again our tentative suggestion is that the nurturing of scientific culture, and the aims of universal access with equity between different social groups, must imply considerable support by government to education as a public good.

Whether or not this general view is justified, we must expect considerable debate about the Californian future in terms of governmental responsibility. All postsecondary institutions would like greater public support in order to face their future responsibilities for larger numbers of admissions and higher expectations of successful retention and of improvements in co-ordination with other schools and colleges. Not everyone is satisfied with the pattern of grants and loans, especially those who are most anxious to improve the ratio of educated people of ethnic minority origin. Private colleges are particularly worried about the growing tuition gap. They advocate more generous public support to students, which would leave them freer to use their own funds. Public institutions, and especially the community colleges, seek larger institutional grants to enable them to raise the quality of their offering.

Yet the sources of public finance remain severely limited in California by the constitutional constraints introduced by Proposition 13 and the Gann ceiling. Together with similar policies at the federal level, the state thrusts heavy responsibility on to private charity and private willingness to buy educational products. Of course, economic growth and a growing class of graduates give California a fertile soil for the cultivation of private generosity to the universities and colleges. But it may be questioned whether private funding is adequate to the educational ambitions that the Californians have set themselves and whether the expected increasing competition for private funding will not, in the end, prove to be disadvantageous to public universities.

The Californian state budget links growth of real expenditure to the average rate of population growth. It thus ignores the special ethnic and age structure of the population from the point of view of educational demand. Moreover, there are other areas of public expenditure which are not equitably calculated from average population growth, for example social services to the elderly or penal services to a country afflicted by growing rates of crime. In consequence, education will have to compete more sharply for public funds and will itself be a divided house, given the claims of the three public segments and those of the fourth, the independent colleges and universities.

Finally, whatever the outcome of debate about public sources of finance, and quite independently of it, the case may be made that the coordinating activities of the state are too weak to guarantee the administration of the journey to the Californian dream. First, it may be questioned whether CPEC [California Postsecondary Education Commission] provides sufficiently strong coordination and even whether its admirable and continuing analyses of the state of the system are illuminating enough to show Californians exactly where they stand in relation to their aim to integrate their diverse peoples into a solidary, equitable and free society. It is not possible, for example, from existing studies to gauge exactly how open Californian society is in terms of educational achievement or occupational placement for men and women of different ethnic and social backgrounds.

Coordination between the postsecondary segments is largely based on cooperative procedures and dependent on the good will of the interested parties. Collective decision-making is incremental and undoubtedly CPEC has given substantial aid in long-range planning and in evaluation. It is, however, a reasonable object of debate as to whether arrangements could be improved through a clearer hierarchy (of objectives), a better demonstration of different, cumulative and sensitive factors which might create emergency situations, and of combined ways to cope with them through a clearer definition of the functions of CPEC and the Round Table [a voluntary committee of business and educational leaders]. How far can monitoring and control be separated? Is there a case for more active communication and persuasion of the public through the mass media in favour of the general educational interest, and is this a job for CPEC?

We do not know, and are far from suggesting that the world be made over to bureaucrats. We do not take it for granted that the central ministries in Europe serve education better than the mixed advisory bodies, and that private supporters serve California. We do, however, incline to the view that social science analysis has not been mobilised, even in California, to the task of informing civic and political leaders of the pathways and their pitfalls towards what has to be recognised as a magnificently ambitious educational, social and economic goal.

We have enjoyed and learnt from our experience in California. We have no brief to absorb this western redoubt into Europe. If we have ventured opinions, our intention is more to encourage than to dogmatise. It may be recalled that Daniel Defoe gives to his Moll Flanders and her Lancashire husband a transatlantic life. They spent the major part of their lives in Europe—she as a whore, he as a highwayman. They were [caught, convicted, punished and eventually] rescued by transportation to Virginia where they made an honest fortune as planters. They then returned to England to dwell at ease. They resolved to spend their remaining days in sincere repentance for the wicked lives they had lived.

THE PARIS REVIEW, 1989¹²

[The "confrontation" or review meeting took place in Paris on May 30th, 1989. The European habitués of international congress were interested in, if skeptical of, news from the "State o' California" bearing buoyant modernity from a new nation to an ancient civilization, which was symbolically engaged in sober celebration of the bicentenary of the French Revolution.—A. H. H.]

Altogether it was an exhausting as well as lively day of debate. The exchanges across the east and west of the OECD map were the culmination of much visiting, discussion and writing, not all of which can be encapsulated in this record of confrontation. Both the Examiners' Report and the Background Report Summary are indispensable components of a more complete account. In this wider context, it may be useful to record some of the more memorable impressions made on the rapporteur by the discussion between the country delegates, the Californians and the examiners.

The underlying great question as to the transferability of Californian educational expansiveness was not and could not be wholly settled. Cultures and social organisations do, of course, travel in space and in time, but they are inevitably transformed in their new milieu. The emphasis all through the review meeting was on the possibility of transfer from west to east, from California to Europe, bearing in mind that Japan, which has travelled along its own peculiar trajectory towards mass higher education, is of special interest to California. But the Californians themselves were reminded by coming to Paris, and they reminded their OECD colleagues on the occasion, that their "four-year institutions" are still seen by themselves as essentially a legacy of medieval Europe. And the lights by which these universities live reveal an "idea of the university," a set of notions about research and

¹²Part Two: Record of the Review Meeting, Conclusion: Rapporteur's Retrospect," in *Review*, 121-123.

teaching, autonomy, responsibilities to science, scholarship and students, which are not essentially different from their counterparts in Europe or any other continent. The similarities, not the differences, are the abiding features of the academic enterprise.

What is thought of as an American and especially Californian innovation is the community college. We saw and we discussed its difficulties and especially its recent history of funding frailty due to the loosening of local responsibility and control. Yet no delegate can have departed from the meeting without a clear image of the uniqueness of the community college as a comprehensive institution belonging to higher education, as offering an open door to transfer courses that link secondary to higher education, and at the same time as a revolving door into every kind of vocational, specialist, adult and continuing education. If a distinctive Californian educational export is on offer to OECD, it is the community college.

But that is far from the whole story. If it were, there might well be interminable argument about its significance, with European traditionalists claiming alternative recognition of the merits and the capacity for expansion of secondary schools and what the British call "further education." Some critical conservatives might even still hold that, properly measured, the American, including the Californian, population is no better educated in letters and science or practical skill than are the people of Western Europe. Many more would be convinced that the structure is, taken as a whole, an adequate apparatus of access to an immense range of higher academic and professional learning. Above all, what almost no one can deny is the fact that Californian educational faith is the extraordinarily strong fuel that makes the apparatus work. It deserves specification if its transferability is to be correctly assessed.

In such a specification it is easiest and most important to recognise what Californian faith is not. It is not, for all its superficial sentiment, an empty liturgy of education piety. The Californian postsecondary system is the most expansive in the world because its students, patrons and customers demand it. Belief in higher education has a quasi-religious character. It is the individual road to economic, psychological and social salvation. It is the source of skilled labour for employers, of expertise for government, of innovation for entrepreneurs, of cultivation for citizens. For educational administrators, professors, provosts and presidents it is a mission to deliver civilised prosperity. Thus, higher education in California is a secular church for practical visionaries. If they talk about it out of as well as in season, their rhetoric is not vacuous.

Equally, the Californian faith—liberal and entrepreneurial as it is—is not, in practice, antipathetic to the state. The underlying common sentiment certainly prefers individual to state responsibility. And it is true that the independent colleges and the private purse are readily commended by the majority of educational leaders, and that suspicion of Sacramento is easily

excited. But nothing could be of greater distortion or of greater disservice to current policy debate in the European OECD countries or in Japan than the idea that California is the exemplar of a free market system of higher education. It is placed at the western end of the spectrum of political economies of education. But it is in fact a tendency and not at all a pure case of free market organisation.

The particular Californian genius is that of combining public with private enterprise, of devising constructive competition and cooperation between and among both public and private institutions. Each of the Californian segments of higher education is aware that it cannot fulfill its own distinctive mission without the existence of and support from the others. It is this complex of creativity, and emphatically not the simplistic translation of the message into insistence on education as privatised competitive industry, that can usefully be exported from California to the OECD world.

More positively, it became manifest during the discussion that, liberals though they be, the Californians are akin to the new liberals of the United Kingdom at the end of the nineteenth century rather than the pure marketeers of the earlier decades. They are not latter-day followers of Herbert Spencer. They see no viable future for higher education in California without the strong frame and steady financial support of the political state. Furthermore, they look beyond their own state to the federal government, expect generous support for both research and student maintenance, and see themselves as a kind of entrepreneurial instrument, providing the infrastructure for successful competition in the federal arena.

In a sense they are more aptly described as democrats than liberals. There is a keen appreciation of the dependence of education on popular support. If educational leadership does not meet the demands of popular aspiration, then political patronage will be withdrawn. This is no ideological creed: rather, it is a pragmatic realism about the conditions for successful development of education. Nor are individualistic sentiments hardened into doctrinaire ideology. On the contrary, Californian liberalism is hard-headed and also pragmatic. It is clearly recognised that tax laws can raise or reduce philanthropy. The Californian laws, rather than any miraculous social generosity, explain why so much private money flows into the independent colleges and the public institutions. Pragmatism manifests itself again and again in examples of collaboration across the boundaries of the formally public and formally private sector. The market drives, and competition rules, but the distinction between the private and the public is blurred and but lightly defended.

Finally, one cannot but be impressed by the ever-buoyant optimism of the Californian educational institutions. As President Gardner put it, "the gold rush began in 1849 and has never stopped." People come to California looking for a better life. By common consent they almost believe in the

nineteenth-century idea of progress, even though they would deny formal adherence to such historicism if challenged. They nonetheless behave as if a better future is always there to be found. They believe that education is the steadfast friend of social progress and they are wholeheartedly committed to this idea. Yet, when they contemplate the constraints which have been put on public support through Proposition 13, Proposition 98 and the Gann ceiling, they draw what may seem to some Europeans a surprising conclusion. If it turned out that the Californians had to choose between an expansion involving the dropping of standards at the apex of their structure of public higher education in the University of California, they would with sadness but without hesitation sacrifice quantity to quality. The expansion programme presupposes a thriving economy and willingness to pay. If there is prosperity, the education system will expand it further. But if there is economic recession or failure to support education with dollars, then the ultimate value for California's educational leadership would be to preserve the high standards that have been so dearly won from their past efforts.

The California Master Plan of 1960 for Higher Education: An Ex Ante View

Clark Kerr

Thirty years ago the Master Plan came into being. It was on February 1, 1959, that Roy Simpson, the Superintendent of Public Instruction and also the executive head of the California State Board of Education, representing the state colleges, and I, representing the University of California, went before the Legislature asking for the opportunity to prepare a Master Plan.

At the time, it never occurred to us that that Plan would remain so intact as it has thirty years later, and after three official reviews by the State of California. It never occurred to us that thirty years later it would be subject to so favorable a review by so distinguished a panel of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Examiners concerned with implications beyond California. It never occurred to us that George Papadopoulos and Dorotea Furth, on behalf of OECD, would consider this Plan worthy of study, or that "Chelly" (A. H.) Halsey, Michio Nagai and Pierre Tabatoni would join in reviewing the Plan.

THE AGORA NOT THE ACROPOLIS

Our concerns then were mostly with the 1960s and, to a lesser extent, the 1970s and the 1980s, and *entirely* with California. We did not even think, although it was called "the Master Plan," that we really were developing a Plan. What we really were engaged in was negotiating a treaty among the constituent parts of higher education in California that would, at the same time, be acceptable to the Governor and Legislature of the State. We wanted a structure for planning, not a Plan. We wanted what, in carpentry terms, would be called a "roughed-in" structure, a framework for detailed

development—what the Germans call a *Rahmengesetz*. And we certainly did not want—in fact we were trying to avoid—a plan in the sense of a document that was specifically regimenting, rigid, and sufficient unto itself.

But these OECD Examiners came in from an *ex-post* point of view, evaluating what we did—the quality of our solutions; and also what might be the possible implications for states or nations elsewhere. We, on the other hand, were not concerned with any long-term evaluation of what we might accomplish. We were engaged in current problem solving. The call was then before us to achieve a local and contemporary solution. We did not think we were preparing a Model. We had no thought that we were preparing a Model at all, in the sense of something that might be imitated elsewhere. We were not even preparing a Model in the sense of trying to maximize a solution here. To use terms from economics: we were not trying to "maximize" ultimate real benefits; rather, we were engaged in "satisfying" current felt needs—looking for a solution which was satisfying in the shorter run. Consequently, we were not conscious of ourselves as making history at all.

The Master Plan has been called "The California Dream." We were not dreaming The California Dream. Actually, for those of us who were involved, we were more trying to escape the nightmare that was otherwise facing us. We were not engaged in a high level, sophisticated weighing of theoretical alternatives, but the very low level, practical examination of possible solutions. We were not on the Acropolis looking back on events, but down in the Agora, the marketplace, making deals under the discipline of time deadlines. But the philosophers up there, way above us, thirty years later, now conclude that our deals had some elements of permanent and perhaps universal value. And they see, today, more in what we did then, than we ourselves saw at the time.

Reading the OECD report when it first came out, I was reminded of a University meeting at Berkeley many years ago when Robert Frost was our speaker. Frost, as he did so well, read from his poems, but he also made comments about being a poet. He said, among other things, that when he wrote a poem, he always knew the first implication of what he was saying. Sometimes he had a dim view of what a second implication was that might be read into it. But only the commentators—the critics—knew for absolute certainty what his third, fourth, fifth and sixth and seventh intentions were. And I have to note that our Examiners are reading a bit more into what we did then than we had in mind at the time.

The following is an account of how the development of the Master Plan looked and felt to us who were involved. This will be a personal account of how it felt to be on the playing field that day.

ORIGINS OF THE PLAN

Specifically, the Master Plan began in Regent Edward Carter's living room in Los Angeles in August 1958. It was my second meeting with The Board of Regents after becoming President of the University of California on July 1st. Ed Carter was the Chairman of the Committee on Educational Policy. I went before that committee and said that the University was in an almost impossible position. We were facing immense growth, but we did not know what our responsibilities were going to be—for undergraduate training, for Ph.D. degrees, for professional degrees, for research.

Some of the state colleges wanted to become full-fledged universities. Some of the community colleges wanted to become four-year colleges. The private colleges felt threatened by what they considered to be the insensitive expansion of the public sectors. Would the University continue to be the sole provider of Ph.D. and high level professional training (medicine, law, engineering, architecture and other professions) and of basic research among the public sectors; or would it share these responsibilities? Would the University continue to have undergraduate teaching, and particularly in the lower division? How many new campuses would there be and in which of the public sectors and where located? What would be the admission requirements in each public sector? How would the public sectors be coordinated—by the State of California or by themselves? The Board of Regents expected me to plan for the future of the University, but everything was up in the air—the atmosphere was an impossible one for planning. The leaders of the other sectors faced similar imponderables. What plans could each of us make separately; or would the State of California tell us what to do?

We were under the pressure of time. The tyranny of time was very much in our consciousness. The "tidal wave" of students was just about to sweep onto our shores. The birth rate for women of childbearing age after World War II was about 3.6. The net reproduction rate, which maintains the population, is 2.1; and 3.6 was the highest rate in modern American history. All those young people, born of the Baby Boom, were on their way to our doors. Beyond that, half a million new people were migrating into California each year. And even beyond that, we were making the great transition from mass access to higher education to universal access. Putting all three of these together, it was clear that we were going to be engulfed and would need to be ready.

In addition, there was Sputnik not so long before—in the fall of 1957. America's research universities had particularly been called upon to produce more and better research than ever before, facing what was then considered to be a great world crisis for us. It was also the time when economists began talking about what Adam Smith had talked about in 1776 in *The Wealth of Nations*: the importance of human capital as well as of physical

capital, possibly being more important than physical capital itself. We, in higher education, were being called upon to produce higher skills for more occupations than ever before.

There was another pressure, and that was that the State Legislature was in the process of taking over the determination of higher education policy, taking it away from higher education itself. There were dozens of bills before the Legislature to change different aspects of higher education and to create new campuses across the state. We were particularly worried because there just had been created by legislative action—not at the request of the State Board of Education—a new state college. This state college was in a little town called Turlock, which is a nice little town, a respectable little town, famous, until the state college was put there, only for one thing: there were more turkeys raised and slaughtered there per year than anywhere else in the world. But Turlock also had the Chairman of the Senate's Committee on Education (and the Speaker of the Assembly came from nearby Modesto), and he had gotten through a bill which said that in Turlock, along with all their turkeys, there would be a new state college. The Legislature also approved a new state college in Sonoma, which was far down on the priority list of the State Board.

We in the University of California became nervous. Was the Legislature going to take over? We were particularly sensitive to Turlock and Sonoma because in 1944 the state Legislature had given to the University—not requested by it—the Santa Barbara State College, which later on (after 1958) became a great asset to the University, but in 1944 was imposed on the University. We were not anxious to see such intrusions by the Legislature into what we considered the internal affairs of higher education happen again. We were all very conscious then of our claimed autonomy. We were deeply concerned by any indications that the political process was taking over.

In spite of all the complications, we met the pressure of time. Eighteen months after the meeting at Regent Carter's house, and twelve months after Roy Simpson and I went to the Legislature and asked for a year's grace to prepare the Master Plan, we had a Master Plan, endorsed unanimously by The Regents of the University and by the Academic Senate, by the State Board of Education—also unanimously but with reluctant agreement by some of the presidents of the state colleges and their faculties; unanimously by the Community College Association; unanimously by the independent colleges and universities. And in the Legislature, when the votes came, there was a ringing endorsement: in the Assembly, out of 70 voting, 70 were in favor. In the Senate, out of 37 voting there were 36 in favor. On April 26, 1960 the Plan became law with the Governor's signature. That was a year of extraordinarily hard work, under extraordinary pressures.

Thirty years later one looks back on something which, from current perspectives, might seem inevitable; but it was not. We were living under terrible pressures, day by day, to get it done; and we barely did.

UNCERTAINTIES

There were great difficulties. In fact, there was no Master Plan until the very last moment. It almost seemed as if we had fallen short. There was major conflict between the state colleges and the University. The state colleges were in the process of becoming comprehensive colleges from normal schools training teachers, and were adding engineering and other fields. Every program they wanted to add had to go before a Liaison Committee consisting of representatives from the University and from the state colleges. Quite frequently the university representatives said "no" to whatever was requested, and when our representatives said "no," supposedly they could not do it. This created great tension between the two systems, increased by the fact that, from our point of view at the University, some of the state colleges, having been vetoed by the University, just went ahead and did what they wanted to do in some roundabout disguised way. And we thought that was undesirable. Relations were getting worse and worse. State colleges at that time all over the nation were desirous of becoming full-fledged research universities, and there was one great model of a successful transition: Michigan State University, which had been a land-grant agricultural college as well as a teachers' college, but had been called Michigan State College. I sat on the sidelines, as Berkeley's Chancellor, during many of these Liaison Committee meetings and saw the great tension and antagonism between these two segments. Sometimes, with my head in my hands, I would sit there worrying about what I heard.

Some of the community colleges also had high aspirations. Almost inevitably, some of them would have liked to become four-year institutions. Also they wanted to expand to cover the state; and they opposed the giving of a competitive two-year degree by some of the state colleges—in the course of development of the Master Plan they won on both of these points. The private colleges feared that the public sector would overwhelm them, and set up campuses right next door to where they each were. What would the Board of Education do? The Board was in charge of the state colleges, since they provided most of the teachers for the high schools and elementary schools under Board control. Would the Board be willing to release the colleges from being under their control? And if so, what might these colleges become? With the Legislature increasingly exercising its inherent power over higher education, what might it decide about the future of these colleges? We did not know. We did know that the Legislature had given us one year to prepare a Master Plan on the assumption that we could not

agree and that the political representatives would then have the chance to make the decisions in the end.

It was also unclear what role the new Governor in the fall of 1958, Pat Brown, would play. He was widely quoted (or misquoted) by state college representatives from a presentation he had made at Chico State during the campaign. He was said to have committed himself to making the state colleges into university campuses. And some state college representatives were very hopeful about the "promise," and it greatly encouraged them. And there was a member of the Governor's staff—Fred Dutton—who later was a Regent of the University of California. He stated quite boldly that the University of California was the wave of the past and the state colleges were the wave of the future; that the University was a conservative, elitist, Republican institution (and its Regents largely were Republicans), and that the state colleges were progressive, mass oriented, Democratic institutions (and its first trustees, still to be appointed, largely were Democrats)—the state colleges were the institutions for "the next thousand years." What would come out of the Governor's office? We did not know.

NEGOTIATING THE PLAN

Some of these uncertainties went unresolved to the very end. And then, at the last meeting we were having in the Regents' Room in University Hall at Berkeley, it all broke down. Several of the state college presidents were in revolt. This was in December 1959. We were terribly worried that it was all over. There was a summit meeting in my office in University Hall to try to put it back together again. There were seven or eight of us at that meeting. On behalf of the University were Regent Donald McLaughlin, Dean McHenry, and myself. Regent McLaughlin was the Chairman of the Board and McHenry the Dean of Academic Planning. For the state colleges were Roy Simpson, William L. Blair, Chairman of the State Board of Education, and Glenn Dumke, the President of San Francisco State College and the leader of the presidents' group. Louis Heilbron, of the State Board was, I believe, also there. And from the private sector there was Arthur Coons, President of Occidental College and Chairman of the Master Plan Study Committee.

At this summit meeting, we tried desperately to put an agreement back together again after the revolt against it by several of the most influential of the state college presidents. All of us there knew the consequences if we did not: we would have to go to the Legislature and say, "We failed. It is now up to you." The University made its last concession—the final "sweetener"—and it turned out to be enough to do it. I proposed that the University

join the state colleges in giving joint Ph.D. degrees.¹ This was accepted. And so there got to be a Master Plan at about six o'clock that night; but, in the middle of the afternoon, there was not going to be any Master Plan, or so it appeared.

Few heavily contested issues are settled any better than the process and people who are involved. So it was with the Master Plan, and I should like to step back in time to indicate what happened after that first meeting on the subject with the Regents in August 1958 when they agreed that I should initiate an effort at what became the Master Plan. We were just absolutely stalemated in the Liaison Committee between the state colleges and the University. And so I went to Roy Simpson, and said, "Roy, the Liaison Committee is not working." He agreed. "We do not want the Legislature to take over." He agreed. "Nor do we want some outside group of consultants to come into California and tell us what to do. Can't we find some way we can cope with it ourselves?" Then I made the suggestion that we bring into the process the community colleges that had always been a part of the schools and not part of higher education. I said, "If we bring them in, that makes it three, and they deserve to be part of the process. But why not also bring in the private colleges because they have an interest, too, and that makes four. Maybe we can get agreements out of four parties where we cannot get them out of two stalemated parties." Then I suggested that, to assure the impartiality of the process, the chairman be from the private sector. Roy agreed. Each of these agreements was of extreme importance. It was particularly daring to suggest that so much influence be given to the private sector.

This was a very high-minded set of proposals. All of these parties were affected. They all had a stake in the solutions. There was also a more low-minded aspect, and that was the one I just mentioned: that you could get a solution among three or four parties where you could not with only two who were so antagonistic towards each other. There was even a lower-minded reason, below that, which was that I considered that the University's relations with the private institutions and the community colleges were better at that time than were the relations of the state colleges. In the course of my life I have come to love situations where the high-minded reasons and the low-minded reasons support each other, and this was one of those.

¹I got the idea from Herman Wells, President of Indiana University, who had made a similar arrangement with Ball State.

THE ISSUES

What were the big issues, the central items? Differentiation of functions among the segments was the key point. Student admission levels that each segment would have also needed to be determined to reflect the differentiation of functions. Everyone liked the idea that the community colleges would be making eligible *all* high school graduates in the state and that community colleges would spread throughout the state in many locations so that every high school graduate would be within commuting distance of a community college. And now today the community colleges have 1,400,000 students. Then they had 300,000.

The state colleges then admitted roughly the top 50 percent of the students out of high school. They agreed to go down to 33 percent. This meant that the state colleges gave up some students to the community colleges; but, as a result, somewhat more able students went, on the average, to the state colleges. We in the University agreed to go down from 15 percent of high school graduates to 12.5 percent. This had the same impact: more students for the community colleges and somewhat more for the state colleges, and a University student body with higher academic credentials. Then we added transfer rights, which were very important, so that anybody who did reasonably well in a community college could transfer either to a state college or to the University of California. This also meant that there would need to be more articulation among the curricula of the community colleges, the state colleges and the University so that credits could be transferred and requirements met—also a very important point.

We had to agree upon some system of coordination, because we not only wanted to have our own plan, we also wanted to keep it within our control. We set up a coordinating council with representatives from all four segments. This was later changed to bring in public representatives. The coordinating process did not work too well until Pat Callan became director of the California Postsecondary Education Commission in 1978. We had had difficulty before that time, but when Pat came in, in his quiet way, with his good judgment, with his very considerable ability, and with the accumulating trust from all four segments of higher education, it began to work well.

For the state colleges quite a lot was done. Rather than treat their proposals on a micro basis, program by program, we went macro—anything they wanted within their overall mission. We agreed that they should have masters degree programs *across the board*, and would never again have to ask the Regents of the University of California for permission. This was placed within their sole jurisdiction. Also we agreed that they would be eligible for some state research support for studies that were related to their levels of instruction—which meant the more applied fields. We agreed to help them secure their own board of trustees, which they did. We also

agreed to try to secure for them—but were unsuccessful—the same constitutional independence as the University of California itself had and which was so very important to our development. Also, we agreed to help the state colleges to escape from a line item budget approach by the State Department of Finance. And then, at the very end, we established the possibility of joint Ph.D. degrees between the University of California, with its worldwide renown, and the state colleges. This gave them academic recognition which they welcomed.

The private colleges received an opportunity to participate in making decisions previously made entirely without them via membership in the coordinating mechanism, and this included discussion of the location of new public campuses. Also, support was given to the state tuition scholarship program, which did much more for them than for the public institutions.

The community colleges, instead of being part of secondary education, became a part of higher education. And they were given the opportunity to provide guaranteed universal access to higher education for the first time in world history anywhere.

The University kept what were called its "crown jewels"—the Ph.D. and other advanced degrees beyond the M.A., and basic research.

The state colleges were allotted five new campuses and the University three; and the community colleges had the prospect (and later reality) of many.

We did all this without any academic studies, without the advantage of all the literature that the OECD Examiners have so clearly and excellently presented. Almost none of that literature then existed, so we had to do without it. Had it existed, some of us who were working on this probably would not have known it did exist. If we had known it did exist, I am not sure we would have read it. If we had read it, I am not sure we could have understood it. If we had understood it, I am not sure we would have used it anyway. So much for all that high quality literature.

PHILOSOPHICAL ORIENTATIONS

We all had some preconceptions. To the extent that I was being philosophical about it, I thought of Thomas Jefferson as a guide. John Rawls had not then produced his *Theory of Justice* or I would certainly have had him in mind also. Jefferson wrote in the Declaration of Independence that "all men are created equal," but he also believed, as practiced at the University of Virginia, that unequal treatment should be given to carefully selected students at that university. Jefferson's position was that to make a democracy work, among other things, you needed to have a well-educated populace across the board, since the people themselves are given the power to govern themselves. But he also believed that there needed to be an

"aristocracy of talent" to provide the skills of leadership and the technical skills of doctors and lawyers and so forth in the society. Rawls' point of view was somewhat the same. Rawls said that it was "just" to be unequal in the education provided if, first, all young people had equal opportunity to show their merit. And second if, once they obtained their special skills, these skills were of benefit to the least advantaged members of the total population. So I had in mind that we wanted universal access, but we also wanted a margin for excellence as well.

The second philosophical orientation of which I was conscious was agreement with Benjamin Franklin on the importance of "useful knowledge,"—of all useful knowledge and not just the most theoretical; that all useful knowledge was worthy of respect; and that the test was not the type of the knowledge but the quality of it regardless of the type.² I was raised in an agricultural community of farmers and craft workers and greatly admired their skills and knowledge. Thus it seemed to me that the worth of the community colleges was not measured by the level of knowledge they taught but by the quality of their teaching; so also for the state colleges; and so also for the University. All had important roles to play and it was important that they play them well. This orientation, perhaps, made me somewhat insensitive to aspirations for every institution to concentrate on the same higher level of knowledge when all levels were useful and absolutely necessary.

Another basic view I had in mind was from John Maynard Keynes. I refer to his view that it was not effective to have either a totally atomistic economy or a totally controlled economy; that it was better to have a guided economy at a macro level with atomistic decisions at the micro level. In higher education, I feared that atomistic competition would lead to all institutions seeking to homogenize themselves with similar academic missions as research universities and that, while this would serve their academic ambitions, other functions also very important to society, including universal access and the training of middle-level advanced skills, would be neglected. Thus the idea of decentralization and competition within a framework of guided missions; thus "guidance" in a "treaty" versus detailed directions in a "Plan," and versus unbridled self-interest at the other extreme.

²See also the discussion in John W. Gardner, *Excellence: Can We Be Equal and Excellent Too?* (New York, 1961), 131 ("We must foster a conception of excellence which may be applied to every degree of ability and to every socially acceptable activity.") and 160, "[E]xcellence implies more than competence. It implies a striving for the highest standards in every phase of life. We need individual excellence in all its forms—in every kind of creative endeavor, in political life, in education, in industry—in short, universally."

The fourth orientation was the importance of the autonomy of institutions of higher education—an orientation then intensely shared by the Board of Regents and faculties of the University of California, and by all the other segments of higher education. But autonomy is not a right. It must be constantly earned and earned by responsible conduct and effective service to society. James Madison, among the authors of our Constitution, particularly supported the social value of shared power among several relatively autonomous institutions. We would advance our autonomy by developing a Master Plan that well fitted the needs of the state.

The four above philosophical orientations are standard American convictions and, judging by results, were mostly shared by all of us working on the Master Plan, although we did not discuss them directly. They were the background music.

In the back of all our minds were, additionally, four great practical imperatives—when one thinks back on our discussions. (1) We had to have viable solutions for society, not only a "treaty" among the four segments. We also had to be concerned with ways to meet societal needs at large in the state in a way that would succeed in securing the support of the Legislature and the population.

This in turn, meant that (2) it was imperative for us to satisfy, as best we could, the egalitarian desires of an egalitarian people in an increasingly egalitarian state; and also a very diverse state already at that time in terms of population origins. That meant access to higher education for everyone.

The next imperative (3) was the meritocratic imperative to help produce for society highly trained scientists and doctors and lawyers—people given special opportunities, the meritocratic imperative in a society increasingly based upon high knowledge and high skills.

There was another imperative: (4) the labor market imperative. The occupational structure of the state and the nation was changing rapidly with many more "in between" occupations coming along at the upper levels of the occupational structure requiring four and five year degrees. We had to meet the labor market requirements of a modern industrial society.

Our task was to put together, in a way that might succeed, solutions to begin to respond to these four great imperatives all at once. The first imperative affected all segments jointly; the second particularly the community colleges; the third particularly the University; and the fourth particularly the state colleges. The "treaty" was aimed at meeting—through joint efforts—all four imperatives.

THE PLAYERS ON THIS SMALL STAGE

A final comment is on the roles of the people involved. We were so very fortunate. We could not have taken any major step without the

agreement of Roy Simpson, the Superintendent of Public Instruction. Roy took no initiatives. But he was a statesman. Among many other things, he was willing to see his Board of Education give up its historic supervision of the state colleges.

Louis Heilbron, member of the State Board of Education and later a chair of the new Board of Trustees of the State Colleges, always felt that, for the sake of the people of the state, the University ought to keep "the crown jewels" of research and top level professional training. So he supported this differentiation of function.

Glenn Dumke, the chief representative of the presidents of the state colleges, was under a great deal of pressure from some of his colleagues not to have an agreement, to wait instead to see whether or not they could get full university status through the political process. He stood up against enormous pressures, including during a long automobile ride with several of his fellow presidents. There were those presidents who wanted discussion limited only to securing university status; and they were supported by many of their faculty members. And several presidents had promised their faculties that they would get them university status. Many faculty members had their Ph.D. degrees from leading research universities and had looked forward to employment within this segment of higher education. To them, the state colleges were graveyards of disappointed personal expectations. Glenn Dumke, in addition, always kept any agreement he made.

Then Dean McHenry: He was the University's principal representative in the detailed negotiations and contributed all kinds of ideas. The University could not possibly have had a more skilled and devoted representative. His contributions were heroic.

Arthur Coons, President of Occidental College and Chairman of the Study Group, never suggested, in any way, that the process should be directed particularly to serve the private institutions; and he was totally impartial among the three public segments. Robert Wert, Vice Provost at Stanford, took the same positions. Both of them were very skilled in human relations.

And then the Governor, Edmund G. "Pat" Brown. He gave us encouragement and respected what we were trying to do. He had a difficult task, he knew, to finance the enormous expansion of higher education that went particularly with commitment to universal access. He fulfilled that with great distinction. He had to appoint the trustees to the new board for the state colleges, and he made good appointments, as he did for the Board of Regents. He came to view the Master Plan as one of the great triumphs of his administration.

And the legislative leaders, a large number of them, but particularly Dorothy Donahoe in the Assembly and her assistant, Keith Sexton, were devoted in their support of the Plan. Among senators, Walter Stiern played a leading role, as did George Miller.

Throughout the negotiations, the community colleges were ably represented by Howard A. Campion and Henry T. Tyler. Thomas C. Holy and Arthur D. Brown were joint staff members for the University and the state colleges, respectively.

All of these people had to be statesmanlike. And all of them were. My field is industrial relations, and I have been involved in many disputes between "capital" and "labor." Some outsiders have a view of monolithic capital versus monolithic labor. It is always more complex than that. I discovered that years and years ago. All parties are divided. What looks externally like one bargain between "capital" and "labor" is really three bargains because there is bargaining going on within each unit, bargaining going on within the trade union and within management. And when the bargaining between capital and labor fails, it is usually caused by the failure of the bargaining *within* labor or *within* management. In the Master Plan, we not only had two, but six, parties involved.³ We had divisions within each of them, but particularly within the state colleges. Their leaders were the ones who had to face the greatest internal divisions and thus had the greatest responsibility for bringing their contending points of view together. And representing the state colleges at our summit were men who, under compulsive pressures from the people they represented, stood up and did the statesmanlike thing: Roy Simpson, William Blair, Louis Heilbron, Glenn Dumke. They deserve the most respect of all.

Overall, it was a kind of marvel of human relations, maybe even a miracle, that the Master Plan was put together at the last moment. It was not the inevitable result of elemental forces and the automatic consequences flowing from them. It was only put together because a particular group of human beings came together under particular circumstances and rose to the occasion.

In any event, what we did in the dust and dirt and confusion down in the marketplace with much sweat, a little blood, and an occasional tear has now been blessed by the favorable verdict of three decades of California history, and now also by the mostly supportive analysis presented in so lively a fashion by the three wise men in their roles as OECD Examiners.

California has one of the better systems of higher education, public and private taken together, in the nation. There are many reasons over the past century and a half why this should be true. One of those reasons is that it was possible in that short period of time when all this pressure had surfaced for us to put together the Master Plan. It was intended to solve the problems of that time and that place, yet it has endured now for three decades. And it may even hold some lessons for other places. For nearly

³The Governor's office, the Legislature, the private institutions, the state colleges, the community colleges and the University.

everywhere in the industrial world, five central issues confront higher education of how to satisfy both (1) the egalitarian and (2) the meritocratic imperatives and to decide (3) by which institutions; and (4) on whether to rely on a plan, or on "guidance" or on atomistic competition; and (5) how much should be controlled by higher education itself and how much by the state. The California Master Plan of 1960 faced all these issues and made decisions that met the tests of that time and that place.

As the OECD Report states, the Master Plan was "a distinctive attempt to reconcile populism with elitism"; an effort to combine "equality with excellence"; and "logic was superimposed on history" by integrating "both populist and elitist forces into one system." We did, at that moment, seize upon history and shape it rather than being overrun by it. At the time, it felt like the Perils of Pauline. In retrospect, it looks more like the triumph of collective good judgment.

Is California the Model for OECD Futures?

Burton R. Clark

The question posed as my topic is whether California can serve as "the model for OECD futures," or more broadly, whether California postsecondary arrangements are exportable. This query was apparently the underlying theme of the Spring 1989 "confrontation meeting" in Paris between California higher education representatives and OECD Examiners and delegates. The first requirement of a good answer to this question is a thorough understanding of the dynamics of the California system. And to fashion an explanation of how this system works, and why it works the way it does, we need to add to the OECD Examiner Report by pushing off in two directions.

TWO ANGLES OF VISION: UP AND DOWN

We should first bring the nation back in and put California in its proper place as a state. We need to highlight telling features of the U.S. system of higher education as a whole that are understated and even overlooked entirely when we tear California out of its natural habitat and pretend it is a nation. Here we ascend the scale of organization to a more inclusive level of context and motivation. Second, I want to reverse direction and move within the California system to examine critical features of its three major sectors of public higher education. Since these sectors are powerful actors, we need to grasp their self-amplifying tendencies. Each sector has dynamics that are not well explicated when we fix on environmental forces such as demographic trends and the formal intentions of state planners. We need to bring faculty and institutional administrators back into the picture, especially in a state system, and a national system, in which the springs of action are much more at the bottom than at the top. My two angles of

vision—the one up, the other down—come together in an effort to explain how a thoroughly bottom-up system of higher education works.

BRINGING THE NATION BACK IN

We can capture much of the special nature of American higher education, seen in cross-national comparison, in five primary characteristics: large size; radical decentralization; extreme diversity; intense competition; and a high degree of institutional initiative.¹

Large Size

The U.S. system is so large that it deserves to be called colossal. Over thirty-four hundred institutions, just on the accredited lists, is a mind-boggling number. Despite the geographic space that is provided in a continental nation for institutions to get out of each other's way, this exceedingly large number spells high organizational density overall, and high density within such major subsectors as doctoral-granting universities (200), comprehensive universities and colleges (600), liberal arts colleges (600), community colleges (now 1,400) and detached specialized institutions (600). Great size is also indexed by 13 million students and 800 thousand faculty. The U.S. student body is considerably larger than the entire population of such small European countries as Sweden, Norway, Finland and Austria. The American system has virtually as many faculty as the British system has students. In sheer size, the U.S. system, on various measures, is ten times, twenty times, fifty times larger than national systems, large and small, found on the European continent. We must not overlook the effects of such huge size; it interacts with the other primary characteristics to produce a special kind of system.

Radical Decentralization of Control

Among all advanced industrial nations, the American system exhibits extreme decentralization of control. Some 1,800 private institutions proceed largely on their own in finding niches in the ecology of the system. One by

¹For extended analysis of these five features, see Burton R. Clark, *The Higher Education System: Academic Organization in Cross-National Perspective* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1983), and *The Academic Life: Small Worlds, Different Worlds* (Princeton: The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 1987), especially Chapter 3, "The Open System," 45-66.

one they find the money to support themselves, assemble their own staff and build their own student body. Only a few other systems, notably in Japan and Brazil, have tasted privateness on any scale that approaches that of the United States. And in the U.S. picture, privateness has great historical depth, a richly embellished tradition, and much prestige in the form of leading institutions, both among the universities and the four-year colleges.

When we turn to public higher education, we find fifty systems, a bottom-heavy federalism in which state support and state authority dominate that of the national government. It is this break-up of public control that in the first instance makes sense of an OECD effort to study California alone. The private and public dispersion together constitute a unique national structure of control, one that in cross-national comparisons is positioned at the far end of a tight-to-loose continuum of control.

Extreme Institutional Diversity

The Carnegie classification reported in the OECD review, the best that we have, contains ten major categories of institutions that become twenty when the public-private distinction is run through each of them. And still the classification does not distinguish such important groupings as women's colleges, black colleges and Roman Catholic colleges. A classification with a finer mesh soon runs to thirty or forty categories, many of which still exhibit much internal variation, for example, lumping together as top research universities institutions that have 35 million federal research dollars with ones that have six and eight times that amount. If we try to make use of thirty or more categories we get lost among the trees and cannot see the forest. But when we work with fewer categories in order to see the forest—when for example we speak of three public sectors and a private sector in California—we radically understate the vast differences among individual institutions and groups thereof that have developed in a largely unplanned fashion.

Intense Competition

Decentralized public and private control set in motion a long time ago a restless proliferation of institutions. Back in the first half of the nineteenth century, long before the age of the college gave way to the age of the university, institutions were created under local initiative in number and at a rate unheard of in other countries. At a time when England had two places, Oxford and Cambridge, the United States developed hundreds of separate colleges. But as academic scientists in the late nineteenth century pointed out, what the U.S. had, by the standards of Europe, was a swarm of mosquitoes rather than a few soaring eagles. The eagles began to soar in the last three decades of the century, and in considerable number.

Such leading private colleges as Harvard, Yale and Princeton transformed themselves into full-bodied universities; such new private institutions as Johns Hopkins (1876), Clark University (1889), Stanford University (1891) and the University of Chicago (1892) were composed as universities; and each state soon sought to have at least one institution that could claim substantial university character. By 1900, decentralized control had led to a large number and wide range of universities. When the exclusive club—a voluntary association—known as the American Association of Universities (AAU) was formed in 1900, it had fourteen charter members (eleven private and three public), and many other campuses lined up at the door seeking admission. In 1990, the AAU has 56 members—and there is even a longer line at the door! At the same time, in a setting where institutional initiative was unbounded and stimulated, nonuniversity institutions, public and private, continued to proliferate, giving the U.S. a census of institutions that already approached a thousand at the turn of the century.

The decentralization of control and the institutional diversity that were well in place by the turn of the century have insured a twentieth-century system characterized by sharp competition for faculty, students and institutional status. Compared to that found in other nations, the U.S. system is an open one in which competitive disorder and a market-like status hierarchy heavily condition the ways that institutions define themselves, seek resources and arrange the conditions for research, teaching and learning. Foreign observers, unaccustomed to the competitive mode, often see these ways as decidedly unacademic, even brutish. Notably, the habit of competition extended to the development of big-time sports, a benefit and an affliction that universities in other countries have managed to do without. Using a full measure of counterfactual thinking—what if the Ivy League had not given birth to the sports monster in the last decades of the nineteenth century?—it is now safe to say that if the Ivies had not done so someone else would have. Competitive big-time sports comes with the territory. Indeed, as is well known, athletic prowess often comes first, with an institution then straining for several decades to build a faculty that the football team can be proud of.

High Institutional Initiative

A system that is at once decentralized, diversified and competitive encourages initiative, an entrepreneurial spirit, in individual universities and colleges. To stand still is to fall behind, since others will be moving ahead by amassing financial resources, fashioning attractive packages for recruiting and retaining faculty, increasing the stipends for graduate students, trying to improve the quality of undergraduate life and painting an evermore glorious public image. Within this localization of initiative, trustees, administrators, faculty, students, alumni and assorted well-wishers can join hands. The

leading private universities are especially well-situated for this exercise of competitive initiative. But public universities increasingly have done well in the twentieth century in the game of status. They have learned how to compose comparison groups of private and public universities, and otherwise exercise comparisons, that help them to increase salaries, lower teaching loads, support sabbatical leaves, increase the ratio of graduate to undergraduate students and, in general, to remind the officials of their own state that decline is just around the corner unless they increase allocations and allow for university autonomy.

The competitive university, public or private, is thus an active autonomy seeker. Universities everywhere push for autonomy from the controls of state, church and other patrons. But the search for autonomy is measurably strengthened when responsibility is localized. Sophisticated trustees mark their time in office as successful or not according to how much their efforts contribute to a comparative strengthening of their institution. Campus presidents, chancellors and a whole range of local administrators have careers on the line that depend on how well they do while in local office. Professors build effective research domains in "their" institutions according to their initiatives in competitively raising support from research-funding sources. Hence, responsibility and initiative interact in the construction of institutional capability to resist the control of patrons. Decentralized systems tend to remain decentralized because the structure of incentives encourages key institutional actors to initiate autonomous actions.

The drive for autonomous institution-building has had a striking budgetary outcome: sources of financial support have multiplied. The best guarantee of institutional autonomy in modern universities is to have not one major source of financing, as in the case of the national treasury in unified systems, but many sources. This strategic lesson has not been lost on either private or public universities. Both types steadily extend and diversify their portfolio of revenue sources. The private universities diversify their lines of support from private supporters and users; they eagerly tap the many federal pipelines of research funding and student support. The state universities have shown a remarkable capacity in recent years to raise very large sums of money from private sources in major development drives, leaving in place, as at UCLA, a capability to go on raising, for example, one hundred million dollars each year in the form of additional endowment or gifts for immediate use. As funding diversifies, the power of any one patron to call the shots across the full range of institutional actions is reduced and institutional flexibility is increased. Versatility is added to variation.

The competitive university is also uncommonly subject to self-elaboration. American universities received a strong push towards elaborate structuring in their formative years in the late nineteenth century when, out of competitive interaction, a distinct graduate level of courses and credits in the basic disciplines was laid down over the older undergraduate college,

providing a "vertical university" hybrid that has turned out to be highly useful throughout the twentieth century. A professional-school structure also developed within the universities that has increasingly become lodged at the post-bachelor's level, separating intense professional preparation from the undergraduate years and thereby divorcing it structurally from the general education and liberal education practices that remain deeply rooted in the expectations of "the college years." This tripartite arrangement of undergraduate college, graduate school and professional school has kept disparate functions somewhat out of each other's way.

While highlighting the central role played by competition and initiative, I have spoken mainly of research universities. But I do not mean to suggest that competition and initiative are characteristic of only our 200 doctoral-granting institutions, out of the total institutional population of about 3,500. Far from it. The hundreds of private four-year colleges are in a very competitive situation in which finance, student body and faculty are largely determined by local institutional effort. The huge sector of comprehensive universities and colleges—formally nondoctoral granting, but heavily invested in graduate and professional education—is no stranger to the competitive mode of interaction, as colleagues here at this meeting from the California State University system can testify. In my second section I want to make a special point about the competitive dynamics of the CSU system. And the community colleges, about which more later, are part of a general free-for-all for undergraduate student clientele.

In short, competition is the central process of the American system of higher education. We cannot go far in understanding higher education in California unless we first seize upon this process and attempt to grasp its complicated interplays. It is central to the great international success of Californian and American higher education in the last half of the twentieth century, to the making of universities as intellectual magnets that attract talent from around the world, thereby allowing the system as a whole to take up the role of the international center of learning that Germany held in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. The competitive process is also central to our systemic weaknesses, from our great variability in standards to our sins of pride in the presentation of institutional images.

The central role played by competition is not easy for American or foreign observers to grasp: it cannot be seen in the same ready way as state master plans. It does not appear quantitatively in charts and graphs, as in the case of demographic trends and state finance. It is not often referred to in *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, while every week there is another account of lawmaking in national and state capitals and another account of

what William Bennett has said.² But competition is never far from the minds of faculty and institutional administrators, and even of system-level administrators. Thus it was at the OECD confrontation meeting in Paris last spring that President David Gardner of the University of California kept bringing up the force of competition, especially when the discussion turned to research policy and to the relationship of postsecondary education to the economy. A typical OECD question was posed at one point to the Californians: "Is the absence of a well-defined State research policy seen as a major obstacle in maintaining the competitive position of California in the country as a whole and in the world?" Gardner replied:

We receive [at the University of California] \$200 million a year from the state of California for research. . . . We use that money to provide the basic infrastructure, i.e., provision for those personnel and facilities that enable us, as a university, successfully to compete at the national level for basic research funding from the agencies of the federal government that provide \$800 million to the University of California through a peer research review process. . . . [T]here is not in that process [of state support] any clear formulation of research policy as such, but there is a policy to equip the University of California with the capacity to compete for research. The state's policy is to make us a competitor for the federal dollar for research.³

Note how the state and a constituent university system join hands to compete with other states and other state systems, and with private institutions; note that the state puts up one dollar to help the university get four more dollars from the "feds" (a game that is systemic in American federalism); and note that the state, the main provider of support, is not in the business of defining research areas and targets, but rather attempts to aid the university in building the basic infrastructure, the enhanced capacity, to compete effectively in the national system.

President Gardner noted further that when the national government pulled back significantly in recent years in its funding of research facilities and equipment, the State of California, again compared to most states in the country, funded equipment and space generously, putting "California at an advantage compared with those states that are not funding the infrastructure."⁴ Note how the University can seek to move between two primary funding sources, always with an eye on competition with other institutions

²Former Director of the National Endowment for the Humanities and subsequently Secretary of Education.

³*Review*, 102.

⁴*Ibid.*

and systems. And it can strike a convincing posture that what is good for the University is good for the State of California. We may also note in passing that even just using the more explicit categories, federal funds for research amount to only about 60 percent of the University's research expenditures. Beyond the 40 percent provided by nonfederal sources lies the simple but imposing fact that faculty time for research is the most important subsidy of all in the support of research, and it is largely built into state allocations for faculty salaries.

So it went at the meeting in Paris. Gardner also took some pains to point out in reply to another question that the University seeks to ratchet up its salary schedule by using a comparison group of "eight other distinguished American universities," public and private. He stressed that competition with private universities is a primary problem—and well he might, given the pace-setting role of Stanford, MIT, Princeton, Harvard, Cal Tech, Chicago and so on.⁵ At still another point the California delegation pointed to the increasingly "serious competition from other states which have begun to argue successfully that California already has too large a share of the nation's research and development resources," this in regard to such failures in national competitions as the Supercollider and the National Earthquake Center, major federally funded facilities that somehow ended up in other states.⁶ The game is a rough high-stakes game; it is evermore an intensely competitive game. Notably, it is not grasped by focusing on the internal features of the state Master Plan. Indeed, when the Paris meeting turned to "Planning and Links" in its fourth and final session, there were the Californians, state commission and all, still insisting that "the underlying concern [is] to keep California fully competitive with the other 49 states."⁷

If the national picture insists that we put institutional and state competition first in our analysis of American higher education, it also brings in the role of the national government, a large topic that I shall put aside as both obvious and deserving of much more time than available here. Suffice it to say that most of the resources that come out of Washington do so in a competitive mode. Funds for students go to students to use where they please, hence they enhance choice in the consumer market of higher education. Funds for research still largely issue from the competitive process of peer review, although the Congressional-earmarking political procedure that bypasses peer review has recently become a significant phenomenon.

Instead of pursuing the role of national government, which becomes virtually the most important topic in understanding steerage and coordina-

⁵*Ibid.*, 103.

⁶*Ibid.*, 106.

⁷*Ibid.*, 117.

tion in centralized systems, it is more helpful to point to the coordination that takes place in the American system as a whole in nongovernmental channels. One means of coordination is found in voluntary association. A second pathway is market-like interaction.

Tocqueville was right: Americans are prone to form voluntary associations. As soon as three people find they have something in common they set up an association to further the cause. And nowhere more than in higher education, where every disciplinary specialty demands and develops an association (or a major division of one); where every distinguishable set of institutions insists upon a representative association; where a complex of buildings in Washington centered around One Dupont Circle is chock-full of associations of presidents, graduate deans, business officers, registrars and other administrative specialists who staff the campus bureaucracies. The decentralization of the American system virtually demands voluntary linkages as a countervailing force, as a way of linking individuals across institutions along functional lines. Given their central values and their taste for autonomy, academics also much prefer to be "association persons" than to be "organization men." Association is their answer to bureaucracy. For institutions and their administrators, it is an answer to the pitfalls of unbridled competition.

Thus, the American system may have no national ministry and no national formal system of control; in comparative perspective, it is only loosely structured by normal bureaucratic and political tools of state authority. But voluntary association offers a substitute system, one that is bewildering and hard to capture. This form of linkage is both visible and invisible, simultaneously formal, semiformal and informal. No peak association, or single set of ties, commands all the rest. Lines of affiliation loop through and around one another, with no regard for unifying principles of order, logic and accountability. The gaps and the redundancies are too numerous to count. But voluntary coordination goes with the flow of academic life and institutional self-development. As reasons to associate develop, linkages are formed. When the reasons pass, the related associational linkages die on the vine. More than in other countries, the voluntary ties make for a changeable, even a disposable, structure of national coordination, thereby promoting system flexibility. Voluntary associating is a good way to have structure follow changes in knowledge, and follow changes in institutional capability, rather than have knowledge and capability heavily constrained by national bureaucratic order. Association follows particularly well the many contours of academe. Turned loose by decentralization, and stimulated by the dark side of competition, it is, in the American setting, a primary component of the logic of the higher education system.

The other major pathway of national coordination that remains hidden in the American system, but that is so central to its functioning, is the order

that emerges out of market-type interaction. The U.S. system has an extremely complicated consumer market within which institutions find students and students find institutions. State master plans seek to guide significant chunks of this market, as in the admissions standards set for the UC and CSU campuses. But student choice remains very high, with private and out-of-state alternatives and multiple in-state choices for those with decent achievement records. The private institutions, in turn, one by one, seek to build secure niches in this otherwise wild-and-woolly market.

The national system also has an extremely large and active labor market in which institutions recruit faculty and new recruits find jobs, and in which job mobility is high compared to other countries. This market is a crucial one for institutions, since faculty are the essential personnel and the basis for institutional aggrandizement. It is a finely honed market, one tailored by the detailed specifications of departments in search of faculty and by the specialisms that newly trained academics bring with them to the job search.

Finally, there is the overall institutional market in which the bottom line is not profit but prestige. Reputation is here the main commodity of exchange; relative prestige not only guides the choices of consumers and workers but also a vast array of institutional attitudes and actions. High prestige institutions markedly affect the behavior of other institutions, generating the tides of academic drift wherein institutions imitate and converge. In the general institutional market we observe the interplay between public and private sectors, with the one over time seizing upon the weaknesses of the other, including the gaps that go unfilled. The private universities and colleges significantly shape the public sectors in this country. In some cases they provide "the more," in other cases, "the better," and in still other cases, "the different." While there has been much "state creep" in the last quarter century, with state and national governments exercising more supervision, there has been also much "market creep" as institutions wiggle their way to more autonomy and alter their character. The individual campuses of the University of California have more self-determination now than they did a quarter century, a half-century, ago. A good prediction is that the campuses of the CSU system will move towards more self-determination in the 1990s. Under the steady pounding of size and complexity, the center of large formal systems cannot hold. As operative authority (in contrast to ultimate authority) slips off to operating organizations, market-like interaction is strengthened, in the form of interaction among enterprises that are at least semi-autonomous in competing for personnel, clientele, financial resources and prestige.

When an activity comes under state control, there is a bias for aggregation. Things are to be added up. OECD reviews themselves are exercises in adding things up. OECD delegates at the Paris review of the California report asked time and again, how do you plan this, and how do you plan that, how do you integrate everything into a meaningful whole, how

do you make things add up? But when an activity such as higher education is in a market-like context, it comes under a bias for disaggregation. Things are not added up in one heap, in one place. They are to be left in their piecemeal state. "System" is then an altogether different matter.

THE DYNAMICS OF SECTORS

Now that we have brought the nation back in, particularly to highlight competition and institutional initiative in an American-type system, we can turn back to California universities and colleges and understand better the constraints and the facilitations under which they operate, the incentives that prod them, the logics that become embedded in their character. Lord Ashby has noted that any higher education system has "its own articles of faith by which its practitioners live," producing an "inner logic." That inner logic "does for higher education systems what genes do for biological systems: it preserves identity; it is a built-in gyroscope."⁸ Applying this perspective to the different sectors of California public higher education we can ask: what are the inner logics, the built-in gyroscopes, of the UC system, the CSU system and the community college system?

The University of California, in all its vastness, is the easiest to grasp. It is a foremost case of the American research university about which much of my previous comment has centered. From within, the University is strongly steered by the research imperative. The domination of this imperative is reflected in the criteria by which faculty are hired and promoted, in the strength of graduate programs in the basic disciplines, in the importance given to Ph.D. production over bachelor's degree production in the minds of the faculty, and in the related flow of attention from the undergraduate level to the labs, the seminars and the students of the graduate level. On this later point, David Gardner, at the Paris meeting, was frank in the extreme. Acknowledging the weaknesses that are systemic in the University in its balance of undergraduate teaching and graduate level research and teaching, he said:

We don't know any other way of doing it. The state of California would not pay for a research university if we only offered instruction to graduate students. Indeed they would not pay, in my opinion, for a university that only offered the last two years in undergraduate instruction. The only way we manage is to admit students at the freshman level in large numbers and redirect the money

⁸Eric, Lord Ashby, *The Structure of Higher Education: A World View*, International Council for Educational Development, Occasional Paper No. 6 (1973).

that is appropriated for them to the graduate programme. . . . [T]he quality of the faculty that we can attract to the University of California arises from the quality of the graduate programme, not from the quality of our freshmen students, and the presence in the University of California of a very distinguished faculty, whether they teach freshmen or not, sets the intellectual tone for the university and permeates and infuses every aspect of its work.⁹

The inner logic is clear: the University of California is first of all committed to research. Second, I might add, it is committed to professional education, most of which takes place at the graduate level. Third, it is committed to the general education of undergraduates.

When we turn to the CSU system, the story becomes more clouded. The OECD report on California paid relatively little attention to this mammoth system of universities; American observers generally do the same thing. The research university is seen as interesting because of its research prowess and its dominating prestige; the community colleges readily capture attention because of their open access and their apparently central role in issues of equity. But what of this in-between sector of "state colleges" turned into nondoctoral-granting universities? What can we make of them? What is their inner logic, if indeed one exists? We should make a very great deal of them, for they matter greatly. After all, among other things, they train 75 percent of the schoolteachers of the state, while the University of California trains 5 percent.

What is very clear about this sector of institutions across the nation is the long evolution of many of its members from humble "normal school," to somewhat stronger "teachers college," to a more diversified "state college," to a much weightier, comprehensive university structure with extensive work at the master's level and finally to full-throated university standing as a place of research and Ph.D. output. Nationally, this sector is the strongest instance of academic drift, and so it is in California. There is steady, unrelenting pressure at the campus level to evolve into full university stature. The sources of this strong tendency are many. As we search across the nineteen (now twenty) campuses of the CSU system, across disciplines within them, and across successive cohorts of new faculty, we find that institutional leadership plays a part, that geographic location has influence, that size and the historical buildup of organizational resources must be weighed in the scales. Most of all, we see that the desire to do research and the capacity to do research grows in successive generations of faculty. The faculty have Ph.D.s, they are well-trained, they come from the research universities. They have the desire and they have the skill, and, Master Plan

⁹Review, 104-105.

or not, the campuses, at different rates and to different degrees develop a research capability.¹⁰

Once again in the 1987 Master Plan review CSU was denied the privilege of giving the doctorate. But there is nothing in state master planning, U.S. style, that can keep campuses from raising research funds. Thus it is that the CSU campus in San Diego, at the cutting edge of this evolution, now receives more than 50 million dollars a year of federal research funds, surpassing at least two of the University of California campuses and thereby adding considerably to the overlap of the CSU and the UC systems. Other CSU campuses are following the lead, in a game they all can play. And why not? If the competence is there, why not invest in it? If the state wants more science and technology out of its system of higher education, it can increasingly find it in the CSU system, with perhaps greater attentiveness there to applied research, near-market technology transfer and the local and regional needs of industry.

CSU will remain heavily invested in undergraduate work. But its inner logic is that it will also continually stretch up from its base in bachelor's and master's programs to the research capability of existing research universities. The stretch will be quite different on different campuses and in different disciplines. It will accelerate in some periods, slow down in others. But the easiest prediction of all is that in the year 2000, CSU will be more invested in research and research-related graduate training than it is now. More awarding of the doctorate will come to this system, even as now found in joint-doctorate arrangements with the University of California and private universities.

Can we even speak of an inner logic in the community college system? California community colleges, in some number, go back as far as the 1920s. Born out of the secondary system, they have been comprehensive rather than specialized, open access rather than selective. Over time they have become increasingly comprehensive in program and clientele.¹¹ Their extensive work in adult and continuing education, in remedial education (where they do the unfinished work of our weak K-12 system), in short-term occupational training, as well as in the programs that parallel the first two years of traditional colleges, stretches their character to the point where the problem of organizational identity is critical. California community colleges have become much more than colleges. They are also community centers in

¹⁰Françoise Alice Queval, "The Evolution Toward Research Orientation and Capability in Comprehensive Universities: A Case Study of the California State University System" (University of California at Los Angeles unpublished doctoral dissertation, 1990).

¹¹Arthur M. Cohen and Florence B. Brawer, *The American Community College*, 2nd ed. (San Francisco, 1989), *passim*.

which the easy in-and-out traffic can make observers think of participants in a shopping mall. A sentiment even grew among some community college leaders during the 1970s to not worry about the college label and to accept fully a community-center identity.

This drift turned out to be a loser's game: the state prefers to pay for colleges and not for community centers. The 1980s have seen an effort to call the community colleges back to an academic core centered on two-year programs for matriculated students and to better articulation of coursework with CSU and UC campuses for transfer students. But diffuse character is now systemic; transfer students are a minority of participants; and with state funding based on enrollment, the colleges are very enrollment-driven and clientele-sensitive. Thus, the community colleges march to a different drummer. They do not do research; disciplinary peers are not the audience of first resort for faculty; and competition is not based on scholarly reputation. Instead, their open door and their program comprehensiveness render them dependent on local clientele demand. Their central ongoing problem of identity is how to construct and maintain an inner logic that sets boundaries and convinces outsiders that they are indeed colleges.

CALIFORNIA AS THE MODEL FOR OECD FUTURES

Now that we have higher education in California back in its proper place as part of the national system of higher education, and now that we have out on the table some of the basic dynamics of California's three massive sectors of public postsecondary education, we can return to the original question: "Is California the model for OECD Futures?" The answer is clearly "no." Even the relevance of California as a mirror for reflection, as a setting from which we can draw some lessons, depends on a tough-minded willingness to look at the pros and cons of the American system overall. Let us recapitulate in order of importance.

To take any lessons from California-cum-America means to recognize first the primacy of competition and the institutional initiative that it promotes. Any system abroad that is not prepared to undergo the risks of competition cannot learn much from California. To go the route of enhanced competition and institutional self-aggrandizement means that much steerage must move from state authority to the uncontrolled outcomes of interactions in a higher education consumer market, even more in an academic labor market, and most of all in the interplay of institutions in a reputational market.

Second in primacy is coordination by means of voluntary (nonstate) linkages. To give a simple example: we find hundreds of institutions using the same day of the year to mail out offers of acceptance to students and the same date by which students must respond, without either state or national

government entering the picture. We find numerous agreed-upon ways of behaving in which state authority does not enter. The various markets are not left completely unguided to leave everyone in an Hobbesian state. Much guidance is worked out along functional lines by administrators and faculty within the system. A so-called market system of higher education promotes professional authority over bureaucratic authority; it generates linkages across the national system that are devised by faculty and administrators at lower levels as they go about their business. There is much devised coordination. It is simply more hidden than in the state-command systems. It is also more flexible.

Only thirdly do we come to the determination of California higher education by state planning. The California Master Plan only sets a few broad parameters. The bite of that plan lies largely in the definition of boundaries between the CSU and UC systems in undergraduate admissions, research investment, the awarding of the Ph.D. and the possession of several expensive professional fields. The Master Plan is reviewed about once a decade. Meanwhile the institutions make their own way, individually building as best they can and thereby, in the aggregate, causing long-term evolutions that the state can only partially guide. As I have indicated, the state is not fully in control of the evolution of the CSU system, of its growing inner logic of research orientation. Within the UC system the individual campuses are clearly universities in themselves. As they diversify their financial bases, they are "state assisted": they are also federal government assisted, private-donation assisted, student-fee assisted and hospital-income assisted. The budget of the University of California, Los Angeles, is about one third from the State of California. Its federal research funds in 1988 totaled over 200 million dollars a year, placing UCLA, by itself, fifth in the nation. In addition, UC San Francisco is seventh, UC San Diego, eighth and UC Berkeley (which, unlike the other three, does not have a medical school), sixteenth. In 1990, California has 29 public universities, 9 in the UC system, 20 in the CSU system. They vary greatly in character, and nearly all are entrepreneurial to a degree that would be uncommon in other countries. A good share are determined to develop their own character, and they are positioned to go a long way in doing so. State guidance is a force to be understood only after we understand competition, institutional initiative and voluntary coordination in the national system as a whole.

If there is one specific lesson that comes out of the California-cum-U.S. model it is one that other countries generally learn the hard way. This is the lesson of multiple patronage. The first injunction becomes: do not allow higher education institutions to come under the sway of a single patron, which in our day and age is nearly always the national government, specifically in the form of an education ministry. At the end of the twentieth century, a diversified funding base is a necessary condition for

dependable, sustained institutional autonomy. It is also a necessary condition for rapid adaptability on the part of universities and colleges in fast-changing environments. Diversify, diversify, we might say, do not let any source of money escape your eye, for only then can you reduce dependency on a patron capable of excessive, even punitive, control. The capacity of national governments to turn hostile in their relation with higher education is better documented with each passing decade. The Australian and British systems in the 1980s are only the latest dramatic examples.

So let us take from the California scene what the California institutions of higher education most exemplify. In his 1972 book on American higher education, done for Clark Kerr's Carnegie Commission, Joseph Ben-David had a chapter entitled, "How the System Works: Enterprise, Competition, and Cooperation." He began the chapter by saying: "The most important condition of the system has been that, composed of independent units, the institutions have had to compete with each other for community support, students, and faculty." He added: "This also applies to state universities."¹² Exactly. To understand the U.S. model, or the model provided by any one of the 50 states, one must look first for enterprise, competition, and cooperation, the latter considerably of a voluntary nature. If there is a California model, it is an enterprise model, a model of nongovernmental coordination, a model of loose confederation of diverse institutions, public and private and, above all, a competitive model. As Clark Kerr pointed out in his explanation at this conference of how the California Master Plan was devised in 1960, this type of system depends on agreements among internal groups that are more like treaties than plans.

POLICY VERSUS REALITY

Finally, "the California model" reveals a distorting bias in the nature of the country reports on higher education that OECD periodically commissions. OECD sends out Examiners to look for policies and for planned arrangements. The report at hand is entitled, *Higher Education in California*. It discusses early on why California was chosen as the focus for "another of the OECD's reviews of national policy." But for any country, OECD ought to be most interested in how higher education actually works. *How a national system of higher education is planned and how it works are two quite different things.* Modern vibrant systems of higher education are notoriously bottom-heavy; they are steered more from below than from on high, more by the thrust of the disciplines and by the yearnings of institutions than by

¹²Joseph Ben-David, *American Higher Education: Directions Old and New* (New York, 1972), 25.

the directives of central bodies. If policy and planning are made the center of attention, primary dynamics of the system will be missed or only weakly capture—anywhere, and most so in the American system.

The California case teaches that OECD could serve better the practical understanding of the processes of systems of higher education—their springs of action—if its studies were directed more to how each system works. Policy and planning could then be understood in their limited roles. They could be more realistically grounded in the ongoing realities and capabilities of these quite uncommon systems of effort and achievement.

California's Master Plan for Higher Education: Some Second Thoughts for the Fourth Decade

Patrick M. Callan

Nineteen-ninety marked the thirtieth anniversary of California's widely acclaimed Master Plan for Higher Education. Formulated initially as a response to the enrollment pressures of the 1960s, the Plan has turned out to be quite durable in comparison to the experiences of other states. Its basic policies have withstood the political, economic and demographic fluctuations of three turbulent decades, including explosive population growth, student and taxpayer revolts, supportive and hostile political leadership in the governor's office and the state legislature, and the fluctuations of the state's economy.

THE MASTER PLAN AS A POLICY FRAMEWORK

The essential provisions of the Plan are straightforward. Every California high school graduate able to benefit could attend a college or university. This opportunity would be made possible through three distinctive types of public colleges and universities—research universities (University of California), regional state colleges, later renamed universities (California State University), and junior or community colleges. The pool of students from which each type of institution would draw its enrollments was explicitly designated. Public higher education was to be low-priced, and California students were not to be charged tuition. State scholarships were to be increased to make it possible for qualified California students with financial need to attend in-state private colleges and universities. Responsibility for publicly supported research was reserved to the University of California. A new system of governance under a board of trustees was

established for the California State Colleges (now universities). And a state board to coordinate California higher education was created.

Alterations in the basic framework have been few and incremental. They have included the formation of a statewide Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges in 1967 and the reorganization of the coordinating board as the California Postsecondary Education Commission in 1973. The fundamental principles of universal access and differentiation of institutional mission have endured.

The Master Plan has been the policy framework which enabled California to lead the nation and the world in the expansion of opportunity for education beyond the secondary school, to pioneer the concept of universal access to higher education and to develop its preeminent public research university. The Master Plan represents one of the most successful public policies in the history of California or any state.

What accounts for the successes of the Master Plan over three decades? First and most important, the plan reflected the values of the state in its emphasis on both the broadening of opportunity and the development of elite institutions. The provisions for upward educational mobility within the higher education system reinforced the expectation that students could enter the system in the open enrollment community colleges and progress to the baccalaureate degree and beyond in the more selective sectors. The system offered second, third and fourth chances. Second, once the plan was adopted, the state kept its commitments by providing the financial support that allowed the system to expand and each of the public segments to pursue its special mission. This is not to say that all budget requests were always funded or that higher education annual budgets have always been adequate. However, over three decades, California's willingness to put its dollars behind implementation of the Master Plan has been quite impressive.

The simplicity of the Plan also helps to explain its longevity and success. As Clark Kerr has noted, the Plan was a framework rather than a highly detailed operational scheme. It was flexible enough to accommodate changing conditions while preserving basic provisions. Periodic reviews and evaluations by citizens' commissions and special legislative committees contributed to maintaining public confidence while providing opportunities for incremental adjustments. Public confidence was also enhanced by acceptance on the part of the public segments of the clear division of responsibility set forth in the Plan. California was thus spared the political turf battles over advanced degrees and professional schools that dominated the politics of higher education and may have undermined public support in many states during the 1960s and 1970s.

Finally, the self-interest of the public and private segments helped to maintain a political consensus in support of the plan. The community colleges were to accommodate the bulk of the enrollment growth. The state university under its own board of trustees was moved out of the public

school system; and its mission was made comprehensive through the master's degree. The University of California was given continued monopoly within public higher education of the right to offer graduate and professional programs beyond the master's degree. And state scholarships were to be increased to provide more California students with the opportunity to attend a private college or university. Thus each of the key institutional actors saw themselves as stakeholders in the Master Plan.

The Master Plan has been a perennial favorite for evaluation by special legislative committees and blue ribbon commissions. By the late 1980s, the Plan had been scrutinized by three special legislative committees and two blue ribbon citizens' commissions.¹ These reviews were funded by the state and took several years to complete. Four of the reviews, including the two conducted in the late 1980s, recommended that the basic elements of the Plan be continued. It is possible, however, that the accomplishments of the past three decades have blinded Californians and their leaders to weaknesses of the Master Plan and to changing conditions that may require modification of particulars to preserve basic principles. Some issues that may be critical to the future of California higher education were barely or perfunctorily addressed in the most recent round of master plan reviews. These omissions have less to do with the principles of the plan—access, specialized institutional missions and enrollment pools—than with institutional arrangements and public policies that may not be adequate for the conditions of the 1990s and beyond.

One such set of issues involves the "policy infrastructure" established by the Master Plan and subsequent to it and the capacity of the institutions of governance and coordination created since 1960 to provide needed leadership. A second cluster of issues is directly related to specific conditions of the nineties in California, particularly to the need to begin another period of expansion and capacity-building in a political, fiscal and educational environment much different than the 1960s.

¹The Joint Legislative Committee on Higher Education issued its report in 1968. In the early seventies the Master Plan was studied by the Select Committee on the Master Plan for Higher Education, appointed by the Coordinating Council for Higher Education, and the Joint Legislative Committee on the Master Plan for Higher Education, which reported in 1973 and 1974 respectively. More recently, the Master Plan was reviewed by the Commission for the Review of the Master Plan for Higher Education, which issued its final report in 1987, and the Joint Legislative Committee for Review of the Master Plan for Higher Education which published its final report in 1989.

STRUCTURAL ISSUES

Prior to the Master Plan public higher education in California was governed by the Board of Regents, the constitutionally established governing board of the University of California, and the State Board of Education, which was responsible for the state colleges and for state level governance of the community colleges, which were governed by locally elected school boards. Under the Master Plan three statewide entities were created to govern and coordinate California higher education: the Trustees of the California State University,² the Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges³ and the California Postsecondary Education Commission.⁴ The Master Plan had successfully set boundaries and directions for California higher education. But its very success seems—at least in recent years—to have narrowed the vision of those with continuing responsibilities for the broad policies that it embraces. The track record of these entities over as long as three decades is less than impressive. While each has made contributions, there are reasons to doubt that these institutions of state and system leadership are prepared or equipped to address the difficult issues of the 1990s—the fourth decade of the Master Plan. Yet with the exception of the community college Board of Governors, neither of the reviews of the Master Plan which were commissioned by the state in the 1980s examined carefully or in depth the effectiveness of these institutions, assessed their capability to meet future needs, or compared them with comparable institutions in other states. (Nor did they look at the role or effectiveness of the Board of Regents of the University of California, which predates the Master Plan by almost a century.) These omissions by reviewing bodies specifically charged with reassessing the Master Plan are particularly striking because structure is a cornerstone of the Master Plan and the plan's authors had identified governance and coordination as a "basic issue in the development of the Master Plan."⁵

The California State University Board of Trustees deserves credit for leading the system through an orderly, if unimaginative, period of growth in the early years of the Master Plan. In the 1970s, the Trustees began to develop initiatives that would explicitly address the issues of minority

²Initially established as the California State College System, later renamed the California State University and Colleges and again renamed the California State University.

³Established in 1967.

⁴Originally the Coordinating Council for Higher Education until reorganized as the California Postsecondary Education Commission in 1974.

⁵*A Master Plan for Higher Education in California, 1960-1975* (Sacramento, 1960),

education. However, the Trustees and their staff have functioned more like a bureaucratic control agency over the twenty campuses than as a locus of educational policy leadership. This tendency was accentuated by the inevitable conflicts involved in moving a loose federation of quasi-autonomous colleges from administration by the state Superintendent of Public Instruction to a common governing board and chancellor. Emphasis upon bureaucratic structures and controls led to a failure to create genuine collegial values and processes. There was little commitment by the central office to the concept of shared governance between central office and campuses or between administration and faculty. One result was a virtual stampede to faculty bargaining as soon as it became legally permissible. Of high quality and reasonably well-compensated, the faculty perceived itself as disenfranchised and mired in adversarial relationships with the Trustees and the administrative leadership.

In the 1980s the Trustees recruited a chancellor who was not particularly committed to the special mission of the system. Significant opportunities to gain financial and programmatic support for the strengthening of two critical aspects of that mission—the education of undergraduates and the training of teachers for California's public schools—were squandered. And although some individual campuses made strides in enrolling and graduating minority students, success has been much less than what has sometimes been claimed by the system's leadership. Instead, the Trustees and the administrative leadership of the system spent a good deal of their energy and political capital pursuing ephemeral goals such as authority to grant doctoral degrees in education, constitutional autonomy and high salaries for administrators, particularly central office administrators.

The Trustees' past interests often appeared to address their sense of status deprivation, particularly regarding the Regents of the University of California, rather than the educational mission of the California State University. For the 1990s, one would hope that a new agenda would give high priority to a hard look at the State University's bureaucratic, adversarial culture and would reassess the roles and relationships of the Board, the central administration, the campuses and the faculty. And careful thought should be given to Sacramento relationships that have wavered in the past between cautious, almost cringing subservience and thoughtless arrogance.

For the State University, what may be needed is the kind of cultural and organizational revolution that many large and top-heavy American corporations experienced in the 1980s, which included greater delegation of responsibility, authority and accountability to those responsible for providing service, and major reduction of the size of middle management. The basic elements of such a revolution might include recommitment to core educational missions, decentralization and development of more sophisticated and less heavy-handed systemwide leadership strategies.

The Community College Board of Governors, created towards the end of the first decade of the Master Plan, has never had the power to bureaucratize the world of California's 107 Community Colleges that the Trustees of the State University exercised over the CSU campuses. In the 1970s the Board was not able to find an appropriate and effective leadership role in a system of essentially local governance. In the post-Proposition 13 era of the 1980s, which brought greater financial dependence upon Sacramento, this body was equally unable to lead in a system increasingly dominated by the state. Today, the reality of community college governance is a combination of the least attractive aspects of special interest-driven public school politics and the sometimes arrogant ambiguity of higher education governance. Major public policies, such as recent reform legislation, are developed by coalitions of interest groups representing faculty, administrators and local board members who support statewide organizations with Sacramento lobbyists.

When the state Chancellor of the community colleges, representing the Board of Governors, is personally influential, he plays a key role in the bargaining process. If that person is not influential or acceptable to the interest group community, the negotiations would proceed without him or her. When the bargaining process results in an agreement that is politically palatable to the Governor and Legislature, the interest community has it enacted into law and mandated for all community colleges. While this highly politicized process can sometimes produce constructive results, it is hardly a model for stable, long-term educational leadership.

The California Postsecondary Education Commission represents the state's second attempt to create an agency capable of both (a) coordinating its highly decentralized higher education system and (b) helping the executive and legislative branches develop public policies and financial support. These types of agencies with limited or no line authority over systems and campuses were established in the majority of states during the last three decades. They were to be independent of partisan politics and institutional interests.⁶

California's first coordinating board, established as part of the original Master Plan, was abolished in 1974. The current agency's primary mode of influence is through its extensive research and data gathering. The roles of these types of organizations is thought to be particularly important in times of unusually tight budgets and of growth and expansion. When confronted with such issues, states will often turn to an impartial, knowledgeable body

⁶A brief description of these boards and their evolution can be found in Patrick M. Callan, "Perspectives on the Current Status and Emerging Policy Issues of State Coordinating Boards," AGB White Paper No. 1 (Association of Governing Boards of Colleges and Universities, 1991).

to lessen unproductive institutional competition; to develop even-handed solutions to difficult issues; to depoliticize controversial questions, such as the location of new campuses; and to insulate political leaders from decisions that often have more negative than positive political fallout. The California Commission is generally respected for the technical aspects of its research, such as surveys of faculty salaries, analyses of standards for space allocation and gathering information on subjects of interest to the Legislature. However, its willingness and ability to play a leadership role in raising and addressing core public and educational policy issues is very much in question. Throughout most of its history this agency has preferred to emphasize technical and managerial issues rather than to articulate and define fundamental educational and public policy questions, questions which the other boards, their administrative officers and the political leaders in Sacramento also often prefer to avoid.

I lack an overall theory as to why California has had so little success in developing effective mechanisms of governance over the last three decades.⁷ It has occasionally been suggested that the Community College Board or the Postsecondary Education Commission should have more authority—that is, greater power to control campus personnel and activities. For example, the recent Commission on the Master Plan concluded that centralizing more power at the level of the statewide Board of Governors was a badly needed ingredient of reform of the community colleges. However, California's experience with the centralization of the State University System should urge skepticism regarding the efficacy of centralized governance in large and complex systems. In fact, the best models of effective governance of higher education systems are models of leadership and accountability under conditions of decentralization. (This is increasingly true in the corporate sector also.)

If lack of centralized power is not an adequate explanation, what alternative hypotheses might be advanced to account for the weakness of these state institutions? I offer one at least partial explanation: legislative involvement. The histories of the boards established under the Master Plan are pretty much coterminous with the existence of the full-time, professional Legislature in California, beginning in the late 1960s. The state Legislature's involvement in the lives of these boards and institutions is reflected in hundreds of pages of education law binding the state university and the community colleges. The specific subjects of legislation have often been trivial and procedural. And—to the credit of the California Legislature—attempts to intrude on academic freedom have been rare. But the

⁷The Board of Regents of the University was established in 1868. The discussion here deals with the institutions of governance that were created as part of or subsequent to the 1960 California Master Plan for Higher Education.

cumulative effect of legislative involvement in the details, even in the minutiae, of the operations of these systems of education mitigates against the development of strong and effective boards and institutions.

Pressure has mounted for the Legislature and its individual members to be the ombudspersons and courts of last appeal for every constituency that fails to prevail within the established governing structures—particularly constituencies that contribute to political campaigns. With the Legislature in session most of the year and highly staffed, there are few issues or disaffected individuals or interest groups that ultimately fail to find their way to Sacramento. This results in an enormous amount of legislative activity, a large volume of laws and a tendency for central higher education bureaucracies to expand in order to respond to numerous requirements for information. Most seriously, an environment is created at the central offices and governing boards that is increasingly pervaded by "How will it play in Sacramento?" These problems are sometimes compounded by a propensity on the part of a handful of legislators to believe that any unlegislated idea is an unfulfilled idea and to try to micro-manage details of implementation. This was evident when the leaders of the public and private segments and the public schools established structures for voluntary coordination of some activities related to access and to student movement between systems. Immediately there was a rush on the part of some legislators, unsolicited and resisted by the segments, to place these young and untested structures into statute. This political environment often saps the energy and will of boards and administrators to take the initiatives and risks that are the essence of effective leadership.

I believe it is imperative that California shore up its institutions of higher education leadership. Legislative restraint, accountability based upon outcomes rather than on compliance with the prescriptions of Sacramento's micromanagers, as well as willingness on the part of governing boards and leaders of the segments to identify the types of accountability to the state and to the public that they believe are appropriate—these are key elements in any effort to forge new understandings between the state and the segments of higher education. Without strong institutions capable of addressing the difficult issues of the 1990s and with a highly politicized system of governance California is likely to continue to avoid issues, an avoidance that has resulted in a nondebate about many critical questions that must be raised and addressed about California's higher education system.

ISSUES AND QUESTIONS FOR THE NINETIES

The logical starting point for a policy agenda for the 1990s would seem to be the two evaluations of the Master Plan which were completed in the

late 1980s. However, these reviews, one by a blue ribbon citizens' committee and one by a joint committee of the California Legislature provide little substantive assistance in anticipating the conditions or staking out the issues of the next decade. Basic questions about the organization and delivery of public higher education were raised only about community colleges. The structural changes in public finance in California, which began with Proposition 13 in 1978, and the implications for California higher education under the Master Plan were not addressed in depth. And the issues of enrollment growth were addressed superficially.

However, the basic theme of the work of the citizens' Commission for the Review of the Master Plan for Higher Education stressing the need to strengthen the relationships of colleges and universities to the state's public schools was sound. Colleges and universities could play a much more proactive role in public school improvement through restructured teacher education programs, assuring that the graduates of these programs can teach the revised curriculum frameworks the state has developed, through new collaborations with public schools, particularly the formation of professional development schools, through greater recognition of the scholarly contributions of school-based research and the writing and reviewing of textbooks, through research involving disciplinary as well as education faculty on the improvement of pedagogy and numerous other initiatives, most of a local character. Unfortunately the Commission while acknowledging the importance of some of these areas, dissipated its energy, and to some extent the energy of the leadership of the systems in tinkering with bureaucratic and procedural approaches, including the establishment of more committees and subcommittees at the state level and the prescribing of voting procedures within those bodies. The special legislative committee that reviewed the Master Plan focused its rhetoric upon the urgency of response to the needs of the state's diverse ethnic groups, but added little—beyond exhortation at a fairly high level of abstraction—to the public or educational policy agenda for the nineties.

Neither of the Master Plan reviews nor the policy pronouncements of California's various governing and coordinating bodies have thoughtfully addressed the special ways the state and the Master Plan will be tested by the anticipated explosive enrollment growth of the 1990s. The public debate about new campuses in California has largely been a discussion of which systems (University of California, State University, Community Colleges) and which localities will be selected to replicate the kinds of campuses that were built in the 1950s and 1960s. Demographics, technology, the economy and knowledge itself have changed dramatically in the past thirty years, but there seems to have been little consideration of the possibility that these changes suggest—perhaps even require—significant variations on the current models

of public colleges and universities. (A recent governor's commission in Virginia did raise this question.⁸)

No credible national or state authority has suggested that either the United States or California lack capacity that will be needed in the future for research and graduate education; indeed much of the nation's current capacity appears to be underutilized, underfunded or both. The cost of conducting world class research in many disciplines has become nearly prohibitive; and a potential shortage of qualified faculty lies ahead. Yet there appears to be little serious debate about current proposals to building new *research* universities to accommodate growing demand for additional spaces for lower division *undergraduates* in the University of California. Another issue calls for careful analysis and debate: Are the specific admissions pools for each system (top eighth of high school graduates eligible for UC, top third eligible for CSU) essential to the Master Plan's principle of differentiated missions and enrollments? Might the formulae, which were largely a function of the sizes of existing campuses and the speed and costs of expanded and new campuses in the early 1960s, be adjusted while maintaining the principles of differentiated missions and admissions policies? Might such adjustments be an alternative to the establishment of new research universities? Finally, while each of the three systems is struggling to come up with its own plans for expansion, the state lacks an all-encompassing blueprint for higher education growth, much less one with links to the even more pressing demands for expansion of the public schools.

Another change in conditions over the past thirty years is the availability of public financial support. The 1960 Master Plan was adopted in the middle years of the most dramatic expansion of state and local government services and budgets in the nation's history. Structural constraints in state and local finance, state budget crises and the failure of higher education bond measures point to a much less fiscally expansive environment in the 1990s—an environment which will pose special problems for California and a small number of other states that must face increases in numbers of students.

In view of these changing circumstances, what are some of the policy issues that might be raised in considering the future of California education and the Master Plan?

First, should the state have an overall plan for higher education expansion? Or will the *laissez-faire* approach suffice, with each system using its own assumptions about enrollment needs, state priorities and availability

⁸Commission on the University of the 21st Century, *The Case for Change*, (Commonwealth of Virginia, 1988). The report looks at the implications of societal changes and changes in the structure of knowledge and discusses the implications for universities, new and existing.

of financial resources to plan, at the same time generating its own political support for new and expanded campuses? Will this produce the best outcome for prospective students? For taxpayers?

How should the current and anticipated enrollment pressures, the result of explosive population growth, be handled? If new institutions are to be created, what kinds of colleges and universities would best meet the needs of California's population in the next century? Would they be different from colleges and universities designed in earlier eras?

Should new research universities be built to accommodate growing numbers of high school graduates eligible for the University of California under current policies? Does it make sense to respond to demand for new undergraduate spaces by building universities that will hire faculties and allocate most of their resources for research and graduate education? Are there alternatives to new research campuses, such as greater utilization of community colleges for freshmen and sophomores, restricting the amount of time undergraduates spend in colleges at state expense to the traditional four years, creating three-year baccalaureate programs, tightening admissions requirements (with provisions for assuring campus diversity), increasing faculty undergraduate teaching, or some combination?

How should the state and the higher education systems recognize the reality that California has embarked on the second round of abrupt and steep fee increases in a little more than a decade? The issue here is not that students are being "overcharged" in terms of value, but that the process for adjusting fees is politicized and unstable—a function of the condition of the state treasury rather than of policy. One result is that fees go up when the economy is going down—when family discretionary resources are declining, part-time and summer jobs are more difficult to find and fewer resources are available for student financial assistance. Do unpredictable and large fluctuations in student charges engender cynicism about saving for college among the middle class and discourage the poor from applying and enrolling? Are current student financial aid systems, designed for an era of low student charges in public institutions, adequate and equitable for a time of higher fees? Should the state and the leaders of higher education develop new policies for setting fees and providing aid or continue to base levels of fees on the health of the economy and the condition of the state treasury?

Should the "no tuition" policies at UC and CSU be altered to permit money collected from students to support academic programs instead of restricting the use of these revenues to nonacademic services and financial aid for other students? The current policies have not succeeded in protecting students or their families from fee increases, but they prohibit the use of the proceeds for educational programs. Thus students may pay more for less education, as their fees increase but the monies cannot be spent on their academic programs.

Should the state increase grants for needy and qualified students attending private colleges and universities? If more students attended private institutions, would fewer new spaces be needed in public colleges and universities? Would there be a net savings to the state?

Would it make educational and financial sense for faculty at public research universities to devote more time and effort to undergraduate teaching? After a period of heavy emphasis upon research, is it time to adjust the balance in UC and other research universities, tilting in the direction of undergraduate teaching in the nineties?

If effective teaching and learning are high priorities for the next few years, should state policy and financing reflect this? Should institutions and faculty that respond to the need for more effective teaching be rewarded? How would more effective teaching be defined—in each type of public institution, for instance, and who would define it? Do the incentives currently in place at the state and institutional levels adequately reflect the importance of teaching?

This list of unanswered questions is neither original nor exhaustive. But there has been no perceptible enthusiasm for addressing them by California policymakers, educational leaders or by various commissions and committees responsible for planning.

POLICY LEADERSHIP FOR THE NINETIES

My assumption is that educational opportunity, teaching effectiveness and research will be even more critical to the future of California than they have been to the past. But state and institutional reputations derived from massive access and research excellence will not be sufficient to meet the needs of students, the economy and society. If California attempts to rest on its past laurels, it will surely lose its leadership position in American higher education. But to make the transition to the new agenda, state and educational leaders will have to raise uncomfortable questions and depart from established "business as usual" policies and practices. As part of this process, some of the conventional wisdom—the sacred cows of California higher education—must be subjected to scrutiny and revision.

The impressive accomplishments of the past thirty years do not assure the future viability of the policy framework set forth in the Master Plan. In fact, past successes may breed a false confidence, an unwillingness to examine critically the assumptions inherited from different times and a reluctance to raise and address difficult issues. The questions facing the architects of the Master Plan were no less daunting than those facing California today. The issues they addressed were unprecedented and difficult. Yet the 1960 Master Plan laid the foundation for a period of remarkable progress for California higher education. By recognizing that

leadership meant more than extrapolating past policies into the future, the framers of the Master Plan accommodated the inevitable political and fiscal constraints, compromised where compromise was required and still managed to put forth a bold and compelling vision of opportunity and excellence. The essence of that vision is as central to the future of California now as it was then. Its achievement in the 1990s and beyond will demand that we face the differences between our time and theirs and abandon comfortable myths that are no longer grounded in reality.

For California higher education, the 1990s will provide the opportunity to build on the three decades of experience under the Master Plan. But it will also present enormous challenges of rapid growth, of financial constraints, of faculty turnover, of the most diverse student population in the history of American higher education and of great societal pressures to enhance both quality and access. California appears on the verge of entering this era without a well-defined agenda, hoping to negotiate the decade of the 1990s by mechanistically replicating the policies of the 1960s.

Class, Race and Higher Education in the United States

Martin A. Trow

These reflections on class, race and higher education in the United States were stimulated by the report of an OECD committee charged with reviewing and assessing higher education in California, just as if it were one of the sovereign states belonging to the OECD. This original idea, of OECD's higher education division, was partly in response to necessity; it simply is not possible to do a country study of higher education in the U.S., both because it is too large and diverse, and because there is no single responsible authority to which the report could be given. Some of these difficulties apply also to a state as big and diverse as California; by the latest census, it is the home of about 29 million people. However, the idea of a "country study" of higher education in California is at least conceivable—after all, in the U.S., education is constitutionally the responsibility of the states.

The report, as I think his colleagues would acknowledge, was substantially drafted by Professor A. H. Halsey of Oxford, who chairs the committee. The report is an excellent one, sympathetic and understanding of the peculiar character of American higher education in a way that few non-American observers are.

Here I must interject a bit of personal knowledge that is relevant to my theme. Professor Halsey is and always has been a socialist, not a Marxist, but a Christian or Ethical Socialist in a great and still powerful British tradition for which, incidentally, I have the highest respect. This tradition places great moral and thus political value on the social qualities of equality

and fraternity.¹ Halsey's observations on California's higher education naturally reflect these values—not crudely, or dogmatically, or didactically—but subtly, as they color the insights and reflections of an extremely intelligent and knowledgeable observer. His perspectives are just different enough from mine (and from those of most Americans) to be unusually stimulating to those like myself, who come from and hold fast to a different social and political tradition.

Mass higher education in the United States, with universal access in many places, has many functions that it shares with similar institutions around the world. But it has one function that is perhaps unique to us: it is the central instrument for the legitimation of a society around the principle of broad (and in principle, equal) opportunities open to all individuals, opportunities to improve themselves and to make their careers and lives through their own efforts and talents. Our 3,500 accredited colleges and universities, offering course work at every level of standard and difficulty to an enormously diverse student body, serve a wide variety of functions for the students and for the society at large. While most of them offer some liberal and general studies, they serve as the chief avenue of entry to middle-class occupations—even to quite modest lower-middle class occupations, which in most countries would not require or reward exposure to postsecondary education. These institutions, without the kinds of educational ceilings common in European nonuniversity forms of postsecondary schooling, encourage students to raise their aspirations through further study, full- or part-time, and provide the possibility of transfer to advanced studies elsewhere if they do not have such provisions themselves. They thus reflect and reinforce the radical individualism of American values, a set of values deeply opposed to socialist principles that center on cooperative efforts at group advancement and on the common effort to create a society whose members all profit (more or less equally) from the common effort. American higher education, as a system, both serves and celebrates the American Dream of individual careers open to talents, a dream given much of its institutional reality in the contemporary world precisely by America's system of mass higher education offering a clear alternative to socialist principles of class identification and horizontal loyalty. The contrast between these competitive visions is captured in the stirring appeal of Eugene Debs, the last socialist leader in the United States with any significant following (he gained nearly a million votes for president on the Socialist ticket in 1920), when he called on his followers, most of them in the working class, to "Rise with your class, not out of it."

¹The values are set forth with clarity and historical specificity in Halsey's book (with Norman Dennis), *English Ethical Socialism* (Oxford, 1988), as well as in others of his writings.

Mass higher education in the United States (and to some extent elsewhere as well)² is deeply opposed to this vision of society, to which it offers the alternative exhortation "Rise out of your class, not with it." That unexpressed call (unexpressed precisely because it is understood beyond need for explication by all Americans) touches a fundamental chord in American society, and not least among its workers and immigrants. It is a long-standing cliché of American life that parents say with fervor of their children: "I want them to have a better life than I have had," a better life seen as achievable not through collective or political action, but through more and better education, and in recent decades, through college education. George Ticknor, then a professor at Harvard, expressed an American truism in 1825 when he observed: "There is, at this moment, hardly a father in our country, who does not count among his chief anxieties, and most earnest hopes, the desire to give his children a better education than he has been able to obtain for himself."³ In the same year, the president of the University of Nashville, then near the frontier, declared that ". . . every individual, who wishes to rise above the level of a mere laborer at task-work, ought to endeavor to obtain a liberal education."⁴ Already over 160 years ago, "every individual," not just gentlemen, as in most of Europe, was being exhorted to rise out of the ranks of the "mere day laborer" through education. And while higher education in the U.S. would not be providing the means of social mobility for large numbers for a century or more, and not for the whole society until after World War II, the sense of the possibilities for achievement through education are there very early indeed. And these are the expressions not of radical leaders, but of members of the solid professional middle class who believe that they are voicing perfectly ordinary middle-class sentiments, not those of political radicalism.

The idea of higher education as an instrument of mobility for poor young men "making their way" was present in America throughout the eighteenth century. But it required the enormous growth in the numbers of colleges after 1800, the fierce competition among them, and the effect this competition had on the costs of college attendance, to bring large numbers

²In western European countries, fewer youth of modest social origins have taken advantage of the call to mobility inherent in mass higher education, in part because of tight restraints on access to higher education, restraints chiefly through a class-linked stratification of the secondary school system, and of related requirements and standards for entry to higher education. But institutions of higher education everywhere serve to weaken working-class ties and affiliations.

³Quoted in Frederick Rudolph, *The American College and University* (New York, 1962), 216.

⁴*Ibid.*, 214.

of penurious students to college. Allmendinger, an historian of this period, notes that:

Poor young men, sometimes described as "needy" or "indigent" or even "paupers" gathered in large numbers in the colleges of New England during the years between 1800 and 1860. They came down from the hill towns, where opportunities were few, to the small colleges at Hanover or Williamstown or Brunswick. Even before New York State and Ohio drew many of their kind to the West, they began to infiltrate—almost imperceptibly at first—the student population. They did not want new farm lands, nor would they try to find places at home as hired workers in an agricultural proletariat; they joined, instead, a rural intelligentsia of students and teachers aspiring to the middle class professions.⁵

The proliferation of colleges in the United States in the first half of the nineteenth century resulted chiefly from the weakening of political constraints on their establishment. In the Colonies, as in most countries to this day, governments (in America the Colonial governments) controlled the establishment of colleges and universities through their control over the awarding of charters to institutions that allow them to award degrees. Governments almost everywhere have had political and religious reasons for limiting the numbers of institutions of higher education; moreover, new universities have been subsidized by the state or been given guarantees of their continued survival. The Revolution in America greatly weakened central state power, over higher education as over almost everything else. The Constitution took education (including higher education) completely out of the authority of the federal government; it took both federal and state

⁵David F. Allmendinger, Jr., *Paupers and Scholars: The Transformation of Student Life in Nineteenth-Century New England* (New York, 1975), 8. Allmendinger did his research on poor students in the emerging colleges of New England, but I believe that the patterns he describes were also to be found in the much larger number of small, modest, largely denominational colleges springing up along the western frontier. Indeed, then as now "one clear sign of the presence of the poor was the increasing maturity of the student population. . . . Men in their middle twenties now enrolled in large numbers, along with boys in their early teens. . . . Many had started trades, and then having changed their minds, had continued in their work to get money for education. This brought about a mixing of the social classes, as well as ages." (page 9).

It was crucial that these new, mostly "private" colleges were cheap, not too far away, provided charity (i.e., student aid) and were not too particular about their students' academic preparation. The students' education was also substantially subsidized—indeed, made possible—by the tiny salaries paid to the teaching staff who themselves did not have the dignity of the guilds of learned men in the old countries.

governments out of the direct administration of the new independent colleges springing up everywhere after the Revolution, and it also removed any firm commitment by government of public funds for their support. The hundreds of new colleges that sprang up between the Revolution and the Civil War, many sponsored by the competitive Protestant denominations, had few academic or social pretensions, and in their need they were open and available to poor students. It did not take the democratic revolutions of the post-World War II era to create the possibility of a college education for poor youth; America had its democratic revolution in the first half of the nineteenth century. The nineteenth century, and especially the freeing of higher education from the control of the state, created the potential for the expansion of access to mass higher education in the United States. But that potential was only fulfilled after the second World War.⁶

This spirit of individual aspiration, opportunity and achievement, present throughout our history but taking special force during and after the Revolution, is at marked variance with socialist principles of collective aspiration, opportunity and achievement. It is at odds also with the instruments of that collective spirit, notably trade unions and the European socialist (or social democratic) parties of the past century, along with the cultural institutions that were created in many European nations around those institutions. Those institutions—schools, newspapers, sports clubs, cooperatives and others—together constituted not just a political/economic movement, but an alternative subculture, the achievement of socialism in everyday life even before the triumph of socialism nationally.⁷ But this subculture tied the individual worker firmly to his class; it did not encourage mobility out of it. Even the adult education it provided was aimed at raising the moral and cultural level of workers, not at providing them an avenue of mobility into the middle class: they characteristically offered "humanistic" studies designed to raise the cultural level of the working-class members of the subculture, not vocational courses designed to equip its members for mobility up and out of their class. For example, the studies provided the British working man in his leisure hours by the Mechanics' Institutes, and

⁶On this broad development, see Martin Trow, "American Higher Education: 'Exceptional' or Just Different?" in *Is America Different? A New Look at American Exceptionalism*, ed. Byron Shafer (Oxford, 1991), 138-186; and Sheldon Rothblatt and Martin Trow, "Government Policies and Higher Education: A Comparison of Britain and the United States, 1630-1860," in *The Sociology of Social Reform*, ed. Colin Crouch and Anthony Heath (Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

⁷On the concept of an "occupational community" in the American context facilitating the development of class-based institutions, see Seymour Martin Lipset, Martin Trow and James Coleman, *Union Democracy* (Glencoe, Illinois, 1956).

later by the Workers' Education Association, pivoted around literature and "pure" science, not professional engineering.⁸

Mass higher education is the enemy of a class-oriented society, and of class-oriented institutions such as trade unions. In the United States it has always been so, but dramatically so since enrollments have broadened and grown to include large numbers who would formerly have joined the labor force directly from high school. The turning point was World War II, when the wartime effort created a quasi-socialist society for a few years without affecting the underlying individualistic ethos of the society (with the partial exception of its academic and intellectual elites). At the end of World War II, American trade unions enrolled nearly 40 percent of the nonagricultural labor force, the highest level it ever achieved. It reached this level largely on the strength of war-time governmental requirements that firms having contracts with the government allow trade union organization of their labor force, a policy which in part reflected the close connections between organized labor and the northern wing of the Democratic Party, and in part because of the usefulness of the unions in organizing a war-time labor force and supporting the war. When the war-time rules were rescinded, along with the direct role of the government in the economy, and a little later the decline of the industries in which unions were heavily represented (e.g., steel and mining), the proportion of the labor force in unions declined precipitously. During the years since World War II, while enrollments in higher education have grown from 1.5 million to over 14 million, and the proportion of the age grade enrolled in colleges and universities increased from 15 percent to about 50 percent, the proportion of the nonfarm labor force in trade unions fell from roughly 40 percent just after World War II to about 19 percent in 1988, and in the private sector to 14 percent.⁹ (The figures for California show the same pattern: the proportion of union members as

⁸Writing in the 1920s, Lillian Herstein observed that "the differentiation between adult and workers' education . . . has been stated and can be accepted. The responsibility of providing schooling for those who are seeking a way out of industry by means of education can be placed on the public schools. Workers' education should concern itself, let us grant, with those who are willing to be the apostles of a new order. 'Labor education,' says Mr. Horace Kallen . . . 'should become conversant with control rather than escape.'" From "Realities in Workers' Education," in *American Labor Dynamics in the Light of Post-War Developments*, ed. J. B. S. Hardman (New York, 1928), 378-379.

⁹Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstracts of the United States* (Washington, D.C., 1990), Table 689, p. 419. Calculated from data in the U.S. Dept. of Labor, *Handbook of Labor Statistics*, Bulletin 2340 (August 1989), Table 68, p. 290, and *Historical Statistics of the U.S.: Colonial Times to 1970*, Series D927-939, pp. 176-177.

a percent of nonfarm wage and salary workers in 1951 was 41 percent; in 1987, it was 19 percent.)¹⁰

I am not suggesting a simple direct causal relationship between these figures—e.g., that all those who did not join the unions were going to college instead. Both sets of figures point to and reflect even more fundamental changes in the economy and society, changes that also occurred in other societies but which in the U.S. took on characteristically individualistic forms. As traditional heavy industry and the big manual occupations such as mining and cargo handling, which everywhere have been the heart of the trade union movement, declined, other occupations grew that required (or came to be seen as requiring) a postsecondary education. In the U.S. this meant a massive growth of enrollment in the same institutions that had educated the older social and professional elite groups, and in the reinforcement of the individualistic ethos of opportunity and social mobility. All horizontal bondings which might inhibit or discourage individual mobility were avoided or weakened—not only trade union membership but also neighborhood and friendship ties. At the very least, they were modified and made instruments of individual mobility, as, for example, were family ties. The family, for most people (outside of a small social elite that could pass on substantial wealth across generations), became not the source of an individual's inherited social status but a launching pad for an individual career, with the advantages of money and higher social status translated into opportunities for more and better formal education, and thus of better life chances for individual achievement and mobility. Indeed, the very idea of a "career," the planned sequence of upward steps in a chosen occupation, as against a series of jobs gained and changed in the course of working life, is in the United States now largely a function of some experience of higher education; it is hard to have a career without having been to college. And a "career" is inherently the property of the individual, and not that of an organization or class.

Institutions have survived in America by adapting to the conditions of a society marked by easy social and geographical mobility. Already in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as George Homans shows, New England farmers (not peasants) were alert to the main chance; only one farm in five was passed on from father to son, and thus only one farm in 25 stayed in the same family over three generations. New England farmers' sons left for better land in the West or for better opportunities in other callings, as Americans have always done. Those who remained farmers showed little attachment to the land, but rather to the idea of individual betterment: a betterment that in many cases also included attendance at a

¹⁰California Department of Finance, *California Almanac*, ed. James S. Fay and Stephanie W. Fay, 4th ed. (Pacific Data Resources, Santa Barbara, 1990), 235.

state land-grant university, with its school of agriculture, and use of the university's agricultural research and demonstration units.

After World War II, the trade union movement survived least well because it could not adapt to social mobility; unions are intrinsically instruments of horizontal bonding and are the enemy of individual achievement and mobility except for the tiny number who could make the unions a career. (Many of its leaders were and are college educated and came to the unions out of ideological commitment rather than as a reflection of common class membership.) The absence in America of a solidly based socialist party and its related institutions narrowed further the possible reconciliation of class-linked organizations with some possibilities for individual mobility and achievement within the labor movement, as, for example, has been possible in Sweden and the United Kingdom until recently.

The radically individualistic spirit of America is also opposed to a more conservative concept of social organizations that envisions society as organized around status groups and strata or corporate guilds, the careers (or, echoing Weber, the life fates) of whose members are closely tied to those larger social entities. That spirit is embedded in most Western European societies, whether governed by social democratic or more conservative parties. And while market forces (the economic reflections of an individualistic ethos) have been gaining ascendancy everywhere over more corporatist modes of economic organization, they are still resisted by most European systems of higher education or are adapted within close constraints on access. Such constraints, tying access to universities to highly selective upper secondary schools, minimize the power of the consumer and thus limit (or at least postpone) the emergence of a system of higher education at the service of the society rather than of the State, or of specific elite strata which will serve the State.

Throughout its history, American society has, for many reasons, provided an unfriendly environment for socialist ideas and institutions. The absence of a feudal past, our early extension of the vote to all white men, the frontier, our relative affluence, our ethnic heterogeneity, religious roots and social mobility have all been cited as explanations of why the U.S. has been and continues to be the only industrialized society in the world without a significant socialist movement or party.¹¹ Mass higher education has been an important element in this "unfriendly environment," especially over the past half century. And it works in a variety of ways. For example, mass higher education, especially since the great expansion following World War

¹¹The literature on the problem is very large. See, for example, *Failure of a Dream? Essays in the History of American Socialism*, ed. John H. M. Laslett and Seymour Martin Lipset (Garden City, N.Y., 1974).

II, has drained off from the working and lower-middle classes many of their brightest and ablest young men and women—not only the most intelligent, but also those with the most energy and initiative—making for a kind of brain drain out of the working class and weakening its organizations.

Ironically, the strong cultural emphasis on social mobility, on "getting ahead" in life, may have accounted equally for the leaders who governed and ran the unions, the businessmen they bargained with and the mob bosses with whom they all too often were allied. Strong aspirations for personal achievement, for getting ahead, drive Americans of all kinds to seek avenues of mobility of all kinds, both legitimate and illegitimate. The chief legitimate avenues have been through speculation in land, entrepreneurship and education. The latter two have historically been alternative routes up for different groups in different generations. The chief illegitimate channel of mobility, of course, is crime, both blue and white collar, of which we have a fair amount. And white collar crime increasingly requires an M.B.A. or at least the opportunities and access gained through higher education, both its skills and its connections. These channels have all been in competition with one another throughout American history, a competition that has provided the story for much of our literature, and even more of our movies. Since the Second World War they have become complementary. One can still start a small grocery store in an ethnic neighborhood without a college degree, but you need a college education to be a consultant about anything or to provide the sophisticated services of modern urban life.

But all of this—the multiple channels of mobility open to ordinary people and the ambitions behind them—are strongly corrosive of all institutions that depend on horizontal solidarity and collective improvement, not least the labor unions.¹² The brain drain through education out of the unions of their best and brightest young members is part, but only part, of that corrosion; it is one of the mechanisms of that corrosion.

We can see this also when we look at the last great period of union growth in the U.S.—the creation of the big industrial unions—the steel workers, the automobile workers, the electrical workers and then the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO)—during the Great Depression of the 1930s. This period preceded the great expansion of American higher education; while our system in the thirties was large by European standards, it was still exceptional then for poor or working-class youth to go to a

¹²This applies also to research universities, which try (with only partial success) to harness the individual ambitions of scholars and scientists to the welfare of the institution.

college or university.¹³ For the ordinary industrial worker, something closer to the classic conditions of class struggle between labor and capital seemed to prevail. The new industrial unions—led to some considerable extent by socialists such as Walter Reuther and his brother in the United Auto Workers—had broader dreams and hopes for what a labor movement could do to reshape the politics, the economics and indeed the basic character of American society. Such unions could evoke the deep loyalties of their members and could also be a real alternative to "getting ahead" as the guiding principle of life. It was perhaps not a fair test for the unions, since during most of that decade there was not much chance for anybody to get ahead in the U.S. Still, perhaps for the first and last time in the United States, large numbers of people could envision building a working-class movement, one with real weight and influence on one of the two major political parties. The Roosevelt Democratic coalition provided an opening, with the more radical or visionary union leaders seeing perhaps a labor party of their own in the future.

Indeed, there seemed to be some historical warrant for such hopes; had not the democratic socialist and labor parties of Western Europe emerged out of just such coalitions with liberal bourgeois parties thirty to fifty years earlier? Could the U.S. replicate that history? Some, in any event, believed so.

Yet another element contributed to the building of working-class institutions during those Depression years, and that is the production, really for the first time, of a sizeable group of unemployed college and university graduates, many of whom had themselves come from working- or lower-middle-class backgrounds. Many had grown up in homes with socialist ties or sympathies, "red diaper babies," as they were called, and had early taken advantage of relatively open access to higher education, particularly to free urban public universities such as New York's City College and Temple University in Philadelphia. Moreover, many of these young men were themselves socialists—both of the democratic and communist varieties. For them, job prospects in the thirties were poor. Some, trained as economists or sociologists, could find work in the expanding welfare agencies of the New Deal and could believe themselves contributing in that way to a nascent socialism in America. Others threw in their lot with the new unions, sometimes serving an apprenticeship on the shop floor and then getting elected to union office. Some went directly into union management by appointment to a staff position, as aides and advisors to the new, more politically minded, socialist minded leaders. Sometimes the young men who

¹³For more detail, see Martin Trow, "The Second Transformation of American Secondary Education," in *The International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, II, no. 2 (September 1961), 144-166.

went from college into the unions were members of the Communist Party, and occasionally they were members of the Socialist Party of America. But for a short while, union leadership offered the prospect of a real ideologically oriented career for a small number of college educated youth.¹⁴

But the dream of a politically relevant mass labor movement, one that would evolve into an independent Labor Party embodying socialist principles, died with World War II.¹⁵ It more obviously collapsed with the election of Truman in 1948, because that kept the labor movement inside the Democratic Party. The pent-up war-time demand fueled an immediate boom; moreover, the government economists had learned something from the New Deal and the war about how central government interventions could avoid deep depressions as well as shorten and mitigate recessions. The growing economy, together with the GI Bill, encouraged and supported literally millions of veterans to go back to college, and the subtle permeation of democratic sentiments and higher aspirations throughout the society created a burst of demand for access to postsecondary education. The educational system thus grew to meet the demand. There were similar tendencies in all western European countries. The difference is that in the United States demand for education at every level drives supply; at the level of higher education, it is not constrained by either resources or academic standards. In 1950, a comprehensive secondary system was already bringing 50 percent of the young to high school graduation; that figure by 1990 was about 75 percent. During those postwar decades, the U.S. built and opened hundreds and hundreds of colleges of every kind, in some years nearly one every day, under the implicit, sometimes explicit doctrine that "Something

¹⁴At the end of World War II, when C. Wright Mills did the study reported in his *New Men of Power* (New York, 1948) his sample of American labor leaders was distinctly better educated than the American adult population. Already a quarter of the American Federation of Labor and a third of the CIO leaders had been to college, as compared with only 10 percent of adult Americans.

¹⁵I remember going to a meeting of a democratic socialist group in 1946. It was addressed by a young Irving Howe, later to become the distinguished literary critic, professor and editor of a small socialist journal. He gave a gloomy speech, anticipating a major economic collapse in America, an event which, in his view, would give socialists an opportunity to create a mass party. (It was perhaps always a handicap for socialists in America that they had to seem to hope for, and not just predict, depression and misery, before they came to the cheerier part.) I was a bit skeptical of the imminence of a depression in America and afterwards asked the speaker how the socialist movement would respond if there were no depression. His answer, with its hard realism, surprised and impressed me. "If capitalism can buy the workers off with low unemployment and good wages," he said, "it deserves to win." Howe was betting his life that it could not meet those tests. It could, and it did.

is better than nothing; let the future worry about standards. Right now, let us provide as good an education as possible for as many as possible."

And so between 1940 and 1970, nationwide enrollments rose from about 1.5 million to about 8.5 million. By 1991, enrollment in all American colleges and universities was about 14 million. Roughly two thirds of high school graduates get some exposure to postsecondary education in the seven years directly after high school graduation, meaning roughly half of the age cohort. And some 44 percent of the whole labor force, including of course older people, have now had some exposure to postsecondary education.

The enormous expansion of the postwar years changed the perceptions of higher education among broad strata who had never before seen it as a realistic possibility for people like themselves. Higher education thus became for many the vehicle for social mobility that high school graduation had been for the half century between 1890 and 1940. Those fifty years had seen the growth of a broad system of state-supported secondary education all over the country. While higher education had actually served as a vehicle of mobility for many before 1945, especially for youth from farms preparing themselves for teaching, and for such educationally precocious ethnic groups as Jews and Armenians, it had not been seen as available for career making and mobility by broad segments of the population until after World War II.

The significance of World War II as a watershed of values and attitudes ushering in the mass higher education that followed is suggested by *The Grapes of Wrath*. John Steinbeck's powerful novel, published in 1939, is about the mid 1930s in America, the Great Depression and the migration of thousands of impoverished farmers from Oklahoma and Arkansas (the "Okies" of American history) to California. This great internal migration can best be compared to the post-World War II mass immigrations to California from other countries: Mexicans, Chinese from Hong Kong and Singapore, Vietnamese, Koreans and Filipinos. Like the Okies, these more recent immigrants from around the Pacific Rim are predominantly poor people, and they in turn resemble the earlier European migrations of the decades from 1860-1925. But the extent to which (and the ways in which) these different groups have used education in their strategies of acculturation have differed. *The Grapes of Wrath*, like so much of Depression-era literature, is a story infused with socialist values, marked by anger at the exploitation of workers by employers and the condemnation of injustice and inequality. It is a story of the class struggle, even if in the nonideological form in which that struggle was experienced and expressed by the migratory workers created by the Depression and fleeing to California from the Dust Bowl.

At the end of that novel, Casy, the itinerant preacher turned union organizer, is clubbed to death by some goons, thugs hired by a big farm company (or agribusiness) to break a strike of migratory workers. In the melee, Tom Joad is injured, but in turn kills the company thug, thus

becoming a fugitive. He hides out in a field for a few days near his family, whose members are picking cotton for starvation wages. Ma Joad comes out to him to give him some food, and to tell him he must go away to avoid arrest. He agrees, and in a final stirring speech tells her that he is going to take up Casy's work and become a union organizer allied with poor people like himself against the rich and the exploitive. Ma asks where she will be able to find him, and his answer to her moves us over half a century later.

Well, maybe like Casy says, a fella ain't got a soul of his own, but on'y a piece of a big one—an' . . . then it don' matter. Then I'll be all aroun' in the dark. I'll be ever'where—wherever you look. Wherever they's a fight so hungry people can eat, I'll be there. Wherever they's a cop beatin' up a guy, I'll be there. . . . I'll be in the way guys yell when they're mad. . . . An' when our folks eat the stuff they raise an' live in the houses they build—why, I'll be there.¹⁶

Tom goes out to fight for his people, the ordinary poor people pushed around by big corporations and their cops and thugs—a man committing his life to the struggle to rise with his class, not out of it. "Like Casy says, a fella ain't got a soul of his own, but on'y a piece of a big one."

What Tom Joad does *not* say to his Ma, in that hole in the ground where he is hiding near the boxcars in which she and the rest of his family are living and starving along with the other cotton-pickers in prewar California, is:

Ma, I've got to go and make it on my own. This is my chance to find out who I am, and what I'm made of. So, Ma, I'm going to Fresno State College down the road. If *they* don't take me in I'll go to one of these community colleges springin' up all over the place, and I'll work my way through school, and get my bachelor's degree, and then get my state license, and mebbe an MBA, and buy and sell real estate. Maybe I'll start up my own little consulting firm, and make a pile of money, and build a big house for you and Pa and Rosasharn and the kids, with four bathrooms and a swimming pool.

Tom doesn't say that, but he might have done so, in a different novel, out of a different but equally authentic American tradition. What Tom didn't say is essentially what migrants both to and within America have said since our beginning, and certainly what most of Tom's successors have said in the great migrations to California since World War II. These new immigrants, and the children and grandchildren of the Okies too—the descendants of the

¹⁶*Grapes of Wrath* (New York, 1972), 572. First published in 1939.

Joads and their friends from Oklahoma—have flooded into California's colleges and universities, which have expanded enormously in number and size to meet that demand. Since the end of the Second World War very little has been heard in California of "rising with your class," and a great deal about the need to create more truly equal opportunities for individual advancement for all, rich and poor, black, brown and white, through education—and especially through higher education.

There is in American history and popular culture a heroic saga to compete with the socialist saga, the story of the self-made man rising through his own talents and industry. The saga is also often about the loneliness of that climb, and the pain that accompanies the breaking of strong ties to family, class, ethnic group and friends—a different kind of sacrifice in a different kind of struggle. We hear it in the stories of the frontiersman and in the saga of Swedish emigration to America in Moberg's great epic. It is a sacrifice not *for* social ties, ties of class and ethnicity, but *of* ties; and that can be an equally wrenching sacrifice. We see and hear it endlessly in the films and stories of men and women rising out of the urban slums and neighborhoods of the big eastern melting pot cities, and it often has a bitter and sardonic twist of failed ambition and thwarted aspiration. But after World War II, that saga usually includes attendance at college or university, as that becomes the alternative to failure or crime.

Today, we are not hearing many heroic sagas about young men and women struggling out of the barrios (the Mexican-American slums of Los Angeles) up to UCLA and law school and into a partnership in a big law firm or elected office. We are not hearing many African-American sagas of the rise out of the "projects"—the public housing units that have become black slums, up to UC Berkeley and beyond. These sagas are waiting to be told; it may be that we have not heard many yet because they do not seem heroic to those who experience them. Or maybe the tellers are too busy just now making it up the ladder to write about it.

A culture is defined, in part, by what it feels guilty about. Western European nations, on the whole, feel guilty about their working classes, about the sacrifices they made during the rapid industrialization of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, about their substantial exclusion from opportunities to get good health care, recreation and leisure, good education, economic security and security in old age, and a chance to share in the high culture of their society. Much of public policy in European countries over the past hundred years, and more rapidly over the past fifty years, has been aimed at ameliorating and reducing those disadvantages linked to class.

Americans, in contrast, are remarkably free of guilt towards working-class people, individually or collectively. There is, of course, an enormous body of legislation on the books that aims at helping people who are, as we

used to put it, "down on their luck," or as we would say now say, "disadvantaged." Some of it is federal law, much is state law.

The United States has more social legislation on the books than Europeans give us credit for and less, probably, than we need. But it has not been put there, for the most part, out of a sense of class guilt. If we have any national policy regarding social or economic class, it is an educational policy designed not to strengthen the working class or ameliorate its conditions but to abolish it. The American dream, I believe, is that eventually everyone will be either self-employed or a salaried professional, and higher education is the instrument for the achievement of both.

If Americans do not feel especially guilty about the "working class"—even if they accept that there is such a thing—we as a nation still feel intensely guilty about our history of race relations and especially about our history of Black slavery and the elaborate social and legal machinery (much of it at the state level) for the subordination of African Americans from the end of Reconstruction after the Civil War all the way to the burst of Supreme Court decisions and legislation that marked the revolution in race relations of the 1950s and 1960s. There is, of course, still plenty of racist sentiment in the society, though the polls show less all the time. But at the level of public policy, policies that are put in place by legislatures that are elected for the most part by white voters, the commitment to what only can be called a prominority policy is strong and persistent. The general term for prominority policies, policies aimed at benefiting particular racial or ethnic groups, is "affirmative action." Affirmative action is pervasive throughout American society—in the hiring policies of private business, in public housing, in federal employment and its policies for contracting in the private sector for goods and services, in the military—but nowhere can the presence of affirmative action be seen more clearly than in the policies of higher education. It is apparent not only in public institutions, in response to legislative or government pressure, but also in private institutions, in response chiefly to the powerful dictates of a collective conscience—a force that *also* operates in publicly supported institutions, where its effects are mixed up with those of expediency and institutional responsiveness to external pressures from government and interest groups.

"Affirmative action" as a concept and a set of institutional policies is the subject of intense debate and controversy, chiefly centering on whether governmental intervention in favor of racial or ethnic groups should be aimed at *equalizing the opportunities* for achievement and advancement of members of that group, or whether those efforts should continue in ways that will ensure instead the *equality of achievement* for that group, as compared with the more advantaged groups in the society. The differences between these conceptions—of equality of opportunity, or of achievement—are large, and the issue is still in doubt; all such issues in America end up in the

Supreme Court, where the constitutional rights of the groups and individuals involved are determined.

While sharp differences exist about the proper scope of affirmative action in American higher education, and the appropriate degree of governmental or institutional intervention against the free play of competitive meritocracy, there is a near unanimity in our colleges and universities that some kind and degree of affirmative action is appropriate and necessary.

Affirmative action makes the contrast sharp between our policies regarding class and our policies regarding race. Perhaps I can capture the difference in the realm of higher education by observing that in the last 30 years I cannot remember ever hearing a California legislator demand that the University increase access to it for the sons and daughters of working-class families. Moreover, the *OECD Review* of higher education in California could not say what proportion of the students at Berkeley are of working-class origins; our statistics are simply not collected that way. Chapter 2 of the *Review*, "Planning and the Market in Higher Education," discusses "education and stratification" and "education and social selection," familiar categories when analyzing European education systems. But its authors are unable to discuss specifically Californian issues within these categories; the necessary statistics are not available, and the discussions carried on in California are rarely couched in these terms. It is the only chapter that rests completely on European perspectives and theories; its distance from Californian realities is apparent by contrast with the rest of the report.

The failure of traditional models of social stratification and social mobility to illuminate California's society helps clarify American exceptionalism. Elsewhere in advanced societies, education is seen as a vehicle or instrument for social mobility, both between generations and within a single lifetime. Social class is ordinarily defined by the physical nature of one's job or occupation, by the income it commands, the status it enjoys, the sense of horizontal identity it engenders or by some combination of these dimensions of class position. In California at the end of the twentieth century, education is not so much a vehicle or channel to higher social status as it is itself the chief defining feature of one's social status. To "place" a person in the social world, one ordinarily asks where one went to "school" (i.e., college or university), and perhaps whether one finished and took a degree and what one studied. In 1987, fewer than 20 percent of Californians 25 years and older had not graduated from high school; nearly half had attended college, and the proportions are much higher among the younger cohorts.¹⁷ It is less important how one happens to be employed at any given moment, since people change jobs and occupations frequently, and

¹⁷*California Almanac*, 65.

what they do, or appear to do, correlates poorly with their education. And education predicts their lifestyles, attitudes and loyalties much better than does whether they are "manual" workers, or are self-employed, or in one of the other ordinary categories of social stratification.

Ethnicity is the other great defining feature of Californians; if one knows a person's ethnicity and formal education, one knows a great deal about them. In contrast to the paucity of data on the class positions of Californians, the official statistics are rich in ethnic and racial data. The Legislature is constantly affirming the importance of special efforts to recruit, retain, graduate and sponsor members of disadvantaged minority groups. (In California, this includes African Americans and Hispanics but now excludes almost all those of Asian origin. They are too successful to qualify for the special benefits and attention of affirmative action policies.) Many university policies pivot around racial issues, enormous amounts of statistics are collected within racial and ethnic categories, and discussions of affirmative action (mostly how to strengthen it and make it more effective in the university) are central themes in academia, from the departmental level on up.

In California, as elsewhere in the U.S., student admissions are heavily influenced by affirmative action policies. As just one example of these policies, the proportion of African Americans and Hispanics in the entering freshman class at UC Berkeley rose from about 11 percent in 1983 to about 25 percent in 1990, more than doubling their proportions. The percentages of Asians in entering classes remained roughly constant at 28 percent, while the proportion of white enrollees fell from 58 percent to about 40 percent.¹⁸ This was accomplished by applying quite different criteria for admissions to students in these different racial and ethnic groups. Similar policies are in place in almost every American college and university; the numbers in many are not as dramatic as at Berkeley only because they have fewer minority applicants.

Two questions might be asked: (1) How can we explain these quite dramatic policies, and (2) Why has there not been a vigorous backlash by the now discriminated-against white students and their parents?

Part of the answer to both questions is surely the sense of guilt among white Americans towards certain minority groups, especially African Americans and Native Americans, that I spoke of earlier. But the other, related reason arises out of a national commitment to achieving a genuinely multiracial society, one in which African Americans and other minorities are

¹⁸Office of Student Research, *Berkeley Campus Statistics* (University of California at Berkeley, Fall 1990), Table 10A, p. 31; and *Applicant Numbers and Percentages, 1981-82 to 1988-89*, (University of California at Berkeley, February 19, 1989), Table 18.

represented in numbers roughly similar to their proportion within the population at large, and are represented proportionally in the leadership of all the institutions of the society—in its political, economic, military and educational institutions. To attain leadership in almost all of these social institutions, experience of, if not a degree from, an institution of higher education is a necessity. And that, in a word, is the driving force behind these affirmative action policies in higher education—policies keyed to the mobility of individuals through competitive performance.

African Americans and Hispanics in America have made conspicuous progress in some areas of national life, but less in others. Here I refer mainly to African Americans; the situation of recent immigrants from Mexico is similar in some respects, but different in others.

African Americans are very well represented in all ranks of our armed forces; General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, our highest ranking military officer during the war with Iraq, is only the most prominent. African Americans have also done well in politics; thousands have been elected to local and municipal office, many are in Congress, the mayor of almost every big city in the country is African American, and a male African American has recently been elected governor of Virginia.

African Americans as a whole have done much less well economically, or in the leadership of economic institutions, or in academic life. On this latter point, a few figures can stand for all. In 1988, 625 Americans nationwide received Ph.D.s in mathematics or computer science. Of those, only 2 were African Americans. Of the roughly 500 doctorates awarded that year in the U.S. in marine, atmospheric and earth sciences, only another 2 were African American. The problems are not confined to the physical or natural sciences: in that same year (1988), only 5 American-born African Americans gained Ph.D.s in anthropology; 11 were granted doctorates in economics, 7 in political science and 14 in sociology.¹⁹ This in a country with 3,500 colleges and universities, most of which require a Ph.D. for a regular tenure-track appointment.

The indicators of educational handicaps for African Americans in the U.S. are many and striking and go all the way back to performance in grade school on up to scores on national tests of scholastic aptitude. African Americans do not enter colleges or universities in proportions that reflect their proportions in the general population. A university like Berkeley can attract and admit African-American students at higher rates than their proportion in the California population, but nationally, despite many academic and financial support efforts on the part of these colleges, only about 7 percent of college and university enrollments are African American,

¹⁹National Science Foundation, *Women and Minorities in Science and Engineering* (January 1990), Table 47, p. 151.

as compared to their 12 percent proportion of the population. This represents a huge improvement over the terribly low numbers before the racial revolution of the 1960s, but, sad to say, that figure of 7 percent has not changed much in the past 15 years and indeed has declined somewhat for young African-American men.

Moreover, African Americans are far more likely to drop out of college before graduation, and those who do graduate are much less likely to go on to graduate school than their white counterparts.

All of this may help explain something of the near-desperate efforts American colleges and research universities have been making to enroll African-American undergraduates, hoping that some will do well, gain entry to graduate studies and that perhaps some growing fraction of those will opt for a career in science or scholarship, while still others will enter both old and new professions, thus providing leadership not only to these institutions but to the African-American community at large.

American universities, and not least those in California, have been making great efforts to identify talented minority youngsters at the secondary and even primary levels and have encouraged and sponsored those individuals for university entry. In these and related ways, American higher education has become a part, indeed a central part, of a national effort to transform African Americans from a racial caste into an ethnic group. A caste, of course, is a social category in which membership defines an individual's life fate permanently, even more rigidly than that of class, while membership in an ethnic group in the American context says something about an individual's origins but in principle does not define or limit present or future prospects. The nature and strength of an individual's connections with an ethnic group are, in principle, voluntary; one may use them as an aid to individual advancement, but those ties need not be a hindrance to personal achievement. The reality behind these norms, of course, varies. It is great for most European ethnic groups, more problematical for, say, recent Mexican immigrants and most troublesome for African Americans. Since World War II, to be treated as an ethnic rather than a racial group has become an increasing reality for most people of Asian origins, both recent immigrants and the children of earlier immigrants. There is remarkably little racial prejudice today against Asian Americans of any kind.²⁰ Racial identity is still a handicap for African Americans—although less so for middle-class, well-educated members than for the less well-educated. Thus, education is still the quickest road to ethnic status for African Americans.

²⁰Instances of "Japan-bashing" and several violent attacks against Asian Americans as reported in the press in 1992 are deplorable but do not invalidate my general point about the acceptance of Asian Americans into American society.

The nation's preference for ethnic rather than racial identities and relations is clear historically. The United States, on the whole, has not had an enviable record in race relations. On the other hand, it has had a comparatively good record on ethnic relations, starting with the assimilation and integration of peoples from all over the world to a common, overriding identity as Americans. Scholars still argue whether the metaphor of the "melting pot" is the best way to describe this process, or whether some other term is necessary to describe the nature and mechanisms of this process. Whatever they decide, in the United States, Protestants and Catholics of Irish origins live peacefully side by side, as do Jews and Arabs and Maronite Christians, Turks and Armenians, and so on. A multi-ethnic society is our model of a good society; it encompasses the possibility of continuing strong *voluntary* cultural ties to one's ethnic origins. And the historical images of the mobility of whole ethnic groups reflect the parallel mobility of their *individual* members. We have watched these mobility patterns over two, three, four and more generations, with the first poor immigrants from an ethnic group coming in at the bottom of the social and economic ladder, living usually in ethnic enclaves (sometimes miscalled ghettos), speaking the mother tongue and striving to advance their children's opportunities. The next generation tends to get more education and then to move out of those neighborhoods into whatever suburb of American life the individual's ambition, talent and achievement will allow. The ethnic ties may remain strong into the third and even fourth generation, but usually only when these ties aid rather than hinder individual mobility.

This is of course a greatly oversimplified model of reality, but not too far from popular image and sentiment. In some sense, for Americans, this is the way things are supposed to be. To some important extent, the racial revolution of the sixties, the enormous changes in law and the parallel changes in sentiment and institutional behavior have brought American blacks into this model. The 1960s also gave to African Americans the political and social freedom (and to some extent the economic affluence) of a rising ethnic group rather than that of a low and despised caste, while permitting up to half or two thirds to move into the mainstream of American life. Perhaps a third live middle-class lives (i.e., have careers as opposed to jobs), and perhaps half are in reasonably stable working-class occupations. But somewhere between 15 percent and 25 percent of African Americans (2 to 3 percent of the whole American population) comprise an underclass, living mostly in the central cities, caught in a morass of problems: crime, alcoholism, drugs, the collapse of family ties and responsibility, child and spousal abuse and welfare dependency. These are the things that constitute the greatest problem facing American society; thus far we have been conspicuously unsuccessful in our approaches to it and to them.

For the rest of the African-American population, movement is visible and appreciable, if too slow. It may be reasonably fast by the standards, say, of the Irish in America in the 1860s, or the Italians in the 1920s. But that rate of change is not acceptable by or for African Americans in the 1990s, both because of the special guilt regarding them in the U.S. and also because of the heightened standards regarding the rights and opportunities due all citizens. Moreover, African Americans also point out that they are not new immigrants but have been in America as a group longer than most white ethnic groups and all Asians.

Nevertheless, affirmative action throughout American life, but most especially in higher education, is a conscious effort to accelerate the transformation of African Americans as a whole from a racial into an ethnic group, and to accelerate their mobility as an ethnic group by accelerating their mobility as individuals upward through American society. Looked at another way, it is an effort to accomplish for African Americans in one generation what may have taken two generations for Irish or Swedish Americans, and perhaps three for Italian and Polish Americans. It is, in short, a set of policies designed to improve the opportunities for individual members of racial and ethnic groups towards whom we as a society feel especially guilty. These efforts are made by many social institutions, not just government, to improve life chances and to enable the disadvantaged to rise in the society, with a common goal being for some significant proportion of African Americans to take their places in leadership positions in all the social institutions.

The final irony is that policies designed to improve and thus equalize life chances for disadvantaged individuals may, by the very character of the enormous advantages they carry for designated ethnic and racial groups, be creating status groups whose members, and especially whose leaders, have more to gain through emphasizing their group memberships than by asserting their independence of group ties. These patterns, and their associated ideological claims and assertions, point to a new kind of permanent, racially based group identity, that differs from the old in being voluntary and privileged rather than involuntary and disadvantaged.

These new claims to racial identity and cultural autonomy involve stronger horizontal bondings than do most class-based institutions, such as trade unions or socialist parties. Unlike working-class identification, "race consciousness" does not inhibit or discourage college attendance but is brought onto the campuses by the next generation of minority groups themselves. It is clear that the assertion of the primacy of racial identity for most Blacks and Hispanics arises out of a shared life experience; it is not so clear that it anticipates a shared life fate. That poses a special challenge to minority group leadership, which has to struggle against the corrosive effect on the primacy of racial identity posed by an institution that in principle is indifferent to it and that prepares people for life in a competitive world that

is also, and increasingly, indifferent to racial identity. The intense efforts currently being made to rationalize and reinforce the primacy of racial identity in the colleges and universities where the future leadership of racial groups is being educated and prepared—by "multiculturalism" in the curriculum and social segregation outside the classroom—attests to the sharp tensions created by these new forms of horizontal bonding in institutions that have led society in throwing them off. The danger is that the new conceptions of permanent and self-conscious racial groups may be no more assimilable to the classic models of an ethnically diverse society of individual careers and achievement than the old caste groups. This raises many more questions for higher education, but at the least suggests that public policies often have perverse and unintended effects, sometimes generating new problems as great as the ones they overcome. But higher education in America has already had some experience with those ironies of history and public policy.

A Dialogue with California

A. H. Halsey

I have been a California watcher for forty years, and for the past four years I have visited this western extremity of the First World under OECD auspices to survey, to write about and to discuss the relations between higher education, the economy and society. At Professor Sheldon Rothblatt's request, I now write this recapitulatory essay with particular reference to the critical essays by Californians included in this volume but also to the essays and speeches made at a *Conversazione* in Berkeley in the spring of 1990. My comments have the advantage of both hindsight and further discussions with Professor Rothblatt and his colleagues during a visit to the Center for Studies in Higher Education at the University of California, Berkeley, in November 1991.

THE BERKELEY CONVERSAZIONE

In the spring of the year following the OECD meeting in Paris, we had a kind of return match at Berkeley in May 1990. In Paris the California delegation faced not so much the Examiners as the assembled delegates of the twenty OECD countries with all their politeness and protocols, their simultaneous translations and their preoccupations with the relation between the educational systems (enterprises, structures, administration and all the polysyllables of international diplomatic exchange). Now we were playing a much more domestic game. People from the "segments" of Californian higher education replaced the international delegates as the main body of a more relaxed seminar in California, of California and for California. Californian English and social science became the medium of exchange. Practical, "no nonsense" public policy analysis dominated the agenda. Europe and the old world retreated somewhat to an amiable but relatively remote distance. Whereas in Paris, Americans were more than usually

conscious of the community of higher education, especially the historically common origin of the "four years institutions" (the medieval European University and the Germany research heritage), now in Berkeley awareness of difference became prominent. The question of whether Californian development constitutes a model for OECD futures was not ignored. Indeed Professor Burton Clark conclusively offered "no" as an answer while others, out of diffidence or sensitivity to the perils of California's own future, in effect invited the visitors to refuse to take "yes" for an answer.

I was fascinated by the change of mood: a response to the papers by Clark Kerr, Pat Callan, Bob Clark and Martin Trow may therefore be usefully added to my retrospect on the Paris "confrontation" meeting provided earlier in this volume.

President Clark Kerr

It was highly appropriate that Clark Kerr, who was President of the University of California before the formulation of the Master Plan, should have taken a major part in our conversations. In 1990 he was elegantly at pains to de-mythologize the story of 1960. A plain American come to do a job of work was how he preferred to remember his role in the original Californian commission. Treaty between hard-headed spokesmen for competing, legitimate, but different interests was the fortunate outcome, avoiding a nightmare of under-funded chaos rather than elaborating a dream or unfolding an Olympian blueprint for the educational development of all nations. It was a practical exercise in parochial politics, not a pace-setting venture into mass or universal higher education.

In one sense Kerr's account is endearingly preposterous. He is no plain American, and many of the other parties to the treaty were also educationists, politicians or administrators of high distinction. Kerr himself is after all the author of *The Uses of the University*, the Godkin Lectures of 1963 delivered at Harvard, which clearly broke new ground in the international conception of the possibilities of a fully modern system of higher education. One only has to think of the contrasted reception of Kerr's with Flexner's earlier message of the 1930s in *Universities: American, English, German* to realize that an entirely new "idea of the university" had been born. Flexner was urging the USA to follow the model of English Oxbridge restriction. Kerr simply described the multiversity, pointed to its comprehensive affinity with advanced industrial society, and left it to make its own persuasive way through the international world. No wonder then that Flexner was forgotten while Kerr's book was a constant reference source for the European progressives in education who had adopted the slogan of "doubling in the decade" and for the Pacific Rim countries who saw that economic growth necessarily presupposed a vast development of education and training beyond school.

In another and equally obvious sense the former President was "telling it like it is." Californian development is characteristically pragmatic—the outcome of individual enterprise, mediated from time to time, and usually reluctantly, by collective agreement which is embarrassed to call itself planning. The Plan after all, is what defines an underdeveloped or a communist country. It was not at all that Kerr was unaware of the need for firm definition of the sphere and function of the university, the state colleges and the junior (community) colleges or of the immediate pressures of immigration and natural increase that might easily engulf the campuses and colleges. He assumed something like a transition from mass to universal higher education but wore this theoretical clothing lightly and concentrated on the exigencies of short-term survival. There was in any case also a felt threat to the autonomy of higher education in its three state and one private sectors. Legislative activity and power might subjugate educational autonomy to the political process. So suspicion of Sacramento added urgency to the task of treaty-making between the sectors. Reading Kerr's reflections from thirty years on, this passion for autonomy has undiminished echoes and, I would suggest, tends towards defining OECD as a latter day super-Sacramento and super-Washington that might be yet another agent of political bureaucracy liable to stifle the grass-roots sources of vitality on which Californian education essentially depends.

Yet in a third sense the President is again mistaken. He was, despite contradictory affirmation, dreaming the Californian dream. True he was sleep walking, as practical reformers habitually do. But the Californian dream was his inheritance from older American commitment to Jeffersonian equality of opportunity, to Benjamin Franklin's insistence on "useful knowledge," to John Maynard Keynes' balanced economy and to James Madison's vision of power shared between relatively autonomous institutions. The Californian dream is a vigorous variant of that wider and deeper philosophy of the good society. If it is relatively unselfconscious this is because swift social change promotes problem-solving practicality rather than academic and theoretical contemplation. The latter luxury is more sumptuously available to an OECD Examiner, especially thirty years later. But its principles, as Kerr himself indicates, guided the practical action of men and women under the pressure of present circumstance.

Burton Clark

Professor Clark was asked to address himself to the question of the exportability of the Californian system to other OECD countries. He is skeptical to the point of rejecting the possibility of such an international transfer. To make his case he believes that the original analysis offered by the Examiners has to be amplified in two directions—to bring back the nation and the local unit so as to expose the dynamics of a vast, decentralized

system. It is for others, not me, to judge the deficiency of the Examiners' *Review* in these two respects. Certainly Clark's own description of what he insists is a "bottom-up" system of higher education is completely persuasive. He brings out admirably its five primary characteristics: large size (3,500 institutions of virtually infinite variety); extreme diversity; radical decentralization; intense competition; and a high degree of institutional initiative. Few will quarrel with these distinguishing features of both American and Californian arrangements. The question is rather how much these attributes are weaker or even absent from the systems of other OECD countries. I would suggest that he exaggerates both the historical and contemporary differences. Thus, for example, it is misleading to suggest that England had only two places in the first half of the nineteenth century, Oxford and Cambridge, while America was developing hundreds of colleges by local initiative. On American definitions there were dozens of English and Scottish foundations at that time, including four (or five) ancient Scottish universities and Durham, as well as the mechanics institutes and Nonconformist academies. The point is that they were obscured by the fame and magic of the ancient English colleges and lacked the fervent support of local communities and national elites which was so marked a feature of the American continent. And the first industrial nation did not share the faith of the first new nation in the power of formal education either as an engine of industrial advance or as a redemptive instrument of cultural modernization. What is more spectacularly different is the British and European trust in the benevolent potential and social responsibility of the State compared with the preference of the Americans for market solutions. It is market competition as opposed to aristocratic patronage that informs the contrasted paths of development on the two sides of the Atlantic.

At the same time it is of importance to exact understanding that, rhetoric and culture notwithstanding, we keep in view the central role of the State in the funding and fostering of education in all countries, including the United States of America. In the 1980s economic liberal ideas have notably increased their influence on both public and private institutions including hospitals, insurance schemes, public utilities and prisons as well as schools and colleges. These trends towards privatization, with their most spectacular eruption into the political economies of eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union since 1989, are in effect an assimilation of social and educational organization in these countries to the model of American society. They have, incidentally, dated the classification of the political economies of education which I extracted from the literature to form a context for the examination of California in that year. The "command economy" end of the spectrum has virtually passed into history. Yet the importance of State activity in education remains paramount. Thus any appraisal of California has to include competition for the federal dollar in the conduct of research activities, and the funding activities of the Californian State Legislature have

to be seen as an essential political underpinning of the competitive effort of the Californian Higher Education business. Viewed from that angle, President David Gardner and the leaders of the State University sector and the presidents and chancellors of the individual public and private universities and colleges are both businessmen and politicians. What makes their dual role distinctive is that they are also guardians of the autonomy and academic integrity of their several institutions. And it is the effectiveness with which they play that distinctive part that gives us the key to understanding the character and powerful dynamic of the "bottom-up" system that might, in some form, be exported to other quarters of the world.

It is not, or at least not only, that competition is absent in Europe. Hunting for funds in the private sector, though primitive in its organization by comparison with Harvard or Stanford or UCLA, is now an established feature of the European scene. Competitive entry to different universities and colleges has traditionally been organized in Europe through both the State and the market. An intriguing object of speculation for the future is the growth of European Community funds—a nascent United States of Europe—which might play a parallel role to that of the federal government in Washington and induce politically backed competition for European federal funds among the member states of the European Community. An "American" future for Europe may already be in the making, with or without conscious attempts to transpose the lessons of California. The underlying dynamic, I believe, is the logic of mass higher education. Its structure is inevitably shaped by the history of each country and the assumptions about the nature of higher education that are embodied in its institutions. Variations in the forms of competition illustrate both the force of history and the easily unforeseen consequences of simplistic administrative borrowing. The lessons of California are accordingly more the opportunity to be sophisticated by close attention to the experience of an alternative human laboratory.

Patrick Callan

Patrick Callan's caustic essay on the frailty of the Californian Master Plan still further reinforces my feeling that the difference and distance from Sacramento to London or Brussels is rather overestimated by Bob Clark. He puts emphasis on the bias towards aggregation when the State controls; but surely recent movements contain the tendency towards disaggregation through market forces and the distinctive feature, at least of the British case, is that governmental action is directed towards the creation of markets or quasi-markets, for example in the use of the "customer-contract" principle of research funding. The realization of the ideals of wide and equal access turn everywhere and increasingly on the use of political-administrative skill. A great feature of the California Master Plan was the negotiation, legislation

and preservation of separate missions for the segments of higher education—a politically sanctioned restriction of the market that is possibly more secure in California than in Europe. But it is precisely at this point that Callan is most critical and gloomy about the Californian prospect.

His gloom has been further justified by subsequent events. The economic recession has continued to plague Californian efforts to go on with educational expansion. In 1991 it became increasingly clear that the capacity of the state to meet rising demands for expenditure is threatened in the remaining years of this century by a growing gap between those demands and the tax revenues that are currently forecast. An alarming analysis was published by the State's Department of Finance in November 1991 and still more alarmingly publicized by *The New York Times* under the headline "Amid Cuts, California is Curtailing College Dreams." The essence of the financial report is that, even assuming normal recovery from the current slump, California faces a deteriorating ratio of taxpayers to "tax receivers" throughout the 1990s because of rapidly growing numbers of dependents at both extremes of the age spectrum. Immigration and a recent surge in fertility have driven up the number of children; low birth rates in the 1960s and 1970s together with out-migration of the high earning 45 to 64 age group has slowed down the growth of the working population.

To the extent that these demographic trends continue, California faces continuing budgetary difficulties. No matter how strong its economic recovery, the state will not be able to fund existing programs at current levels within projected tax revenues. With rapidly increasing case loads, the imbalance between taxpayers and tax receivers could result in a \$20 billion budget gap in the year 2000.¹

It is rather that the structure of competition is different (and also differs between the European countries). We can bring out the transatlantic difference by contrasting the USA and the UK. American higher education is market-driven conspicuously at two points—student entry and faculty recruitment. American student consumer sovereignty is aided by modular courses, credit transfer and electives. Traditionally the British universities have been a State-regulated and unitary system aided by totally defined degree courses for three year, full-time undergraduates, not transferable between institutions. Entry has been a national competition at exit from secondary schools and a further national competition for a class of degree standardized nationally by the system of external examining. In both systems the agent of competition has been the individual, but in America the arena of competition has been the college while in Britain it has been the nation.

¹*The New York Times* (November 10, 1991).

Similarly for academic staff America has run an elaborate market (with Michaelmas fairs reminiscent of the hiring of shepherds and servants in agrarian England) while Britain, especially since World War II, has had in effect a State bureaucracy with a rigid age-wage national salary scale. The British, and indeed the European systems generally, are moving towards the American market system. But meanwhile the differences tell us a great deal about the values that underlie two different organizations of higher education. Bureaucracy is combatted in America primarily by reliance on "exit," i.e., use of the market. In Britain more reliance is put on "voice," i.e., there is more academic self-government, especially in Oxford and Cambridge. And a further consequence is greater institutional loyalty. Such are the pros and cons of market and State organization. With respect to competition in research, it must be recognized that reputation is just as ferociously sought in Europe as in America. The management of a market for research funds by the State is becoming an increasingly prominent feature of arrangements on both sides of the Atlantic.

Vulnerable California programs include higher education. Already all three state segments of higher education have suffered budget cuts with consequential freezes of faculty salary, elimination of classes, worsening staff-student ratios and raised student fees. The promised tenth campus of the University of California has been postponed. President Gardner, in effect reiterating his previous remarks in Paris, told the Regents in October 1991 that admission standards might have to be raised to cut enrollments with the anticipated consequence of heightened ethnic tension if Asians and whites are refused admission to preserve the affirmative action program in favor of African Americans and Hispanics. In short the Master Plan which legislated the Californian dream is patently at risk.

Callan points to the evidence of poor state leadership, weak bureaucracy and adversary relations between collegiate and state authority in a "post-Proposition 13 era . . . increasingly dominated by the state." He deplores the fact and cannot explain why "California has had so little success in developing effective mechanisms of governance over the last three decades." He suspects that politicization "saps the energy and willingness of boards and administrators to take the initiatives and risks that are the essence of leadership." In consequence he is far from sanguine about the capacity of California to solve its urgent problems of rising demand for enrollment, falling supply of funds and shortage of qualified higher education staff. So one plausible interpretation of his remarks is that if there is a Californian model to export it has to be different in the 1990s than it was in the 1960s. No doubt this is true. Progress cannot be merely extrapolation of past policies. But more fundamentally I think that what Callan is raising is the abiding question of how politics and enterprise can interact to maximize educational quality under new political and economic conditions. Putting the problem in that way permits the possibility of a reverse flow of lessons

from Europe and/or Japan to California. Even so I believe that the Master Plan is unlikely to become an antiquity but, on the contrary, to remain a principled guide. That guide, we should note, is not unequivocally an instruction simply to go on expanding. It also contains a traditionally "European" lesson—that higher education standards in both teaching and research must be maintained. So it was that in Paris both the President of the University and the Chancellor of the State University affirmed that, if forced by economic recession or failing financial support, the universities would choose quality rather than quantity, thus presumably shifting the burden of response to popular demand out of their two segments onto the private colleges and the community colleges. Incidentally we should note here that, quite apart from the priority given at present to affirmative action on behalf of certain minorities and other social groups, because the Californian four segments are not, in fact, fully autonomous, a pure meritocracy can never emerge. Again, we see here a commonality of commitment of American and European educational leadership with an ironically converging trend—the Europeans for the time being more sensitive to the need to take in greater numbers, the Americans more anxious to preserve the traditional meaning of higher education.

Martin Trow

Martin Trow challenges the Examiners' Report at a quite different level. Kindly and correctly he appreciates that my own contribution to the analysis proceeds from a position in political and social philosophy—the standpoint of an English ethical socialist—which is different from his own commitment as an American liberal. His essay is an elegant reaffirming statement of the view he shares with many Americans of the dynamics that underlie the expansive centrality of education in the search for our common goals of prosperity and freedom. He is surely right in distinguishing between two different philosophies and in separating both from Marxism, especially in its orthodox historicist form. He and I do differ, not with respect to the value of freedom nor as to our rejection of Marxist historicism as its most potent enemy in recent history, but rather with respect to both our conceptions of equality and the means of its attainment through collective action. It is not clear to me how far we differ if at all, on the third of the trilogy of western social values—fraternity or solidarity—but there can be no doubt that he sees the underlying (and for me logically anterior) idea of *koinonia* as one with radically different origins in America compared with European experience. For me fraternity or solidarity is rooted in an ancient Judaic-Christian collectivist conscience. From the Pauline premise that we "are all members one of another" flows the inference that equality and sensitivity to the freedom of others must be the central guide for personal action and public policy. Thus the horizontal bonds to which Trow refers are the fundamentals

of good society as well as the model of an always improvable person, and it is the task of education to bind the individual into these collective as well as personal goals. Tom Joad's notion of individual and collective consciousness is that of the European socialist; Trow's alternative script is that of the American liberal, and the idea of educational policy that is to be derived from the two starting points is radically different.

For me also as a Briton the contextual assumptions are made that class is a divisive force against the integrating influence of citizenship and that the state is a relatively benign and reasonably uncorrupt instrument of democratic will. For Martin Trow the binding force of society is ambition tolerated between free individuals. Social consensus relies on shared hope for the future rather than on sad lessons from the past. And the State is more suspect than the market as an instrument for delivering human preferences.

More specifically, Trow argues three propositions. First, that American ambition shaped by American liberalism enjoins the individual to rise out of, not with, his class. Second, that class analysis of education is of dubious relevance to the Californian case and is in any case not empirically possible. Third, that the equivalent to European guilt about class inequality is, in America, race or ethnicity.

I would want to weaken all three of these propositions, arguing instead that Europe and America are more alike than they suggest and still more that the two continents are converging. American exceptionalism is a time-honored but nonetheless unproven thesis. True that neither Steinbeck's *Grapes of Wrath*, nor any other work of fact or fiction, will ever destroy the historical truth that America never had a coherent working-class movement. But the knowledge we have of comparative social mobility, whether in the older and cruder measures offered by Seymour Martin Lipset and Reinhard Bendix and their associates² or in the more recent and highly sophisticated work of their successors, Otis Dudley Duncan, Beverly Duncan, Robert M. Hauser, David L. Featherman, Michael Hout and Donald J. Treiman, as well as the European class analysts associated with the CASMIN (Comparative Analysis of Social Mobility in Industrial Nations) group at Mannheim, lends no support to the idea that *relative* individual intergenerational mobility rates are higher in the USA than in Europe. The modern social scientific consensus is, to use Robert Erikson's and John Goldthorpe's forthcoming title, one of *Constant Flux*. In the sense of relative mobility America is an open society but no more so than the western or eastern European countries. The differences, and they exist within Europe as well as between Europe and America, stem from differences in the development of the occupational structure of distinct industrialisms, not from differences

²*Social Mobility in Industrial Societies* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1959).

in the openness or fluidity of these societies. There are, in other words, historically determined differences in *absolute* rates of mobility but a commonality of underlying mobility regimes as revealed by comparison of *relative* mobility rates.

As to educational equality of opportunity, there are again intercountry variations. But the essential differences stem from different patterns of recruitment to jobs or careers at any given level of educational qualification. Perhaps the most important research finding here is that of Hout³ showing that the tie between socio-economic origins and destinations weakened in America by one third between 1972 and 1985 and that this trend is related to the proportion of workers who are college or university graduates. The older assumption that class origin influences job destination irrespective of educational qualification is now seen to be false in the case of degree holders.

Thus the Californian program of college expansion appears to be a powerful engine of what Europeans used to call "class abatement." Nevertheless, important as these shifts in class structure are in their implications for the openness of society and the use of educational policy for equalization of opportunity, they are emphatically not a demonstration of the irrelevance of class. Class stratification exists or does not exist independently of whether the Californian state collects statistics about it, whether or not sociologists can agree about its measurement and whether or not the citizenry feels guilty about it. Certainly ethnic guilt is a distinctive American social sentiment (and one cannot but be amazed that Harriet Beecher Stowe's *Uncle Tom* ever became a term of abuse—there is surely no more dramatic case of the triumph of particularistic over universalistic morality). Yet it is surely significant that the current right-wing attack on affirmative action in the form of D'Souza's *Illiberal Education*⁴ repeatedly insists that poverty rather than color must be the legitimate claim to affirmative support from the State.

Nor is the USA different from other OECD countries in its record of achieving relative equality of income distribution whether through educational or other social policies. The USA is a country of high relative income inequality. The shape of class stratification has and will alter, but we have no grounds on which to declare its premature demise.

Fact and ideology are at odds here. Why? It is partly a difference of cultural tradition: Europeans tend to hide while Americans proclaim their upward ascents. But it is also true that Trow overstates the difference in attitudes to education. Social elevation through education has always been

³"More Universalism, Less Structural Mobility: The American Occupational Structure in the 1980s," *American Journal of Sociology*, 93 (May 1988), 1358-1400.

⁴Dinesh D'Souza, *Illiberal Education* (New York, 1991).

recognized on both sides of the Atlantic as an individual phenomenon (social mobility, incidentally, has been greater in the "class ridden" British islands than in France or Germany). It is an intrinsically vertically rather than horizontally bonding experience as Trow remarks. I would add that this individualized opportunity structure is probably growing faster in Europe than in America. There is convergence.

Educational reform, so vigorously publicized by OECD, has led the European countries towards raised popular aspirations for the education of their children. In the past the management of ambition has been markedly different on the two sides of the Atlantic. American cheerfulness has vastly encouraged educational aspiration. First the comprehensive secondary or high school and, since World War II, the college has been made the normal popular prize of American citizenship, and the consequences for the idea of higher education in terms of its admission standards and curriculum have been but lightly regarded. A much looser connection of education to the occupational hierarchy has been an accepted feature of the economic order. The higher educational institutions have been great social integrators of American life with both the towering secular cathedrals of Harvard, Chicago and Berkeley as well as the modest chapels of a thousand community colleges and two thousand four-year institutions offering collectively virtually universal hospitality to any conceivable liberal or vocational study. In Europe by contrast the hierarchy of institutions has been tightly held in a straitjacket of class stratification. Education has been tied to strongly defined and class-linked styles of life. Mobility through education has been, in Ralph Turner's distinction, sponsored from early selection in contrast to the American structure of contest with its second, third and *n*th chances. Hence among many other things, the uniquely American phenomenon of the community college: and the American process identified by Burton Clark of "cooling out."

Today it all seems to be changing and converging as educational expansion becomes globalized. The European countries are in process of relaxing the definition of a university, inventing the equivalent of community colleges in two-year institutions like the French IUTs, calling British polytechnics universities and developing many new vocational, short cycle, part-time courses in such institutions as the Open University.

This convergence is another facet of the Americanization of Europe. The final question is then whether it also spells the end of class society. Trow seems to suggest that it does. California legislators do not demand class equality of access, and Californian statisticians do not collect figures on the class composition of different student bodies. But surely this does not dispose of the problem. Subjective perceptions of class may be looser, less pervasive and linked in more complicated connection to race and ethnicity in America compared with Europe. But the objectivity of power and advantage remains. European class consciousness may be different—though

here too there is clear evidence of change, not least the dramatic re-emergence of ethnic consciousness in western as well as eastern Europe. Nevertheless, for all their cultural emphasis on individualism, Americans are also class conscious and also aware of the (Weberian) class implications of different educational levels and pathways. As Jackman and Jackman summarize their study of Class Awareness in the United States:

Our results offer no support for the often-heard claim that the United States is a classless society. Nor do we find evidence that America is a society where class conflict is undermined by crosscutting affiliations and loyalties. On the other hand, the structure of subjective class does not conform to the dominant analytic formulations of class. Subjective classes do not capture a single distinction between owners and workers, between those with and those without authority, or between manual and white-collar workers. . . . Evidence throughout the book supports our view that social life is organized into a graded series of groups that behave like Weberian status groups but which have their basis in configurations of socioeconomic criteria.

These groups we call social classes.⁵

And with particular reference to the mission of the community college, the American case is summarized by Brint and Karabel:

What the junior college vanguard and their successors proposed to these students was, in effect, that they renounce their goal of gaining access to the higher rungs of the occupational ladder in exchange for short-range mobility and the security of stable employment in middle-level jobs. By offering vocationalization as a solution to the problem of the gap between the aspirations of junior college students and the opportunities available to them, community college administrators were pursuing their own organizational interests in finding a distinctive function and a secure market niche for their institutions. But they were also, it must be stressed, expressing a genuine concern for the welfare of the large numbers of students who entered the community college only to emerge with neither the credits necessary for transfer nor any marketable skills. If this dilemma continues to be with us, it is because it is woven into the fabric of a society that is striving still to reconcile the democratic promise of

⁵Mary R. and Robert W. Jackman, *Class Awareness in the United States* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1989), 216-217.

upward mobility through education with the stubborn reality of a class structure with limited room at the top.⁶

In short the relevance of class, freed from any assumption of the Marxist theory of history, remains essential to an understanding of education in an advanced industrial society. Martin Trow raises the fundamental question of horizontal bonding in such a society. In California this form of integration has instead its brave attempt at multicultural society through basic universalization of educational opportunity. Yet, as Trow emphasizes, in campus practice ethnic identity through separate group experience and learning is fundamentally inconsistent with its ideal of an individualized claim to occupational and other life-chances for which education is its publicly offered preparation. I fully share his vision and his fear. Ethnic division would undermine California and American solidarity. And so too, I believe, could class. So I would insist that *koinonia* must remain the yardstick of the good society with class as well as race as its still powerful and potent sources of social division.

⁶Steven Brint and Jerome Karabel, *The Diverted Dream, Community Colleges and the Provision of Educational Opportunity in America, 1900-1985* (New York, 1989), 213.

Conversazione Conference *Participants*

Clark Kerr Campus
University of California, Berkeley
May 21-22, 1990

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Professor Paul Alpers, English, and Director, Townsend Center for the Humanities, UC Berkeley

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- Mr. Patrick Callan, former Vice President, Education Commission of the States
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- Mr. Stephen Mello, Education, UC Berkeley
- Associate Dean Margarita Melville, Graduate Division, UC Berkeley
- Ms. Irene Meneges, Learning Center, Diablo Valley College
- Dr. Karen Merritt, Director, Planning & Program Review, Office of the Senior Vice President, Academic Affairs, UC
- Chancellor David Mertes, California Community Colleges
- Mr. Larry Miller, Education, UC Berkeley
- President Myrna Miller, College of Marin
- Associate Vice President Calvin Moore, Academic Affairs, UC
- Mr. Jim Moore, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary, Office of Postsecondary Education, U. S. Department of Education
- Dr. William Moore, President, Association of Independent California Colleges and Universities
- Ms. Elizabeth Morse, History, UC Berkeley
- Dr. Jane Moorman, Director, Counseling Center, UC Berkeley
- Professor Michio Nagai, Chairman, International House of Japan, Inc., and formerly of the United Nations University, Tokyo
- Dr. Maresi Nerad, Research Coordinator, Office of the Dean of Graduate Division, UC Berkeley
- Ms. Suzanne Ness, Senior Associate/Government Relations, EIP Associates
- Ms. Colleen Nickles, Project Specialist, Office of the Treasurer of the Regents, UC
- Dr. Thorsten Nybom, Director, Research Council for Higher Education, Swedish National Board of Universities and Colleges, Stockholm
- Dr. Kenneth B. O'Brien, Executive Director, California Postsecondary Education Commission
- President Cornelius Oomen, Leiden University, The Netherlands
- Dr. Karen Padget, Director, California Policy Seminar, UC Berkeley
- Dr. George Papadopoulos, Deputy Director for Education, Directorate for Social Affairs, Manpower & Education, OECD, Paris
- Ms. Leann Parker, Coordinator, Intersegmental Policies & Projects, Office of the Associate Vice President, Educational Relations, UC
- Dr. Richard Peterson, Educational Testing Service
- Associate Vice President William Pickens, Finance, California State University, Sacramento
- Dean Karl S. Pister, Engineering, UC Berkeley
- Professor Nelson W. Polsby, Political Science, and Director, Institute of Governmental Studies, UC Berkeley

- Mr. A. Alan Post, former Legislative Analyst, California Legislative Budget Committee
- Dr. Margaret Race, Assistant Dean for Planning, College of Natural Resources, UC Berkeley
- Professor Austin Ranney, Political Science, UC Berkeley
- Professor Emeritus Theodore Reller, Education, UC Berkeley
- Mr. Lorenzo Rodriguez Durantez, former Deputy Director, Ministry of Education & Science, Madrid, Spain
- Acting Dean William Rohwer, Education, UC Berkeley
- President D. Candy Rose, Contra Costa College
- Professor Sheldon Rothblatt, History and Acting Director, Center for Studies in Higher Education, UC Berkeley
- Mrs. Janet Ruyle, Assistant Director, Center for Studies in Higher Education, UC Berkeley
- Dean William Sadler, Academic Affairs, Holy Names College
- President Linda Salter, Skyline College
- Mr. Louis Schell, Director of Access, Cooperative College Preparatory Program, Lawrence Hall of Science, UC Berkeley
- Mr. Henry Schott, Peralta Community College District
- Ms. Diane Scott-Summers, Assistant Dean of Instruction, Evening and Summer Programs, Diablo Valley College
- Professor Raphael Sealey, History, UC Berkeley
- Dr. Lucy Sells, Consultant, Higher Education
- Professor Barbara Shapiro, Rhetoric, UC Berkeley
- Professor Philip Siegelman, Political Science, San Francisco State University
- Dr. Maria Slowey, Head of POLYLINK, Centre for External Relations and Continuing Education, Newcastle upon Tyne Polytechnic, England
- Vice Chancellor John M. Smart, University Affairs, California State University
- Ms. Doris S. Smith, Assistant Director, Human and Community Programs, Division of Agriculture & Natural Resources, UC
- Dr. Robert Smithwick, Trustee, Foothill-DeAnza Community College District
- Dr. Katrin Spinetta, Director, Research and Planning, Peralta Community College District
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- Mr. Uri Treisman, Associate Director, Professional Development Program, UC Berkeley
- Mrs. Katherine Trow, Project Director, Long-Term Effects of a Berkeley Experimental Program, Center for Studies in Higher Education, UC Berkeley
- Professor Martin A. Trow, Public Policy, UC Berkeley
- Dr. Barbara Turlington, Director, International Education, American Council on Education
- Professor Emeritus Joseph Tussman, Philosophy, UC Berkeley
- Mr. Charles Upshaw, Senior Administrative Analyst, Budget & Planning, UC Berkeley
- Mr. Kent Watson, Interactive Resources, Richmond
- Professor Melvin Webber, Institute of Urban and Regional Development, UC Berkeley
- Dr. Jane Wellman, Associate Director, California Postsecondary Education Commission
- Professor Harold Wilensky, Political Science, UC Berkeley
- Assistant Chancellor Olly Wilson, and Professor, Music, UC Berkeley
- Professor David Wilson, Political Science, UC Los Angeles
- Vice President David Wolf, Santa Rosa Junior College
- Ms. Sally B. Woodbridge, Architectural Historian
- Ms. Michele Woods-Jones, Staff Ombudsperson, UC Berkeley
- Academic Vice President Joe Zelan, John F. Kennedy University
- Professor William Zumeta, Graduate School of Public Affairs, University of Washington
- Dr. Ami Zusman, Principal Administrative Analyst, Office of the Senior Vice President, Academic Affairs, UC

The Master Plan has been called "The California Dream." We were not dreaming The California Dream; we were more trying to escape the nightmare that was otherwise facing us.

What we really were engaged in was negotiating a treaty among the constituent parts of higher education in California.

Clark Kerr

The California dream is a vigorous variant of that wider and deeper philosophy of the good society. Its principles guided the practical action of men and women under the pressure of present circumstance.

A. H. Halsey

The Master Plan contains evasions, myths and fictions. Indeed, by necessity, all cultures contain them. A typical "evasion" by Americans is to avoid advocating principles that make open, invidious distinctions.

Sheldon Rothblatt

The impressive accomplishments of the past thirty years do not assure the future viability of the policy framework set forth in the Master Plan. California appears on the verge of entering this era without a well-defined agenda, hoping to negotiate the decade of the 1990s by mechanistically replicating the policies of the 1960s.

Patrick Callan

Is California the model for OECD Futures? The answer is clearly "no." Even the relevance of California as a mirror for reflection, as a setting from which we can draw some lessons, depends on a tough-minded willingness to look at the pros and cons of the American system overall.

Burton Clark

Public policies often have perverse and unintended effects, sometimes generating new problems as great as the ones they overcome. But higher education in America has long had experience with those ironies of history and public policy.

Martin Trow

